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ALGERIA

Impact of New Soviet Military Supply Conditions

92AF0047A Paris LE MONDE in French 8 Oct 91 p 8

[Article by Georges Marion: "Moscow Refuses To Continue Supplying Military Equipment 'on Previous Terms'"]

[Text] The unrest shaking the USSR is being closely monitored by Algeria, which maintains important economic, political, and particularly military ties with the former fatherland of socialism. The Soviets are already expressing a change in attitude, claiming to be forced to reconsider the size of Algeria's debt and exact stricter terms, particularly insofar as weapons shipments are concerned.

On the heels of the abortive coup against Gorbachev, Algiers, which had refrained from any reaction during those difficult days, politely congratulated the Soviet president on the failure of the conspirators. It was a reaction visibly lacking in warmth compared with the emphatic speeches that not so long ago were the rule whenever there was any celebration of the friendship linking the two countries.

Officially speaking, relations between Moscow and Algiers have not deteriorated, but their mutual affection is visibly no longer the same.

Like many Arab countries, Algeria was caught off guard by the rapid changes that have occurred in East Europe, particularly the USSR, forcing it to question some of its most hallowed dogmas. Whether the war in the Gulf or the Palestinian issue, Algiers was slow to understand the change, not always concealing its disappointment. On the other hand, according to Alexandr Aksenyonok, Soviet ambassador to Algeria, the situation in the USSR no longer allows it to be sentimental or guided by "ideological criteria" in relations with Third [World] countries. Henceforth, business will be strictly on a cash basis.

This new approach affects all areas of Soviet-Algerian relations, including military, the most important of all. Led by many officers trained in the Soviet Union or former Warsaw Pact countries, the Algerian Army relies almost exclusively on Soviet equipment. A visible manifestation of this dependency, a third of all Soviet technicians now stationed in Algeria are involved in military cooperation, directly or indirectly. Some 4,500 Soviet citizens, men, women, and children, now reside in the country.

Burden of the Debt

According to the Soviet ambassador, his country's new guidelines should not affect this military cooperation with Algeria, which "is guided by a reasonable, balanced policy." Nevertheless, clouds do loom on the horizon of Algerian-Soviet relations. Like many Western nations,

Moscow, which is now experiencing a major economic and political crisis, is worrying about repayment of the Algerian debt, which it puts at some \$4 billion.

According to certain sources, 90 percent of this sum relates to military expenditures, a proportion not peculiar to Algeria inasmuch as, according to the Soviets themselves, 82 percent of all the money owed them by developing countries (except for Cuba, Vietnam, and Mongolia) is for military goods.

However, the Soviets now note, Algeria, which until 1986 paid for its purchases of weapons and equipment on time, has since then experienced difficulties honoring its commitments. Rescheduling agreements concluded between the two parties in 1987 and 1989 have apparently not ironed out difficulties. If one is to believe the Soviets, the Algerians have reportedly still not made the payment for the 1989-90 period, estimated at 500 million rubles. Under such conditions, Moscow says it can no longer continue deliveries "on previous terms." To what extent halting Soviet military shipments would affect the Algerian Army's capabilities is not known. Nor does anyone know whether other countries would be technically or financially capable of taking the defaulting supplier's place in the near future.

At the time of the meeting between the governments and parties on 30 July, Algerian Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghazali made brief reference—publicly for the first time—to the matter of the military debt, a substantial addition to the civilian debt of \$24 billion burdening his country (LE MONDE, 1 August 1991). And yet, the problem does not seem to be truly urgent. Unlike sums due on short terms to Western banks, the Algerian debt to the Soviet Union is stretched out until the year 2010, long enough for a reasonable solution to be found.

EGYPT

Open Border With Libya Sparks Commerce

91AA0629A Cairo AL-AHALLI in Arabic 21 Aug 91 p 7

[Article by Mahmud al-Hadri: "Fifty Pounds to Libya Instead of 400 Pounds Before Border Opening; New Measures To Protect National Industries in the Two Countries"]

[Text] The al-Sallum checkpoint at the Egyptian-Libyan border is experiencing unusual activity with regard to travel from Egypt into Libya, and vice versa. The experience of waiting that has prevailed for many years has changed. The traveler used to be forced to remain at the checkpoint for several nights until the passport, customs, and security activities were completed. With the opening of the border on 5 August 1991, the passport formalities have been limited to less than 400 non-Egyptian and non-Libyan travelers and emigrants daily, instead of the 7,000 per day before the border opening.

Over a five-day period, AL-AHALI monitored the traffic entering and exiting, as well as travel between the two countries, and closely followed the progress in the two countries from Cairo to Tubruq in order to ascertain the positive and negative results of the decision to open the border. Our object was to emphasize these aspects so that no cracks will appear and hinder the rapprochement between the two countries.

Speedier Travel, Less Cost

Traveling directly from Cairo to Tubruq takes between 10 and 12 hours, less than half the time before the border opening. The trip might take 15 hours to Banghazi by the coastal road. The border opening has freed up about 12 hours that the traveler used to be forced to spend at the al-Sallum checkpoint in passport, customs, and security formalities.

According to Major General Kamal Mansur, the governor of Marsa Matruh, Egyptian and Libyan citizens can have breakfast in Tubruq and dinner in Marsa Matruh, and then return again to Tubruq.

Idris Musa 'Abd-al-Rahman, secretary of the People's Conference in the town of Musa'id Yakfi, said that the citizens of Musa'id, Tubruq, Marsa Matruh, and al-Sallum are closely related. If they wished to visit their relatives before the border opening, it was like a trip around the Cape of Good Hope, taking several days to reach their relatives in al-Sallum or Musa'id, passing through Cyprus or Tunisia, despite the fact that the distance between the two countries was only 20 kilometers.

Since the border opening between Egypt and Libya, travel costs between the two countries have been reduced. The Egyptian citizen can go to Tubruq or Banghazi from Cairo or Alexandria for a cost of between 50 and 70 Egyptian pounds if he uses a direct means of transportation. Travel costs from Libya to Egypt—via the same means—range between 20 and 40 Libyan dinars. The Egyptian citizen used to be forced to spend approximately 400 pounds for that trip before the border opening.

With regard to beneficial advantages to the people of Marsa Matruh, Dr. 'Adil 'Abd-al-Karim, assistant secretary of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping [NPUG] in the governorate, said that this decision gave the people of Marsa Matruh exoneration from nine months imprisonment. This used to be imposed on them when they were caught slipping into Libyan territory to visit their relatives or to work, in light of the state of economic stagnation and unemployment from which the governorate has suffered for the many years that the border was closed. Opening the border was like a decision to abolish unemployment throughout Marsa Matruh.

Dr. 'Abd-al-Karim added that the NPUG party has always called for the creation of a new kind of integration between the two countries. Therefore, a regularized

form of border opening must be found, so that this decision will not be overturned someday.

Twenty-Four Hour Cities

When you pass through Sidi [Barani], al-Sallum, Musa'id, and Tubruq for the first time, you feel as if you were in new cities that do not sleep, and whose day goes for 24 hours in constant movement. Libyan goods are distributed in the streets of al-Sallum, Sidi Barani, and Marsa Matruh. The same thing happens with Egyptian goods in Libyan cities. The Libyan merchandise concentrates on food products and commodities such as rice, sugar, tea, corn oil, tomato sauce, soap, hair oils, and shampoo. These goods are sold at lower prices than their Egyptian counterparts. Libyan sugar is sold for 150 piasters per kilogram, compared with 160 for Egyptian sugar; corn oil for 275 piasters, compared with 450 piasters for the Egyptian brand; and a 450-gram can of sauce is sold for 125 piasters, which is 50 percent cheaper than the Egyptian brand.

Aside from those goods, reinforced iron is brought into Egypt in large quantities. Vehicles carrying scrap iron and copper have also begun to arrive in Egypt in large quantities, and their cargoes go to copper and iron smelting plants. Libyan metal and wooden desks are beginning to be seen on vehicles returning to Egypt. As for Egyptian goods reaching Libya, the majority are plastic products, such as mats and plates, in addition to cigarettes, mild tobacco, Ideal [brand] refrigerators, and livestock. Some types of fabrics, especially curtain and carpet material; certain chemical products, such as paint, cosmetics, and insecticides; and furniture are also included.

Ghazi 'Abd-al-Rahim, the owner of a Tubruq shop, told me that Egyptian goods are commonly seen in the Libyan market, and that sales will increase with time, since the Libyan market needs many commodities, such as automobile spare parts and chicken farm necessities.

Among the Egyptian goods that have begun to circulate in Libyan markets are empty egg cartons. On the road leading to Banghazi, trucks carrying piles of cartons are seen from time to time.

In a conversation with a senior Egyptian customs official, he said that Egyptian goods do not just go to Libyan cities, but reach other countries as well, such as Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania. This will achieve expanded growth for Egyptian goods, and will lead to stimulating Egyptian factories and companies.

First Decision Applied

Since the opening of the border at 1200 hours on 5 August 1991, the role of Ports and Passport Security in supervising entries and exits was abolished, except for non-Egyptians and non-Libyans. Egyptian and Libyan border guards have taken over this function. Brigadier General 'Abd-al-Hamid Hidayah, chief of the Ports Security Branch at the al-Sallum checkpoint, stated that

opening the border was the first decision issued and was implemented immediately. The border was opened without any restrictions or regulations on either individuals or goods. Police stations are limited to issuing communiques to the two sides. Smugglers from either country will be subjected to legal and security measures in each country. Brig. Gen. Hidayah expects that there will be regulations to protect security in both countries. They will be discussed between the two responsible ministers in Egypt and Libya.

Brig. Gen. 'Awad Muhammad Sha'ib, Musa'id's chief of police, stated, "We hope that there will be unlimited cooperation between the two countries and that it will not be confined merely to the exchange of goods. We desire full unity."

Idris Musa, the People's Congress secretary in Musa'id, said, "Our hope is to create one political and economic system. Our two peoples must take responsibility for preserving this step for the future."

In Tubruq, we met with a senior Libyan official who said that opening the border was an overdue step. It was necessary to evaluate it and draw up regulations, so that it will succeed completely. He said that there were Libyan committees that are preparing reports to expand mutual cooperation. He added, "We have heard that Egypt is still placing some regulations on the border. We want them removed!"

Twelve Thousand Daily

The latest border-crossing statistics show that the number of travelers from Egypt to Libya and back through the al-Sallum checkpoint is right around 12,000. Of these, 60 percent are enroute to Libya and 40 percent are returning to Egypt, including 10 percent who frequent the crossing point on a daily basis.

Egyptians constitute 65 percent of the border crossers. We met with an Egyptian driver named Muhammad Shanbu, who said: "Large numbers travel with me almost daily, but there are specific kinds of travelers who must be stopped, especially since they are harmful to Egypt."

With regard to vehicles crossing between the two countries, Shanbu said that between 1,000 and 1,200 go through the al-Sallum checkpoint daily, both coming and going. More than 55 percent are enroute to Libya. Half the vehicles are trucks transporting Egyptian goods to Libya and returning. It is noteworthy that the traveler to Libya at the al-Sallum checkpoint feels like he is passing from one governorate to another, and that the situation is only slightly different upon returning.

Returning Goods, Prices

One of the observations that deserves reconsideration and serious study is that Egyptian goods are being exported to Libyan markets under agreements, such as paint, cosmetics, and insecticides, which are subsidized

for the Libyan consumer and are sold at prices equivalent to 40 percent of their prices in Egypt. However, some Egyptian merchants are buying them and bringing them back into Egypt in commercial quantities and here is where the danger lies. As this activity increases, Egyptian factories might run the risk of bankruptcy—or more precisely, be responsible for customs [fees]—or sell at the same prices in the Egyptian market for up to 100 percent profit, despite the fact that some of these goods are stamped "made in Egypt especially for the Libyan al-Jamahiriya."

I made this statement to Maj. Gen. Kamal Mansur, the governor of Marsa Matruh, and he stressed that this is considered smuggling. He wants this practice stopped. Those who have goods for personal consumption are not in any violation, but it is a different matter for merchants. Those who are caught must be punished. When I spoke with the director of security in Marsa Matruh, Maj. Gen. Faruq Khadiri, he said that he was responsible for security inside the governorate. As for the al-Sallum checkpoint, that was the responsibility of port security.

I learned that the Libyan liaison officer at the al-Sallum checkpoint has asked Egyptian officials to put an end to this practice of re-importing supplied goods so that the Libyan consumer would not be affected. He did this after the volume of these goods entering Egypt from Libya increased.

A Libyan official told me that two prices for these subsidized goods were applied in Libya. Goods sold by ration cards and in cooperatives for Libyan consumers have subsidized prices, while goods sold in shops have commercial prices for those who wish.

The governors of Marsa Matruh and Tubruq told me that fewer of these kinds of goods began to enter Egypt after the gap between Libyan and Egyptian prices narrowed. It had ranged between 10 and 30 percent.

Reinforced Iron

Among the observations that should be studied is the fact that the reinforced iron coming into Egypt from Libya costs between 220 and 250 Libyan dinars per ton. After adding transportation costs, the price reaches 800 to 850 Egyptian pounds per ton. The danger in selling locally lies in the fact that Egyptian reinforced iron sells for 1,200 Egyptian pounds per ton. The question here is: Are there any guarantees with regard to selling Libyan iron for less than its Egyptian counterpart? What is the position of Egyptian factories, especially since the volume of Libyan reinforced iron brought into Egypt—in a seven-day period—amounted to 5,000 tons?

One of the merchants in al-Sallum stated that Libyan and Egyptian iron sells at the same price. Then who profits?

A customs official said that the market was supply and demand, and prices would stabilize.

Another official pointed out the need for regulations to prevent commercial fraud in certain foreign goods entering Egypt via Libya on the pretext that they are Libyan goods. One has only to change the commercial markings from Italian or Tunisian to Libyan. Who is responsible for this?

The most serious danger that has begun to appear in Libya and Egypt is currency trade in the Libyan dinar, which is pegged at 310 to 315 Egyptian piasters. I inquired at Egyptian and Libyan banks about these transactions, and the reply was that "we have not yet received any instructions." I questioned merchants in Marsa Matruh, al-Sallum, Musa'id, and Tubruq, and they said that they were forced to buy the dinar and pound on the black market for commercial exchange. "The two governments are responsible for the rise of the currency trade. What can we do if the banks refuse to do business?"

The director of security in Marsa Matruh said that this was a violation of the law. "We will arrest those who are caught dealing in currency." However, the governor stated that this would be dealt with in the future.

The Musa'id chief of police said that dealing in currency was forbidden and violated the law. "Until further instructions are issued, we will apply the law."

AL-AHALI has learned that the problem relates to establishing the value of the dinar. Should this be calculated on the basis of the volume of commercial exchange, or on its value vis-a-vis the American dollar? Perhaps instructions will be issued for a unified currency between the two countries in a few days.

Security, Security

It has been noted that individuals can enter and exit without regulations or registration. Some expect that a large number of travelers are smuggling items from Egypt into Libya and vice versa.

I asked the chief of the Ports Security Branch, who said that "our work is confined to relations only. Security operations will be within the framework of agreements between the two countries."

Both the Musa'id and Tubruq chiefs of police and the secretaries of the People's Congress in both cities, said that regulations should be drawn up to prevent suspicious entries and exits into both countries. The four officials called for the al-Sallum area to be made into a joint security zone, in which those traveling to and from Egypt and Libya could be registered in order to prevent the infiltration of criminals and smugglers.

The governor of Marsa Matruh stated that there must be regulations to safeguard security in the two countries. "The officer whose job it is to investigate the person must make sure of the person's identity."

South Korea Extends \$16-Million Grant

NC1010200991 Cairo MENA in Arabic 1522 GMT
10 Oct 91

[Text] Egypt and South Korea signed today a memorandum of understanding by which the latter would extend a \$16-million grant to Egypt to bolster its economy. The agreement comes as part of the developing economic relations between the two countries.

The grant includes \$10 million for financing the purchase of equipment for the Egyptian Manpower and Training Ministry's vocational training centers.

Dr. Maurice Makramallah, minister of state for international cooperation, and South Korea's Consul General in Cairo Reng Song-Pak [name as received] signed the agreement.

Mubarak Appoints Two New Governors

NC1110072791 Cairo Radio in Arabic 1500 GMT
9 Oct 91

[Text] President Husni Mubarak has issued a republican decree appointing Counselor Mahir Muhammad al-Jindi governor of al-Gharbiyah and Sabri Ma'mun al-Qadi as governor of Kafr al-Shaykh. The decree goes into effect today.

AL-WAFD Gives NDP Membership Figures

92AF0023C Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 25 Sep 91 p 1

[Article: "Sharif Candidate for NDP Organization Secretary"]

[Text] President Husni Mubarak has received an important report that revealed that the National Democratic Party (NDP) has 612,000 registered members nationwide. The report affirmed the absence of the 200-member minimum established for each party unit for holding secretarial elections, Cairo Governorate in particular. The party has 44,000 members in Cairo, 86,000 in al-Jizah, and 51,000 in Alexandria. AL-WAFD has learned that Dr. Mahmud Sharif, minister of local government and NDP assistant secretary, is now the sole candidate for replacing Kamal al-Shadhili as the party's organization secretary to oversee party elections scheduled for this November. The report sent to President Mubarak affirmed that Kamal al-Shadhili failed to meet his responsibilities as organization secretary in previous years and revealed the absence of orderly membership records.

NDP Addresses Economic Issues

92P40011A Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 27 Sep 91 p 1

[Text] Dr. Maurice Makramallah, minister of state for international cooperation, said yesterday in a meeting of the economic committee of the National Democratic Party (NDP), chaired by Dr. Samir [Tubar], that the deficit in the public budget would be paid with actual

revenues, not through inflationary measures, such as printing currency, which has no productive equivalent. He also said that the government is working now to marshal financial resources to establish a fund for the financial restructuring of bankrupt companies and removing barriers to their developing their staying power and bettering their lot. Likewise, the government is determined to reconstitute the public sector and its management on a sound economic foundation and to encourage the private sector in business leadership development.

Mr. Fathi 'Abd-al-Baqi, head of the Revenue Administration, announced that tax revenue collected from joint-stock financial companies is estimated at around four billion Egyptian pounds.

In another matter, the committee approved a working paper on stimulating the financial market. The paper requested the issuance of instruments for financing some local development projects at the governorate level to ease the burden on the general budget.

It also requested that instruments and contracts for some public services and utilities projects be issued, that shares in public sector companies be offered on the stock exchange, and that all projects be required to offer their stocks for public registration.

Ministry Studies Tax Incentives for Investors

92AF0015A Cairo AL-AHRAM in Arabic 23 Sep 91 p 1

[Text] As part of government efforts to encourage investors and increase the private sector's share in economic development, Prime Minister Dr. 'Atif Sidqi announced that the government is now considering giving a five-year exemption from taxes on commercial and industrial profits to projects sold by the governorates. The tax exemption would begin from the sale date and the transfer of property to the new investors.

The prime minister added that several new incentives are being offered to investors who buy these projects, foremost of which is exempting inheritors from 50 percent of the title deed charges that may be due on the value of projects they inherit, provided that they continue their activity. They will also be offered banking and credit incentives that may suit them.

Dr. Sidqi affirmed that the cabinet has finished working out the principles on which major projects will be appraised. These call for estimating the value of land and buildings at market price by the relevant experts in each governorate. This estimate is considered the minimum value. The fixed assets of each project, e.g., machinery and cattle, will also be appraised at market price. The sale will be by public auction, by sealed bids, or by any other means the governorate may deem fit, in accordance with current laws.

In his statement to AL-AHRAM correspondent Sharif Jaballah, the prime minister said that the governorate

owning the project will be obliged to liquidate its dues and obligations before anybody else, depending on its financial position at the time it is being sold. Each governorate will sell its projects in accordance with the principles to be agreed upon, and the sales committee should include a representative from the Ministry of Finance. The public sector banks should perform the sale transactions in view of their experience in the fields of appraisal, marketing, and investment, particularly since they have funds and contributions in these projects. The assistance of experts from national offices known for their efficiency and integrity can be sought in the sale of these projects.

In all cases, a working group will be set up in the prime minister's office to follow up the steps and results, and propose solutions for problems that might obstruct implementation.

An official source in the prime minister's office stated that establishing a fund in which revenues from project sales will be deposited is under consideration. It has been proposed to set up a bank account in the Central Bank of Egypt under the name "proceeds of governorate projects sale." The proceeds are to be used for the realization of local administrations' economic and social development objectives, according to what the cabinet may deem fit in this regard.

In order to ensure the sale procedures, their legality, and the stability of the investors' situation; and to encourage investors, discussions are underway to pass a law governing the sale of projects and regulating the situation of those working in them, in accordance with the principles to be decided upon.

Minister of Economy Dr. Yusri Mustafa said that selling governorate projects aims to achieve basic objectives, foremost of which is to alleviate the budgetary burden on the local administrations and, consequently, the burden on the general budget, and to deal with its mounting deficit. It also aims to activate the money market in a manner that would contribute to creating channels for the transfer and attraction of investment capital. It also aims to benefit from the distinctive characteristics of financing through the money market. Most outstanding of these is turning to real savings, since they are a noninflationary source of financing, in view of the effect this has on keeping part of the savings from going into consumption; reducing the amount of currency in circulation; increasing the GNP; providing real income; curbing the phenomenon of hoarding savings; and encouraging those who hoard savings to direct their money toward investment, given the improved management of existing projects; freeing them from bureaucracy; and boosting the effectiveness of money utilization.

The minister of economy affirmed that selling projects also aims to deepening the concept of expanding the base of the citizens' property and encouraging the workers'

ownership of property shares in projects, thus contributing to confidence, given the stability of the government's policy in backing and encouraging the private sector, since turning the ownership of projects to the largest number of citizens and workers constitutes a guarantee that the private sector will not turn into a public sector.

The sale of those projects also aims to attract expatriate workers' investments in order to contribute to financing projects and curb the trend of maintaining investments in foreign currencies, thus boosting the national economy and curbing inflationary recession.

Companies Transfer Debts to Investments

92AF0023E Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic 3 Oct 91 p 5

[Article by 'Adil Shafiq: "\$600 Million in Foreign Debts To Be Converted to Investments in Egypt"]

[Excerpt] Dr. Muhi-al-Din al-Gharib, chief of the General Investment Authority's executive board, said that \$600 million worth of outstanding Egyptian company debts—public and private sector—will be converted into investments and capital contributions in these companies under the new investment law that allows foreign creditors to convert their loans to Egyptian companies into investments and contributions to capital, thereby making it easy for such companies to pay their debts in Egyptian currency. Foreign creditors may transfer their profits, as well as their invested capital, outside the country after five years, thus relieving Egyptian companies of their debt burden and allowing them to increase their investments and capital.

Dr. al-Gharib added that "Egypt's respect for the rights of foreign creditors and its protection of their investments are among the most important features of the current economic policy, which is aimed at attracting foreign investment. This is best illustrated by Egyptian measures during the Iran-Iraq war to shield and protect foreign investments, notwithstanding Egypt's political differences with Iran, for the government's political position is totally detached from its economic position, which affirms the legal rights of foreign investors, thus bolstering confidence in the Egyptian economy and attracting additional investments in it. From July 1990 to June 1991, foreign investments grew by 20 percent more than the same period last year."

This was stated in the joint Egyptian-Dutch investment seminar organized by the Egyptian Businessmen's Association in cooperation with the Dutch embassy in Cairo. The seminar was attended by the Dutch delegation that is visiting Cairo and Alexandria. [passage omitted]

Ministry Studies Public Services Price Hikes

92AF0023A Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 25 Sep 91 p 8

[Article: "Soon, A Hike in Government and Local Service Fees"]

[Text] The Ministry of Finance is now looking into a plan to multiply government and local service fees. The

ministry is reviewing revenue-collection laws with a view to amending them. Amendments are expected to be submitted to the People's Assembly soon for debate this November. Budget-monitoring reports in the last three months revealed a discrepancy between ministry deficit estimates and revenues collected in the last three months, particularly in light of the 25-percent drop in projected customs fees and sales tax revenues. Government measures will soon focus on actuating the prices of electric power, water, natural gas, public transportation tickets, telephone services, and local fees for services.

Sales Tax Evasions Reach 5 Million Pounds

92AF0023B Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 25 Sep 91 p 1

[Article: "Evaders' Files Submitted to Minister of Interior, Two-Month Revenue Is 1.5 Billion"]

[Text] An official government source has estimated the value of sales tax evasion at about half a billion Egyptian pounds, pointing to the lack of technical and oversight agencies to monitor tax collection on various goods and services.

The source cited the legal deadline for paying the tax to the Tax Authority, emphasizing that 7,000 taxpayers are in violation of the law and subject to stringent penalties, from a jail sentence to a fine equal to three times the value of the unpaid tax.

The source pointed to the Minister of Finance's instruction to the various tax commissions to prepare evaders' files to pave the way for a special Ministry of Finance committee to be formed in the next few days to look into them. Some senior officials have moved to delay forwarding evaders' files to the competent legal authorities to avert a state of panic in the markets in view of the harsh penalties.

AL-WAFD has learned that initial tax returns for last May and June amounted to 1.5 billion Egyptian pounds, including the consumption tax that has not been repealed on certain consumer goods such as sugar, tea, and gasoline.

AL-WAFD was the first to publish the sales tax law provisions in their actual approved and implemented form.

Commodity Shortage Belies Export Report

92AF0015D Cairo AL-WAFD in Arabic 20 Sep 91 p 3

[Article by Muhammad Amin and Ahmad Fu'ad: "Riddles of Wali and Abu-al-Dahab"]

[Text] Supply Minister Dr. Jalal Abu-al-Dahab has issued a decision rescinding the ban on exporting food commodities. This has heightened economic circles' fear of the possibility of commodity prices soaring to a

dangerous level, especially since this involves basic commodities that are now witnessing a substantial increase. Also, Egypt's diminishing commodity reserve and the drop in production shows that the decision is rash; it is heading toward economic liberation without studying market economics. It is true that ostensibly the decision aims to encourage export of local production, but where is this production?

The primary objective of the decision could be the Libyan market, especially after the borders have been opened and trade between Egypt and Libya is resumed. Therefore, the decision will be of limited benefit.

The irony is that the minister of supply's decision allows the export of commodities of which there is an acute shortage. This is the cause of the people's hardship. This has led to tremendous price increases in these commodities, some exceeding 200 percent. Some 75 percent of our food requirements are imported, costing the government \$11 billion annually.

What is strange is that the decision allows importing commodities like those being exported abroad in order to meet local demands. So what export is the minister of supply talking about? The following is a list of commodities allowed to be exported: wheat and its extracts, tea, millet, sugar, sugar cane, unprocessed leather, black beans, cattle, camels, barley, lentils, sesame, fenugreek, starch, pigeons, quail, birds, poultry, sesame sweets, coffee, oil seeds, black olives, dry beans, black-eyed peas, green peas, vegetable oils and their by-products, soaps, detergents, animal feed, oil cake, blankets, and wool textiles.

Looking carefully at the goods listed in the decision, we would find that they are not enough to meet more than 25 percent of consumption demand. The decision implies that there is a surplus in wheat and flour, which is contrary to the truth. The negotiations underway with wheat-exporting countries such as the United States, France, and Australia are the best evidence of the shortage from which warehouses of the ministry of supply, the originator of the decision, are suffering. The question is: Why is the minister of supply asking the farmers to deliver the current season's wheat crop to the milling and baking companies' warehouses? Meanwhile, the situation is aggravating and campaigns are being mounted in the wheat fields in order to prevent wheat smuggling. Each family is being allotted a fixed ration, while what is beyond the family's need is to be delivered [to the authorities].

If the decision aims to export beans and lentils, then there is the risk of price increase of two popular basic commodities that Egyptian people of all classes consume. This threatens doubling their prices due to an acute shortage in broad bean production and the expected exportation. There has been a steep rise in the price of local broad beans in the markets; a kilogram of broad beans is being sold for three Egyptian pounds.

With regard to egg export, there is an acute shortage of eggs in the markets and food outlets. The price of one egg went up to 20 piasters, i.e., more than 100 percent of the price of eggs the ministry offers in the outlets (2.7 pounds per tray of eggs). How can the decision also apply to eggs, which would lead to doubling their prices? Sources affirm that in the next few days, egg prices, both subsidized and for tourist consumption, will be standardized to become 20 piasters per egg. The quota for edible eggs and subsidized chickens for supermarkets (sold for 2.40 pounds each) is expected to be cancelled. This is the best evidence of the irrationality of the export decision.

The quantity of poultry for sale dropped by 60 percent, according to the figures of the distribution company that comes under the Ministry of Domestic Trade.

What's astonishing is that the decision on exports came two weeks after the decision organizing the import of the same commodities. This was decision Number 526 of 9 January 1991. The decision prohibits tampering with prices of imported commodities, which include sheep, beef of various types, fish of various types, milk, butter, margarine, cooking oil, tea, sugar, flour, sesame seeds, lentils, broad beans, black pepper, and tomato sauce. One can see that these items are the same as those contained in the decision allowing exports, with the aim of increasing state hard currency revenues.

A big question crops up here that we cannot answer. The question is: Is the purpose of the decision to re-export goods that were imported in order to benefit from the price difference, or does the decision conceal an ingenious idea which we cannot conceive?

Without apparent coordination between two elements in the same government, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture Dr. Yusuf Wali came out with a decision banning the export of frozen meat two days ago. Ostensibly, the decision aims at protecting the national veal project. Protecting the local producer cannot be achieved only by decisions banning imports, but also by discussing ways to develop local production in foreign markets [as published] and, at the same time, to save the exhausted consumer the successive price increases so that he may be able to buy at lower prices. Also, real protection of the producer can be achieved by creating a suitably stable climate through providing adequate guarantees for the prices of animal feed and medicine. One of the signs of lack of coordination is evident in the fact that the Supply Ministry imports meat at a time when it has failed to take delivery of more than 50 percent of its share of the veal project in the last season and resorted to compensating for the acute shortage by offering frozen meat as substitute.

Official correspondence of the Supply Ministry and the Ministry of Agriculture are evidence of bungling. While early this month the minister of supply issued a decision organizing the import of frozen meat, a few days later Dr. Wali issued a decision banning the import of frozen

meat. While, in principle, we do not object to the decision banning imports, we are in favor of a lower price for the exhausted consumer, something which the Supply Ministry is trying to achieve.

We wonder why the Agriculture Ministry officials did not discuss whether the meat of the veal project is suitable for export during the days when there was a large surplus of it in food outlets. This has led to the Supply Ministry reducing the profit margin in order to promote the sale of the surplus meat it had in the outlets, as a result of which, the price dropped from 7.5 pounds to 7 pounds per kilogram?

Domestic Production of Oil Seeds Inadequate

92P40011B Cairo AL-WAFA in Arabic 17 Sep 91 p 1

[Text] Dr. 'Abd-al-Maji Abu-'Aziz, president of the Academy of Scientific Research, declared that Egypt is facing a critical shortage in the supply of vegetable oils. He explained that the domestic harvest of oil[producing]- seeds meets only 20 percent of consumer requirements in Egypt. The remaining 80 percent is covered by imports. The president, in remarks made at the inauguration of the International Council for Oils Development and Production, affirmed that the only solution to the problem is to increase the harvest yield of all oil seeds and to increase the area of arable land devoted to the cultivation of conventional oil seeds.

Effects of Communism's Failure on Economy Analyzed

91AA0628A Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic 31 Aug 91 p 5

[Article by Usamah Ghayth: "Fall of the Soviet Empire: Will It Cause a World Economic Disaster?"]

[Text] The thunderous fall of Marxist philosophy is significant in itself, but more significant and momentous is paying last respects to communist ideology as a system of rule, and as an empire that took part in steering international events and dominated an important part of world balances.

The joy associated with the decline of Marxism and the communist ideology cannot be a substitute for serious evaluation and contemplation of the pragmatic political and economic outcome of the fall of an empire that used to be the second axis in the international contest to dominate and prevail. For the very existence of a contest between two international axes created rules of international struggle radically different from the new situation, where the international contest has vanished and events are dominated by only one international axis, namely the United States.

This necessitates a profoundly serious and accurate assessment of the negative aspects of the fall of the Soviet empire, along with the rapid steps to dismember it and dismantle its political and economic structure.

This is an assessment that concentrates on the language of interests—to determine what interests have been lost and how to compensate for them—and on alternate and potential actions from the perspective of state and individual relations. For the fall, the dismemberment, and the dismantling of empires have the same wasteful effects as bank failures. It is a maze of requisite rights and responsibilities and endless waiting lines in front of new symbols, every one of whom refuses to bear the "burdens and legacy" of the imperial deceased who sank his teeth and fingernails into the world for many long years.

Many are committing the terrible folly of focusing only on the political aspects of the Soviet empire's dismantling, amid widespread contentions that this empire is the essence of an economic vacuum, and its economic situation is too weak and emaciated to have any impact on the world economic situation. This is because its strength is concentrated in its military and arsenal of nuclear destruction, which has always overshadowed and masked its totally powerless economic skeleton. The best evidence of such tremendous folly is the statistics that the American CIA published, indicating that the 1989 Soviet share of the world gross product was 13.2 percent, an enormous share by any standard, especially when compared to that of the super-industrialized countries, which is 13 percent, not to mention 9.5 percent for Japan and 25.7 percent for the U.S. If we factor in the 4.5 percent share for socialist bloc countries in Europe, we find that it is equal to Germany's pre-unification share of only 4.7 percent.

Accordingly, having 13.2 percent of the world gross product in the realm of severe economic disarray is indeed an event of a severely negative impact on the course of economic activity and international economic transactions, and an "international economic disaster" whose negative aspects must be carefully and cautiously assessed. For, according to CIA estimates, Soviet production is almost equal to that of the two world economic superpowers, Japan and Germany, and that current events are not limited to the collapse of a world political power, but include the breakdown of a weighty world economic power as well. This is notwithstanding all the facts that point to backward production and management methods, and lagging technological standards, production, and productivity rates, besides other factors on the long list of charges of backwardness.

Since Soviet markets offer opportunities not found in advanced and developed industrialized countries' markets, the Soviet economic situation was a boon to many Third World countries, especially those with great capacities for exporting modest and medium-quality consumer goods. Also, their long list of import needs used to be managed and amply satisfied under government trade and payment agreements, in spite of their alleged disadvantages and drawbacks. Moreover, loans offered for development and major projects have had very easy terms and have been very effective, despite the rude and

despicable political intrusions that they entail, particularly since other intrusions carried the same qualities and more; qualities perpetually linked to the relationship between those with the power "to deny and bestow," and those compelled "to acquiesce and submit."

This has nothing to do with crying over the ruins of bygone communism. Rather, it is an appeal to assess the pragmatic and realistic impact of its fall as a state, as a system, and as an order of relations which, for many years, forged a stack of rules to calculate interests and benefits found in communist action, production, investment, trade, import, and export ties worth billions upon billions. In the Egyptian economy, for example, this amounted to 3 billion Egyptian pounds a year. More important than the amount is the fact that there are several kinds of imports that cannot be procured from alternate markets, and a long list of exports that other markets are unable to absorb.

The gravity of the empire's disintegration is not restricted to economic, trade, and financial transactions. Rather, it extends to a field of utmost importance to most Third World countries, namely, arms imports. Until two years ago, the Soviet Union used to be the chief source of arms for these countries, and despite the evils of military spending, all countries need a strong army to protect their national security, particularly with the irrational conflicts and disputes among Third World countries. The empire's disintegration has caused serious and intense talk about converting Soviet military industries—the most advanced, in terms of technology, production methods, management, organization, and efficiency, compared to other Soviet production sectors—into civilian industries, a plan that has actually been put into effect, causing a downturn in Soviet arms exports. When this plan is completed sometime in the future—particularly since such industries, given their relative advancement, are the only ones qualified to compete extensively and effectively with Western capital—many Third World countries' ability to jockey for international alternatives to procure the arms that they need will wane, because factories that used to produce tanks will be converted to produce motorcycles and other goods.

The assessment logic here is not subject to abstract considerations of "good and evil," but rather to actual international circumstances and the impact events have on the interests and national security of many countries, our Arab region in particular, where conflicts are ablaze, wreaking havoc on the area. This is in addition to Israel's drastic intransigence, rejection of peace, and expansionist designs aimed at wreaking more havoc and seizing water resources. This is besides the impact of the hideous and frightful aftermath on Arab military capabilities following the destruction of the Iraqi force through a plot so blatantly and openly carried out by Saddam Husayn's regime.

With the dismemberment of the Soviet empire, a new language has been introduced into the world economic dictionary, advocating the phenomenon of the breakup

and disintegration of countries, versus the language that almost prevailed, advocating integration as the only path to progress, and further conglomeration of resources as necessary for a viable economic power. It is a new language whose vocabulary is not confined to the Soviet Union. Indeed, some of its scenes are being acted out in Yugoslavia, with a view to dismantling the federation in favor of mini-entities, in addition to many acts being played out on Third World lands. Arab world fragmentation, disunion, and consecration of discord and disunity add fuel to the fire, and much more is being said in secret.

One very important part of the breakup is linked to the position of the Islamic republics, areas that are more backward and densely populated than the Soviet Union, and to the magnitude of the economic disaster they will face, and whether the situation there will lead to famine or something less severe. Will it bring about change in the Islamic world's political map? What international arrangements ought to be made to turn this map into a pickaxe for further destruction, disunity, and schism? What techniques must be used to turn it into a factor of strength for the Islamic world, whose historic legacies include several episodes of nationalistic aspirations, and whose escape from the imperialist genie's bottle is a precious and treasured hope blocked by horror upon horror and boundless hostile designs?

As much as we need principles, values, and ideals to build the future, there is another, no less important or momentous need, which prescribes "cool-headed" calculations, because what is happening is a world hurricane that will inevitably uproot an old world to build a new one. Whatever happens will be subject to the rules and terms of the powerful. However, it is incumbent upon us to reduce the negatives and take advantage of the hurricane to plan early for tomorrow's world. The proper starting point lies in awareness, discernment, and reason, instead of stupor and unconsciousness.

Column Discusses Russian Scientists' Emigration

91AA0628B Cairo AL-AHRAM AL-DUWALI in Arabic
1 Sep 91 p 7

["Just an Opinion" column by Salah Muntasir: "Soviet Scientists"]

[Text] But what about the Soviet scientists? These scientists, who have the most dangerous nuclear secrets in their heads will inevitably be, amid these Western events we are witnessing inside the Soviet Union, the most important commodity to be snatched up by those who want to develop and bolster their nuclear arsenals. Anything is possible in anarchy.

The Americans will be in the forefront of those who would love to get their hands on these scientists, not only to acquire the information they have, but also, and more importantly, to prevent them from going to any other country.

To be sure, all the countries involved in nuclear research have their eyes set on these scientists and have sent their spies to try to conclude secret deals with them.

It would not be strange to hear that some of these scientists have gone to Israel, because this is part of Israel's goals and designs. According to information gleaned by some countries, Israel is now reconsidering its open-door policy in regard to all Jewish immigrants, and is rejecting certain classes of such immigrant groups, Ethiopian Falashas in particular. The Ethiopian regime recently offered to send 7,000 of them to Israel for any price, but Israel refused to take them in, even for free.

The same situation applies to Soviet and East European Jewish immigrants. Israel has discovered that, due to their high birthrate, most of these classes who came pouring in over the last few years are multiplying rapidly.

Even though Israel is trying to keep pace with the Palestinians in population growth, and places the Palestinian high birthrate at the top of perils threatening its future, the Israelis now feel that it would be better for them to keep their population growth in check, so as not to be overwhelmed with growing waves of immigrants from Ethiopia and East Europe who, according to a recently-concluded Israeli study that tracked the activities of immigrants who came to Israel in the last 20 years, have not shaken off their indolence, infecting their children with their laziness and lassitude. The study also noted that their growing numbers would turn Israel into a backward country, mentally, ideologically, spiritually, and physically!

Thus, whoever hears about a decline in Jewish immigration to Israel must not attribute it to any favor to the Arabs, but rather, to an Israeli policy aimed at being more selective in terms of who will be allowed into the country. Soviet scientists and researchers will definitely be the first ones to be lured into going to Israel, that is, if Israel has not already opened its secret doors to some of them.

Commentator Warns Against Ignoring Imbabah Riots

92AF0023D Cairo ROSE AL-YUSUF in Arabic
4 Oct 91 p 22

[Commentary by 'Abd-al-Qadir Shuhayb: "The 'Lid Policy'"]

[Text] "Put a lid on it!"

But it seems that we are no longer satisfied with just that. Indeed, we have adopted this well-known adage as our policy in dealing with unpleasant news.

Events suddenly erupt somewhere, and we immediately hasten to contain them and block any news or information leaks. We resort to reticence by putting our favorite lid on happenings, and if, God forbid, news of such

happenings should be leaked, we nonetheless ignore them, and are content with issuing a statement to satisfy, or perhaps heighten, curiosity!

Even though this policy has failed us every time we have tried it, yielding nothing but harmful rumors, we have not given it up, and are still following it with curious persistence at a time when the world is tending toward instituting a freedom of information act and lifting the ban on reporting news.

We have, on many occasions, tasted the success of the "open media" policy, the sweetest instance being the State Security Agency events, but we always revert to our old policy, the "lid policy."

We applied this policy to the events that erupted recently in Imbabah. As State Security troops and chiefs of police began converging on the area, we were talking about an ordinary altercation!

And, as the prosecution that opened the investigations was reporting that these events claimed 21 casualties, we were reporting that the altercation was between two persons only!

But when security agencies arrested a number of extremist religious group members, we reaffirmed that this behavior was unintentional.

The important thing is that we determined that the Imbabah events were not newsworthy, deliberately making light of them. We advised one another not to go into them, and were content with reiterating the official Ministry of Interior statement, forgetting that foreign radio stations and world news agencies do not shy away from publishing any kind of news!

The result was a flood of rumors that swept Imbabah and from there flowed to other Cairo districts, spreading to other regions as well.

Every one of these rumors was enough to trigger another flare-up in Imbabah and elsewhere, causing riots, or disorders, as we like to call them!

Rumors have not yet been put to rest, and with every passing day—amid the blackout we are so intent on preserving—such rumors are indeed multiplying and being blown out of proportion. Does this make sense?

Having riots or factional discord in our country does not hurt us in any way. All countries of the world, large and small alike, heave with such, and perhaps more serious, incidents. It does not belittle the security agencies in our country to face such unexpected events every now and then. Do we not contend that our country's stability is being targeted?!

It will, however, hurt us a great deal to ignore these events or deny that they even happened, being content with putting our favorite lid on them. For such events will recur in a more serious fashion, one that will be more than security agencies alone can handle!

We can contain such events in the light, and can nip them in the bud. We cannot, however, do that in the dark, and therefore, we can bid stability goodbye!

IRAQ

Professor Profiles Saddam's Meetings With Citizens

91AE0616A Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic
18, 19, 21 Aug 91

[Four-part article by Dr. 'Ali 'Aziz, Babil University: "Trip With Leader Saddam Husayn During His Meetings With Iraqis; Will State Grant Some of Its Positions to Channels of Social Distinction and Influence; Let Us Harmonize What We Believe With What We Do; Our Democracy Is in Preventive Control, Not in Political Infancy and Social Childishness"]

[18 Aug p 3]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted on first part of article] Let us begin in the party what we plan to carry out in the country. This is the slogan raised by our party. It means constantly expanded and entrenched democracy, more effective popular participation in the revolution's march, broader liberties and civil rights, and an increased role for social influences in all spheres of life out of the realization that all this constitutes an objective necessity for developing the revolution's experience.

In the phase of building, reconstruction, and political pluralism, our revolution links closely today, as it did in the past, development in all the political, economic, and social aspects of life with continued expansion of the democratic bases of managing the state's and society's affairs, in which social control and influence has an important. Our country's profound and rich experience has proven that such control and influence dons various robes and assume various forms, beginning with the shaykhs and notables of the country and its tribes, and ending with the nucleus of control from the base, embodied in the Iraqi individual and family and in the popular and party organization in the provinces. This is because it is impossible to maintain the stability and unity of the state system without rules that control individual and collective behavior and without procedures, rules, principles, and institutions that ensure adherence to these dictates. The significant part of the issue is confined to the map that represents the rules of popular social control and influence to which the mass interests are tied. The need for this control and this influence determine the quality of this control and influence in the various social organizations. In the feudalistic monarchic system, the chieftains' social influence serves the feudalist interests. But in the revolution era, it is not required that we hold all chieftains responsible for the failure of the feudalistic system and of its relations. The developments have proven, through the leader's mental discernment primarily, that under the umbrella of the country's revolution command, the

chieftainship's societal influence and social and religious distinction can be employed to protect numerous social structures and can contribute to establishing the moral balance which by necessity produces balanced behavior and balanced social and political conduct on the path of performing the varied tasks for building the new Iraq. Simultaneously with this conduct, the concept of control will change. Under the circumstances of our revolution's principled pan-Arab experience, preference belongs to preventive, not disciplinary, control because the main issue is summed up in creating a condition that does not permit the committal of acts conflicting with the true national interest. The distinguishing mark of our social control and societal influence should be to avert at the right time, through societal influence, any likely straying from the rules, principles, traditions, and laws. The ways in which this control is exercised and the nature of the activities of the social control channels must be characterized by distinguishing qualities and forms. To us, control is fundamentally the issue of all the struggling citizens and a link in national self-management by the people. Thanks to the ever-renewed democratic core in our society, social control and influence are assuming a more popular character. The leader president has attached great importance to this aspect, stating in the context of his precepts for the bright future of the Iraq of "Allah is great" that chieftains, notables, and the country's outstanding citizens must perform their role in helping people, and consequently the government, to entrench our country's great historical role. The leader has also stated that each must work from his position to stir the sources of creativity in a manner compatible with the humanitarian and national status of our people in the awareness and conscience of others. These methods are being practiced at present with promising success that matches the degree of development and progress in the popular democratic principles. This aspect undoubtedly encompasses the profound and genuine steps taken by our party's leadership and the steps included in the Iraqi cabinet's program for active collective participation in enhancing the effectiveness and influence of the government's control and social standing through individual acts, with each individual acting from his position in the channels of social control and influence, considering that they are important means to develop the citizen's political maturity and his effectiveness in defending the country's future and to educate the citizen with a spirit of responsibility regarding the state's and society's affairs. Control "from the base" in our struggling and promising society is tied organically to control "from above," i.e. by the government which truly reflects the interest of the people in their entirety. These two aspects together constitute the social control system which becomes effective through participation by the leadership in several interconnected directions. This participation has been reflected clearly and frankly in the leader's conversations with Iraqi urban and rural chieftains and notables. These conversations can be interpreted as follows:

First, every citizen is entitled to take part in managing society's affairs and influencing the action of the social and functional channels through the prescribed social, functional, party, and popular routes and, secondly, through the specialized social and popular routes that must perform their role within the popular control and influence channels. As for making certain that resolutions and directives are implemented, this is not just the leadership's responsibility. It is also the responsibility of the notables in the field. This combination is essential for making the process of control and influence successful. What ensures that this process succeeds and achieves the desired objective is that the leader and the leadership are constantly concerned with continued expansion of the principles of democratic control and social influence.

In the context of building the new and advanced Iraq, changes occur among us in all spheres of life. This enhances the public's role of social control and influence. One of these most principled and significant changes is the transformation of the State of Iraq under the command of Leader Saddam Husayn into the state of the people in their entirety and with all their sects, minorities, ethnic groups, and denominations. The moral political principle lies in eliminating any barriers between the leadership and the leader on the one hand and the people on the other. The Iraqi people understand profoundly the meaning of the phrase "every Iraqi is Saddam Husayn." We can cite here the song "O Saddam, the Others Will Be Humiliated," written by Umm 'Ali, an Iraqi woman, while she was in captivity in Iran, as convincing proof of the deep-rooted and genuine spiritual and material bond between the leader and our great people. The party state works in the name of the entire Iraqi people, and even on their mandate. The leader, not others, is the one who has said explicitly: "I wish I had a robe as big as Iraq itself to cover the people so that they would not be touched and affected by what the black cloud of March has brought." Yes, it is with this spirit and in this sense that Iraq's political leadership is concerned with the people's past, present, and future. These socio-political accomplishments and numerous other accomplishments, the stability of our political system, and the entrenchment of the legitimate national revolutionary authority have transformed our country into a state of a new kind. The government, and the Revolution Command before it, carry out their activity not just in the people's name but primarily and before anything else for the people's interest. The devastation and destruction accumulated through the demagogic 30-country conspiracy has been overcome.

The leadership is eager to see our society permeated by a significant and purposeful characteristic, namely the broadening of popular national participation in the various political and intellectual tendencies on the path of protecting Iraq's unity and of enhancing its development.

Before this, what permeates our people's life and procession are numerous democratic actions. The leadership

pushes all legislation and laws toward the people's representatives in the National Assembly so that the representatives could debate and express opinions on them and then either pass or reject them without any pressures. The powers of the people's representatives have expanded and they have the right to summon any Iraqi cabinet minister or official for questioning, clarification, and debate. What this fundamentally means is greater rights for the citizens to debate the basic documents of the state's organizations and institutions and to decide on these documents through the vote cast by their representatives in the National Assembly. But it is a foregone conclusion that not all the problems can be solved at once by way of the people's representatives. This is why the past experience which abounds with lessons and examples and with dignity and pride dictates to us two interconnected forms of the people's popular authority that remain simultaneously valid. The first is the authority that can be defined as the social principle of influencing the various economic, cultural, and social spheres of life. This form dictates that a number of state tasks be shifted to the points of social influence, such as the country's chieftains and notables and prominent figures in the various scientific and cultural areas—prominent figures and notables who can voluntarily engage in action serving the interest of the government's societal influence by safeguarding and developing the country. Such channels can go beyond many of the ordinary organizational frameworks of some mass and popular councils. This action assumes a new form which combines civil service with the means and tasks of voluntary participation. The disciplined democratic character and activity of such social governmental channels or governmental social channels broadens the popular base of the state institutions greatly and permits numerous problems to be solved soundly and correctly without increasing the number of government departments, employees, and offices. Simultaneously, this character creates the right conditions to promote efficient societal control over the activities of organizations, government departments and institutions, individuals, and officials and emphasizes more strongly the role and influence of the voices from the "base."

Leader Saddam Husayn tries to polarize more completely the permanent and careful control and influence of all the people and to develop the people's popular control on the path of developing and safeguarding the country. The leader and the leadership realize the importance of the popular quality of influence and control. But by themselves, they cannot ensure efficient action without increased individual personal responsibility on the part of each one of us as a citizen of this country. This is because the leader and the leadership realize that the fact that we are Iraqi citizens means that we shoulder added duties and heavy responsibilities, considering that we are a people who have baptized their moral human victory with rivers of noble blood. Our victory, as the leader has characterized it, is not a victory that can be measured by the criteria of a military battle between several armies on the one hand and one army on the

other. The battle, our victory, and the hopes that we have given the Arab nation and mankind have great and profound dimensions and meanings which the allies in the 30-state alliance are now trying to erase, deface, and bury so that they may not be used as added motives for our people and our nation's sons in their future procession.

The gradual transfer of some state jobs to societal and popular hands is a required adjustment. The phase and the experience have demonstrated our need for such a transfer. But let nobody blame the others' failures on his national partner. Let a (spade be called a spade) in order to save time and effort. The objective is not inaccessible to our people and our leadership as long as the people's affiliation and social appellations are genuine and as long as our leadership is from our blood, our flesh, our origins, and our reality.

[19 Sep p 3]

[Text] An objective understanding of the link between historical and moral values, and social national action requires us to analyze the true reasons for any undermining or disregarding of the inherited moral value. (It is important to respond accurately to this historical moral legacy, which embodies strongly the principle of fundamental belonging and continuity, and not the propaganda-oriented symbols of these values and principles. While making this presentation, we cannot but fully agree with the viewpoint Leader President Saddam Husayn projected when he met with a distinguished group of Karbala' notables and honorable men—a viewpoint to the effect that some of us cannot fully disavow the responsibility for any violation by any of us and that the values and principles of our religious symbols cannot be denied in societal action, depending on the circumstances).

Now that the revolution has revived the spirit of these relations, the course of any future position and tangible action depends on the citizen himself and on the political, social, and religious environment engulfing him. Intellectual convictions, moral principles and values, determination, and the readiness to sacrifice for sublime ideals also dictate a greater striving for honesty, responsibility, and balance between what we believe and what we do, especially for personal responsibility, to which there is no alternative. Such striving gives credibility to man's spiritual, religious, and national belonging and provides a greater opportunity for safeguarding the citizen and the country—an opportunity emanating from loyalty to and embodiment of the ideals in which we believe.

In his meeting with the notables and shaykhs of the holy city, Leader President Saddam Husayn spoke of the dual subjective and moral responsibility of the people of Karbala', considering that, first, the people of Karbala', and of all Iraqi cities for that matter, believe in the values and principles of al-Husayn, may God be pleased with him, and that, second, they are an indivisible part of the

Iraqi national makeup. Under the umbrella of the revolution's genuine pan-Arab experience, such a combination of religious, historical, and national responsibility dictates greater contribution to and role in developing and protecting the country and, at the same time, in overcoming spiritually any contradictions that may develop between the individual and the entire social entity, in order to serve the interest of society and of the values and ideals which we assimilate. Here, considerations of the spiritual and moral values should have their desired positive effect in such a special circumstance as the one just experienced by our country, especially in such complex conditions when taking a position or making a decision depends on the citizen's will, his spiritual inheritance, and his national conscience. In a circumstance when one finds himself faced with the necessity of choosing from among possible positions and forms of behavior, all of which may agree by the same degree at times with the spiritual, moral, and ethical requirements, one should act, even if one acts according to what is dictated by the weakest faith and even if it is not likely that this weak-in-faith action will gain social and religious approval at the critical moment which imposes on man a position that embodies his humanism, principles, and patriotism. If one of us acts even against what is dictated by the weakest faith, thus contradicting himself and his national and spiritual faith, then such a citizen will be nothing more than a citizen engulfed in social and religious suspicions because he has reflected, without explanation, either a lack of understanding of the principles and values which he alleges to believe in or a disavowal of these principles and values. Here, society and individuals who truly cling to their religious and national principles and values must take vis-a-vis the misguided or misleading few a position supporting the values of al-Husayn, may God be pleased with him, and all the religious and patriotic values that dictate a judicious and realistic application—not a dual application—in which we have come to believe and which we have inherited knowingly, especially since our country's experience in steadfastly confronting the treacherous Zionist-imperialist-reactionary aggression has opened the doors of hope and of historical optimism. This hope and optimism is based on words coupled with actions that embody the principles and values in which we believe. It is time for the entire world to understand that if we had abandoned what we believed in, the devastation, aggression, and plotting that have taken place would not have taken place.

The revolution, and the leader's relations with the citizen and his eagerness to ensure social, economic, and moral safety and security in a fundamental manner, have changed the relationship of the Iraqi citizen's interests with his society and have created the objective basis for eliminating the conflict between individual and society. New and remarkable elements have surfaced in the leader's relations with the people. Despite the errors and mistakes made by some people, the leader's dear wish—dear to himself and to his conscience—is embodied in his words in which he wished he had a robe large enough

to cover Iraq in its entirety so he could cover this great people and protect them from any harm or from whatever could offend their history and their greatness. These genuine visions have their reverberations in the Iraqi social arena.

Iraq's notables, honorable men, and tribal chieftains have trooped to the guest hall of Iraq's great host, Leader Saddam Husayn, to renew the pledge and to criticize the negligence and the mistakes that have occurred in some places, thus strengthening between the leader and his people a bond which the wretched scoundrels have tried to assassinate and which has always been the object of their aggression and black hatred. Such a rejuvenated and deep-rooted system of values and morals between the leader and the leadership on the one hand and the people on the other imposes on those engaged in political action and activity new tasks that seek to create a setup which ensures a political approach and a concerted moral political continuity that establishes harmony between society's values and traditions and the political method, especially at the level of field management by the symbols of political, party, and official responsibility. The ethics and principles of our revolution are an indivisible part of our values and our religious, historical, and social legacy. They certainly are not alien or imported. A legitimate marriage between society's values and traditions and the political method can produce values, traditions, and principles with which one can deal without creating a dual behavior in which the apparent contradicts the latent. When politics emerge as a fact that determines individual behavior, then politics can influence individual behavior and action noticeably. Politics is reflected ordinarily in the form of national developments and positions that have a historical pan-Arab and human dimension. An individual will not interact with and respond to these positions and activities positively unless he understands and comprehends them with his mind and his will. As for some images that are incompatible with the true nature of our people, their mettle, their historical legacy, and their political and social stability, serious efforts on the front of collective social and political enlightenment are required to correct them. The leader president described accurately and profoundly some of the individual cases that exist in some of our society's segments. We notice that in their behavior, some individuals in our society are neither rural nor urban. Some of them confuse in a harmful negative way and with a truncated understanding and awareness their rural character with a form of behavior which they consider and believe to be important for reaffirming the impact of urban traditions on this character. Thus, they end up losing both. What is more, their behavior and actions generate abnormal models in the social reality. Such a moral, behavioral, and social anxiety provides fertile soil for an anxious, shaky, and vacillating political position and opinion. However, these are political positions and opinions that are not at all based on premeditated hostility to the revolution's course and policy. But they do offer fertile soil for poisonous and poisoned seeds that can be nurtured by

the forces and elements lurking with evil in their hearts for the country and the revolution. When moving to deal with such soft spots in the social map, one should take into account that it is most likely that these vacillating few with their anxious awareness and behavior are loyal to the revolution and the [public] interest on the basis of the simple and rich equation which says that the citizen is the revolution's goal and guaranteed reserve. When our media and our official and party bannerlines disappeared from the arena and when rumor proliferated and the country was subjected to the most violent psychological and military war, the vacillation of some people with truncated awareness, behavior, and conduct (turned from gray to near-black?) and the enemies imagined that they had a great popular asset in Iraq. Consequently, they persisted in their aggression. Their clamor grew louder in the poisoned media channels and through some lackey elements which sneaked across the borders. But this clamor turned ultimately into a catastrophe for them and for their scheme and conspiracy. They failed in their endeavor to turn the popular balance in their favor and against the revolution.

In those critical days, the world learned for certain that the Iraqi people can never contradict themselves or their history and can never turn their back to the dower which they have paid for the sake of the nation's hope and which is embodied in the blood of their martyrs. The Iraqi people have emphasized to the world anew that even the few who were misled by the enemies have found that their lives, their interests, and their future are ultimately compatible with the revolution line and in conflict with the enemies' path. It has now become clear to them that their heads, their country's independence, and the bright points in their spiritual and historical heritage and legacy are the target and that this target is not the political regime, as Bush and those who are like him allege. The gallows in al-'Abbasiyah and al-Husayniyah parks in Karbala', the mutilation, and the violation of honor are incriminating examples of the enemies' ceaseless efforts to deprive our people of all spiritual and religious bonds to our genuine symbols and principles. We have now realized the important role that we have to perform in the various corners of our society for a procession in which action is compatible with the moral and behavioral principle. We also have to point out the clear routes of any process to harmonize or couple rural and urban values, social traditions, and political path so that none of us will be trapped again. The objective link between the past, the present, and the future opens a broad horizon for one to understand the reality morally and to determine the sound steps in life to entrench the moral and ethical similarity between the true nature of what we believe in and adhere to and what we do. Considering the future on the basis of the historical optimism projected by Leader Saddam Husayn is an ethical process. Visions of the future gain here a significant moral aspect by virtue of the dynamic congruence of society's and the group's interest with the individual interest. This is as long as the steps taken by the revolution command influence the life of the Iraqi

society and family and respond to the aspirations, hopes, and wishes of the individuals who internalize these objectives and transform them into a private higher ideal or view them as an important step toward what they aspire for.

In all cases, moral precepts must not be viewed as being void of any importance. Therefore, it must be noted that our society's tangible historical comparison between the religious symbols and the values of the historical legacy gains new dimensions gradually. New values constituting a continuation of the values of the historical legacy are being rooted by virtue of the fact that the leader president is leading a national experiment with clearcut humanitarian pan-Arab dimensions and features. When we speak of the new models in our society, we are fully entitled to signify primarily those models and values that have been formed and have taken root during the mother of all battles and the series of heroic sagas of our struggling people and our genuine revolution, during our struggle against the arrogant tyrants, aggressors, and sectarians, and during our struggle for building, development, and reconstruction. The Iraqi citizen, who lives with and experiences these models and values, defends and will defend them, will cling to them, and will not back one inch from them. Our people and our revolution are determined to show in the development and reconstruction march that we are a special kind of a building and innovating society, as we are a special kind of a fighting society. Here, we must state that nobody should ignore the fact that there are now in Iraq generations to whom the pattern of national struggle and striving in life have become a natural disposition and whose actions and thoughts are almost completely characterized by a moral and principled position toward the country's unity, prosperity, pan-Arab and humanitarian role, and independence.

This is something that dictates that the Iraqi citizen's longing to create must be developed and strengthened. This should become a distinguishing feature of our society in the march to develop and rebuild—a feature compatible with the individual's profound essence. When we speak repeatedly nowadays about the need to emphasize the Iraqi citizen's role in society, this does not at all mean pitting the citizen against society. Social integration and solidarity are not accomplished by scattered and independent efforts made outside society's sound path and beyond society's congruence with the historical, religious, and national values and objectives. It is the duty of science and of all channels of the popular media to explain the essence of the position on this harmonization and to impress upon the people's awareness the fact that the individual's difficult submission to the collective social resources and circumstances that move in an integrated pattern is ultimately one of the directions, if not the most important direction, for developing the individual to make him resemble what he believes in. We find that this fact is on the rise intellectually in our society's lobbies now that people have realized that the targeting of Leader Saddam Husayn by

the enemies means nothing other than targeting Iraq's soil, people, past, present, and future as long as the leader's main concern and preoccupation is a human, pan-Arab, and historical place befitting this people and this nation—a place in which action begins with the security, aspirations, happiness, and welfare of the citizen, the family, the country, and the nation. Let any of us ask if it is just a coincidence that the leader's name has given hope to all the nation's poor and toilers during and after the battles? Is it a coincidence that the name of Saddam Husayn has become a symbol of manliness, hospitality, and justice among the people of 18 million? No, it is absolutely no coincidence. People are bigger and more alert than to be taken in by an illusion now that the mother of all battles has eliminated the interlocked trenches at all the national, pan-Arab, and international levels.

[21 Sep p 3]

[Text] When one looks back to March 1990 and earlier, one realizes how complex and difficult is the phase which our Iraq and our revolution have been undergoing in their history and in their development and how great is the honor and the glory our country has gained while confronting the 30-country aggression. One also realizes how great is the pain caused by the acts of sabotage carried out with foreign planning and financing and by foreign hands. This is something that requires us to entrench and proliferate this honor, as well as the values of virtue, manliness, and martyrdom that were generated by the mother of all battles. It also requires us to prevent a recurrence of the negligence of some people so that it cannot cause incidents similar to those that occurred in some Iraqi cities during the black March 1991.

Development, actual contribution to rebuilding what has been destroyed by the aggression, and the dissemination of democracy in all aspects of the political, economic, and social life is the path which will reaffirm to the world the truly genuine mettle and creative intellect of this struggling people and the profound vision and wisdom which the people's leadership possesses. Thus, we will overcome the stagnant awareness of some so that awareness can advance by a degree as immense as that which has happened and that which will come in the future and which our country and our people await with greater optimism.

We must tell ourselves frankly and responsibly that there is nothing worse and more dangerous to the revolution's and people's march than the mistake of applying the negative attitude of an official or of a department to the country's entire general condition and then evading responsibility and throwing it on the shoulders of others when painful and harmful incidents occur as a result of the negligence or mistakes of some of us. To make calculations on this basis so as to create a chain of distorted manifestations that are in contrast with our people's genuine character and with the model provided by the party and the revolution. Some people's performance of their role in society in this [negative] manner generates

in society a kind of political infancy and social childishness that permit false priorities to rise at the expense of the people's and revolution's true priorities. The leader has defined and exposed many of these manifestations and maladies, noting that the mistake made by such and such a district administrative officer is the mistake of that particular officer, not of the leadership. The biggest mistake is made when some people allow themselves to justify and explain contrasting mistakes in the course of criticizing the individual mistake of this official or that department and when they antagonize this official or that department as if it is a matter of a partnership unjustly broken or a question of recording a position against the leadership because a mistake has been made by a certain official. A critical citizen may do so without asking himself: Has the official acted with a clear rationale emanating from concern for the relationship between the citizen, the official, and the state institutions, considering that they are parties to a mutual relationship and interest under the national umbrella? As department X and official Y are required to provide the citizen with the service, the citizen is required to use his good effort of criticism to enlighten, not to slander or to demand the severance of heads. The citizen should convey the truth to the higher authorities instead of retreating to some corner to complain.

I have defined and exposed to a large degree the negatives to which Leader President Saddam Husayn has alluded. But does this mean that it will be easy to overcome and eliminate the shortcomings and the mistakes without a collective effort? To assert this and belittle the issue would practically mean a slide to the deceptive approach, the approach of fabricated optimism. The developments have demonstrated that the contrast between how some of us behave and what they say in their institution or their district is more complex and more dangerous to the people and the revolution than we have imagined. The evaluations which people hear from the leader in his meetings with the notables and chieftains of Iraq's towns must be disseminated and the parties in the governorates must turn them into a work program in the field, not by regurgitation and repetition but by practical application of the course followed by the center so that the pace of the center's and provinces' tendencies and movement can be coordinated accurately. This is not only desired and favored by the people but the majority of the masses realize the importance of actually embodying the revolution's values and principles.

The developments have proven to the people tangibly that backing down on these principles is tantamount to a serious risk. The people realize that the course of development and of rebuilding what has been destroyed by the aggression and of entering the democratic path through its broad gates will determine the fate and future of our country. But all people, or the majority of the people, if we may say so, are aware of the reconstruction circumstances and of democratic action. Despite the utter difficulty of the circumstance, what is the majority

determined to do? Does the country's future and the revolution's march allow anybody among us to remain indifferent? Don't all agree that transformations are essential for ensuring a secure future? Yes, thinking differently does not only mean our being trapped in the snare of stagnation and duality but also our being pushed toward fatal darkness. People see in the revolution's values and principles a promising hope. Even though we may be confronted by individuals who tell us that democracy and reconstruction are essential, some of these people either fail, despite their words, to contribute their efforts to this national action or want to perform their role more calmly and quietly and without touching the painful spots or exposing some faults to criticism and comprehensive discussion. Despite this, they remain individuals. However, we must not let them swim against the current in the end because, to put it explicitly, they are a part of our people and a resource that the phase needs.

We say frankly that some people have suffered a shock as a consequence of the numerous severe and complex problems created by circumstances of the economic blockade and the 30-country aggression after they had been "lulled" by the period of the triumphant peace which followed the war with Iran. This shock has caused some people to mistrust the promises to restore electricity and other services. The immense and concerted aggression has caused people to be cautious in making promises. Things have been accomplished in an amazing record time with the experienced Iraqi capability and determination. Leader Saddam Husayn has given a deeply-felt boost to enhancing the practical bases for dealing with life's particulars, with the outcome of the developments, and with the future horizons. He also gave the democratic bases a strong boost when the party's internal life initiated the experiment of electing the party leaders with a spirit of optimism and determination to move toward the future. This is something that has its importance in our society's life, considering that the party is the masses' party and the party leading the revolution.

What the entire issue means and signifies is the kind of future that we want and aspire for. It is obvious that we have to search and find the various new motives that make it possible to set matters aright and to turn the wheels of a sedate development. It is obvious that our need, as individuals and institutions, to entrench democratic action is as great as our need for air because the democracy that befits our people and revolution is a democracy of vigilance. Each of us must free this vigilance of delusion, of repeated cliches, and of the false squeezing of facts into ready-made molds. This is a fundamental task here. It is here in particular and in the arena of awareness that the main clashes will occur and that emotions will boil over. It is here that the main knots that we have to unravel lie. Without solving, even cutting, these knots, we cannot proceed more courageously and efficiently on the path of the desired future.

It is on the basis of this approach that the basic evaluation of each citizen in our society and of the moral and practical standards must be made. This is a very sensitive touchstone and no man can pass its social and moral edge [unscathed]. However, there is no other option. The leader has said that an honorable citizen acting charitably and taking charitable positions is the brother and son of all and that we all disavow the antithesis of this citizen. We must adhere to this course and act according to its dictates on the path of supporting creative employees, workers, and intellectuals who take the initiative, who can and want to move forward courageously, and who are masterful at achieving successful accomplishments.

In the tasks of national fortification and mobilization, our revolution couples the system of political pluralism with dealing with the governmental social or social governmental principle which shifts some of the state tasks to our country's true centers of social influence. In the countryside in particular, the strugglers on the cultural front and on the front of spiritual issues have an important role to play in providing theoretical explanations for the steps the revolution takes in its current and future procession, and even in employing the cultural and spiritual element with all its impact to serve the course of the comprehensive national procession.

In the development and rebuilding procession, it is unfair to saddle the government departments, be they information or other functional departments, with the entire responsibility. All journalists, intellectuals, professional civil servants, and people in the private sector should also be considered jointly accountable in a collective responsibility to achieve what we as a people and a country aspire to achieve. Yes, under the circumstances that our country has just experienced, numerous Iraqis had important, distinguished, and interesting jobs worthy of respect. But this does not mean that there has been an end to that kind of individuals who adapt to the situation and who are ready to do whatever is demanded by the phase, not creatively but hypocritically. Moreover, this does not at all mean that the effort should lose its creative capability. Such models have existed since old times. What the genuine and honorable citizen fears is not such people nor the ordinary difficulties that could face any effort. Difficulties cannot scare a true man. Failure to accomplish what one aspires to accomplish or to produce and give what one can produce and give is the source of the fear. It is easy to overcome this fear with determination and resolve. The Iraqi people do not need to have their will and their firmness described. This will has been tested and it has not bent.

It has become easier to breathe even though the aggression has not ended yet. The threat and the menace continue to be present. But our ship has sailed toward the shores of the future. This requires all of us, each from his position and especially those who fight with the word, to avoid reflecting the major social events in a superficial, descriptive, or exhibitionary manner. We must conduct profound studies on life, not just gather its facts.

People do not expect advance solutions from the fighters with the word and they do not expect these fighters to offer ready-made and prompt answers hastily. The people want the entire and daring truth about the values that are being created today for the sake of the future.

Our political and social optimism motivates us to work more honestly, actively, and effectively. We will march on the charted map without fear of the fresh air that will eliminate all that is not genuine and that is trivial and superficial. Democracy comes engulfed in a storm, or in storms, as writer (Bullock) has said. Life without responsibility is easier than a life in which we have to shoulder the responsibility for every step we take. But life is not calm and motionless, so why should we be?

Oil Minister on Production, Rebuilding

92AE0010A Baghdad AL-'IRAQ in Arabic 7 Sep 91 p 3

[Interview with Usamah 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Hiti by 'Abd-al-Zuhrah al-[Dayrawi]; place and date not given]

[Text] On 22 August 1991, the Oil Ministry enjoyed a visit by President Commander Saddam Husayn, may God protect him, who ordered the honoring of outstanding individuals in the oil sector and their role in building and rebuilding what was destroyed by the 30-state, American, Zionist, NATO, odious aggression against our rising country.

To become familiar with the dimensions of this visit, AL-'IRAQ interviewed Mr. Usamah 'Abd-al-Razzaq al-Hiti, the oil minister.

The importance of the auspicious visit by the victorious commander Saddam Husayn, may God protect him, lies in the importance of the oil sector, which is the backbone of the country's growing economy, especially inasmuch as the oil sector is now witnessing a major upswing to rebuild what was destroyed by the American-Zionist-NATO aggression. The president commander's stamp can be found in every link in the oil industry, inasmuch as his excellency, during his field visits, examined the stages of reconstruction carried out by the ministry to restart the refineries of the general oil refinement installation [at] al-[Dawrah] in the center [of the country] and the General Oil Refinement Installation in the northern region; to rebuild the northern and southern oil fields; provide oil products to citizens; and provide primary materials and oil products to other economic sectors in the state, including the Industry and Metals Ministry.

The minister added: "We are proud that our ministry enjoyed the concern of President Commander Saddam Husayn, may God protect him, and has been honored with the first of his visits at this important time in the life of our people and nation, to examine first hand the achievements made by the ministry in the reconstruction process and the ministry's plans for the future. His excellency praised oil-sector workers for their effective

role in building and rebuilding under the hostile bombardment and their efforts to increase production, improve quality, and enhance performance. His excellency described the workers in the oil sector as 'working like a beehive during the hostile bombardment.'

"The president commander disclosed his brilliant directives to supply citizens with the different oil products they need, especially liquified gas, and to eliminate any constrictions in this regard. His excellency also ordered the honoring of outstanding persons in the oil sector in appreciation of their distinguished, effective role in rebuilding what was destroyed by the 30-state, odious aggression against our combative country."

[Dirawi] What are the ministry's measures to implement the directives of President Commander Saddam Husayn, may God protect him, regarding the provision of oil products, especially as winter approaches?

[al-Hiti] The oil sector has mobilized intensive energies to carry out the directives of President Commander Saddam Husayn, may God protect him. All capacities have been exploited to start a broad campaign in which specialized work teams have been assigned to expedite the implementation of the president commander's directives as precisely as possible. These support teams will expedite the executive efforts of pertinent bureaus currently responsible for implementing tasks assigned to them. His excellency, during his visits to the ministry's administration on 22 August, emphasized the fulfillment of citizens' needs for oil products and efforts to eliminate any constrictions in this regard. He also stressed the provision of oil products required by other economic sectors, so that they can increase their production and turn the wheel of the Iraqi economy in the desired fashion, which will help curb the effect of the economic blockade.

The regular provision of liquefied gas to citizens and other economic activities is something on which we began working immediately. Specialized teams were dispatched to support gas processing installations. Operations were also carried out to reactivate, as quickly as possible, gas processing plants that had stopped operating.

Here, I would like to elaborate on what the ministry has done to increase production in this phase. Production has increased by more than 75 percent. These quantities will provide an abundant flow of liquefied gas. We are working to develop methods to extract a higher volume of gas. Our efforts will not cease until this product is readily available to citizens and other economic sectors.

Regarding the ministry's measures for the winter, we have called on honorable citizens, through the television, radio, and printed media, to store as much kerosene as possible, because the ministry has large reserves of this material, and kerosene production is continuing at a high volume. We are hoping for a greater response on the part of the honorable citizen to our call to store kerosene for use when needed. We do not expect a shortage during the

coming winter. The storage of kerosene will help us save large amounts of gas. In this way, we can balance the demand for all oil products very naturally.

Oils are still being "rationed," because they include imported "impovers" and it is difficult—in the current circumstances of the unjust, unfair blockade against our country—to obtain these products, which total 10 percent of the product's weight, in a streamlined fashion. However, our duty is to strive to supply oil in a way that will not lead to a shortage, because these oils are a vital material in important fields such as transportation and communications, and in other economic sectors that consume oil.

We ask the obliging citizen to avoid wasting this very precious material and to handle it based on its specifications.

I emphasize here that the ministry, based on the directive of the commander president, may God protect him, will work to increase production of different types of engine oils before the end of this year, because the unjust blockade against our struggling country is a main cause of our inability to make all types and qualities of oil easily available to citizens.

[Dirawi] Regarding Iraq's oil policy, the minister stresses:

[al-Hiti] In light of the directives of President Commander Saddam Husayn, may God protect him, the ministry is concentrating on following a balanced pricing policy that takes into account the producer states' right to a net gain on the price of a barrel. Also, these prices must not place a burden on consumer states. The share of oil in the worldwide energy balance will increase by avoiding such burdens.

[Dirawi] What lies in store for the oil sector after the lifting of the unjust economic blockade against our country and the boycott on our oil exports?

[al-Hiti] All of the building and reconstruction plans carried out by the oil cadres have relied on materials and equipment available in the country. In this regard, Iraqi technical ingenuity has been manifest in the use of what little has been available, which has certainly been less than the minimum. Ingenuity and resolve are the basis of what has been achieved so far. We have an urgent need for many materials and equipment necessary to maintain and repair oil installations, now and in the future. Given our country's importance in world oil production, and the supply of inexpensive energy to mankind in general, the countries of the world must reject the blockade measures. International society must demand the rejection of the blockade immediately, because the continuation of the blockade is an abnormal condition in the history of peoples. It is also a negative factor for Iraq's oil industry, which is a part of the world oil industry that is not under the control of international monopolies. Moreover, the oil sector will witness continuous growth after the lifting of the blockade, which

will be good for Iraq, the Arab nation, and all of humanity. Here, I stress that lifting the blockade is important to the development of the Iraqi oil industry. I believe that this industry will witness a new turning point in terms of higher oil production levels than in the past, and the national exploitation of oil through the refinement and processing of other oil products. The decisive factor in this will be the citizen himself, God willing.

[Dirawi] What progress has the Oil Ministry made in the building phase following the odious 30-state aggression against our rising country?

[al-Hiti] The ministry has made intensive efforts to rebuild and build what was destroyed by the American-Zionist-NATO aggression against our great country. It began the building process on 1 March 1991. It started with the reactivation of the refineries. Specialized technical committees inventoried and appraised the damage done to production and service units. Technical cadres were instructed to reactivate the refineries, which required implementing the minimum process of restarting the refineries and production.

All refineries were restarted at the General Oil Refinement Installation in the northern region, as were a number of other small refineries throughout the country. Primary equipment, such as towers, furnaces, heat exchangers (water and air), pumps, compressors, and iron structures were repaired, in addition to the equipment scheduled for repair in the first phase. Regarding the central refineries of al-Dawrah, the campaign was divided into three stages, which have been implemented fully. Our technical cadres in the southern region repaired the Dhi Qar refinery, which comprises three refinement lines with a capacity of 10,000 barrels b/d. Maintenance and repair are now being carried out on the first line of the al-Basrah refinery, which has a capacity of 70,000 b/d. This refinery will hopefully be back in operation in early September. Our cadres have also been able to refurbish installations and utilities damaged by bombs and prepare 75 percent of the destroyed K/3 pumping stations to receive and pump oil from al-Basrah through the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline. We are now prepared to produce and export more than 1 million b/d if agreements are obtained and the unjust blockade on our country is lifted. In addition, our oil cadres have helped in projects in the context of the state's engineering effort for roads and bridges (such as the al-Qurnah pipeline bridge) and the maintenance and repair of the strategic service road.

At the conclusion of this interview, it pleases me, on behalf of myself and all workers in the oil sector, to take this opportunity to renew the oath to President Commander Saddam Husayn, may God protect him, to be loyal soldiers under his wise leadership and to translate his excellency's directives into tireless work. We will continue to increase the pace of building, reconstruction, and production in the service of our great Iraq.

ISRAEL

Role of Associations in Settlement Process

92AE0005A Tel Aviv YEDI'OT AHARONOT (weekend supplement) in Hebrew 27 Sep 91 p 13

[Article by Aviva Sha'abi: "You Don't Stop on Green"]

[Text] This Tuesday afternoon, row upon row of white plastic seats were placed in the middle of a white road that wound its way towards a green wadi. A group of persons, white handkerchiefs tied to their heads as protection against the burning sun, listened to the lecture of a man in a visored cap, who showed them on a map the layout of the new place, whose name is Tzur Yig'al. With a little imagination, they could see there white houses with red-tiled roofs, which could be expanded later should they so desire.

The man's words were translated into Russian over a loudspeaker. At the side was a table covered with white paper, on which sat bottles of carbonated beverages. Not far away was parked the red bus that had brought them, a group of new immigrants, from Kfar Saba to a surrealistic scene. The day before, the death of the Green Line had been officially declared. But the immigrants wanted to know if the house would be registered in the Land Registry in one's name, and where the money would come from. Ordinary things like that. From their viewpoint, anywhere was nowhere, even in the Land of Israel.

The man in the cap, Aharon Siloni, from the Sharon Settlers Association, said that the Ministry of Housing was giving loans. Whoever was interested could sign up on the spot and pay IS [Israeli shekels] 500 in cash and another IS 500 with a check dated 30 days later. No, nothing is being promised, the association is not obliged to accept anyone, and whoever makes trouble will be thrown out. Whoever is not accepted into the plan can get his money back, less the relative share of the association's costs.

Whoever signs up will receive a number, and that will be the order for the selection of the building lots. Afterwards, he will choose the house and its configuration, said Siloni, skipping over the stage of the admissions committee for each candidate. He suggested to the new settlers that they walk another 200 meters and look at the lots on which their houses would stand.

From there, from the hill that overlooks the old patrol path that once marked the Green Line, it is possible to see the houses of the settlement of Tzofim, which is called "the Savyon of Samaria," and the homes of the prestigious neighborhood of Kfar Yosef in Alphay Mena-she. Afterwards, these houses will spill over slowly to the east, across the western slopes of Samaria, and they will link up with Tzur Yig'al, which will connect with Kochav Ya'ir, which will join from the north with Tzur Natan to create a territorial continuity on both sides of

the Green Line. Settled Jewish territory right up to the horizon, as Yitzhak Shamir said in a moment of arrogance.

Tzur Yig'al, which was dedicated this week to the sounds of Pillar of Fire, is a model of settlement policy. It is part of the seven stars plan, which was initiated by MK [Knesset Member] Micha'el Eytan, one of the founders of nearby Kochav Ya'ir. The plan was aimed at thickening Jewish settlement within the Green Line along the Wadi 'Ara-Be'er Sheva axis. Eytan claims paternity over the plan, even though two years earlier the [Jewish] Agency had adopted a plan for regional development along the Lod-Yar'on axis, or Road Number 6. Eytan's project was based on the principles of population dispersal, absorption of immigration, provision of a solution for the homeless, and settlement in the spirit of the Zionist endeavor.

Eytan, who serves as chairman of the [Knesset] Subcommittee for Construction and Housing Budgets, submitted the plan to the Ministry of Housing, which was headed at the time by David Levy, and also recruited for the project Alignment MK Gedalya Gal. Gal was interested in establishing a settlement within the jurisdiction of the 'Emek Hefer Regional Council. The star that was added to the plan will be established opposite Tulkarem, and will be called Yad Hanna.

Several weeks after he entered the Ministry of Housing, Minister Sharon enthusiastically adopted the stars plan and broadened it to 20 settlements. This was a surprising step, considering the fact that Sharon opposed dense construction in the center of the country. And not surprising, if we remember that the patron is the patron of the settlements in the occupied territories, and that his byword is thickening. In any event, as 'Amiram Goldbloom, one of the leaders of Peace Now, says, the documents of the Ministry of Housing do not differentiate between construction in the territories and that carried out in the center of the country.

From Sharon's viewpoint, settlement in the region, which is thinly populated by Jews, is vital to the State of Israel. And it allows him to use cynically the term "coexistence." According to forecasts, approximately 130,000 persons will live along the axis being discussed. There are today in various stages of construction seven settlements, including the ultra-Orthodox settlement of Mazor, which is the fruit of a coalition agreement. Only life alongside of each other, said the Minister of Housing at the ceremony at Tzur Yig'al, makes possible peaceful existence.

Micha'el Eytan, a believer in the Greater Land of Israel, says explicitly: "The plan was crystallized according to the principle of 'consensus settlement' within the Green Line. But that does not prevent settlement from continuing at the same time in Judaea, Samaria, and Gaza. If the projects in the east break out westwards, a territorial continuity will be created, and then the Green Line will be erased.

Ratz MK Dedi Tzucker argues that the plan fits in with the Ministry of Housing's intention to bring about a massive thickening of settlements in the territories over the next two years. According to Tzucker's data, in the November-December period, when the peace conference is to be convened, a wave of construction is planned in the heart of Samaria and on the periphery of Jerusalem. Given the accelerated pace of construction, by the end of 1991 there will be approximately 19,000 housing units in various stages of construction in the territories, representing an investment in settlements of IS 2.7 billion.

In the November-December period, permanent construction will begin in the settlement of Reviva (which was established on the eve of Baker's visit), where 1,100 housing units will be constructed. In Avney Heyfetz 600 units will be built; in 'Aley—450 units; in Neve Oranim (next to Karney Shomron)—2,000 units; in Ari'el—1,600 units. This construction effort is focused on a strip that is 12 km wide and 25 km long, and which extends from Kfar Kassem and Tulkarem in the east to the Jerusalem-Nablus road. There will be approximately 55,000 Jews in the region at the end of the first stage.

The goal, according to Tzucker, is to create a demographic barrier between southern and northern Samaria, and to divide the region into two cantons. The region of Judaea will be a third canton. This theory accords with Sharon's old conception of making the large Arab urban centers on the West Bank into enclaves by surrounding them with Jewish settlements. Within the framework of these enclaves, argues Sharon, the residents will be able to assert some kind of self-rule.

The story of Tzur Yig'al does not lack some local drama. When the establishment of the settlement was first discussed, strong opposition developed in Kochav Ya'ir. The seven-star settlements would be, according to the plan, petit bourgeois concentrations. The Ministry of Housing criteria gives preference for the receipt of a building lot to persons who are eligible for Ministry of Housing aid—that is, to new immigrants and to homeless young couples. In Kochav Ya'ir, they did not like the idea that a transit camp would be established on the border of the prestigious settlement. A house in Kochav Ya'ir, it should be mentioned, is worth today approximately \$250,000.

An alternative idea was to take over the land that is earmarked for the new settlement and to bring it within the jurisdiction of Kochav Ya'ir, with the intention of controlling the regional planning. Micha'el Ratzon, the chairman of the Likud young guard, who was among the few individuals who supported the expansion of the settlement, says that one day all of the settlements in the area will in any event be united, so that it would be preferable to take from the Ministry of Housing the exclusive control over the planning process. In a survey conducted on the initiative of the chairman of the council, David Rosh, who is one of Eytan's opponents, a majority of the residents opposed the expansion of the settlement.

The internal political debate was also reflected in the establishment of an association that competes with Micha'el Eytan's Tzur Yig'al association. The matter of the multiplication of associations is in itself a painful subject. As the Ministry of Housing does not allow the registration of projects except by means of an association, tens of associations that purport to deal with registration for land allocations have sprung up throughout the country. There is no supervision over the activities of these associations, and there are also some that collect administrative fees from their members. The Ministry of Housing has already stated in a notice of clarification that the payment in itself does not give anyone the right to receive an allocation, and that it consequently does not recommend payment.

In the present situation, the ordinary citizen is liable to fall victim to charlatans. If, for example, you are not eligible for housing assistance and you are the owner of an apartment, or are an unmarried person less than 27 years old, you have no chances of being included in the seven stars project. But you are allowed to sign up within the 10-percent framework for the noneligible. The chances for any association of winning an immigrants tender increase with the number of eligible persons registered in it, which makes the registration of noneligible persons meaningless, but does not prevent the collection of the monies. People should be advised to check if the propositions are practical, and if the group is not being formed for money-making purposes, says Aryeh Bar, the director-general of the Ministry of Housing.

The association is responsible for planning and for the construction of the houses through a housing company. That is, separate neighborhoods, each of them belonging to a different association, may theoretically arise in one settlement. The construction cost figures that are being bandied about (about \$75,000 for a small housing unit of 60 square meters) also have no basis in the initial stage, and there is already talk of even larger costs for development. What is certain is that this has nothing to do with reality.

Rumors in Tzur Yig'al refer to seven associations. Officially, there are two. Eytan's and one that belongs to a member of the Siloni council and which also is supported by the head of the Kochav Ya'ir council. Next week, the tender will be published for the first stage, in which 500 housing units are to be constructed. Approximately 1,000 persons are registered in Eytan's association, 60 percent of them Soviet immigrants, the rest being young couples and unmarried persons. As of this time, 470 persons have registered in Siloni's association, including members of the second generation of the residents of the region and persons who are improving their housing—that is, apartment owners who dream of their own houses.

All in all, what we are talking about is a power struggle over what will spring up in the courtyard next to Kochav Ya'ir. Mich'ael Eytan argues that Siloni's association is a

means for personal profit. Siloni and his assistant, Rolly Hogen, assert that the money that they have collected is earmarked for payment of the IS 500 in good faith money that is demanded by the Ministry of Housing, and for the costs of maintaining an office and of an architect, an engineer, an attorney, and an accountant, as is stipulated in the procedures of the Ministry of Housing. The problem is that, meanwhile, nothing has happened. But the people are paying for the right to dream.

JORDAN

Water Resources Official on Dam Construction Plans

92AE0003A Amman AL-DUSTUR in Arabic 7 Sep 91
p 2

[Article: "Construction of Dams in al-Ruwayshid and al-Azraq To Store 13.5 Million Cubic Feet of Water a Year"]

[Text] The Ministry of Water and Irrigation is showing great interest in water-harvesting projects that involve building desert dams and constructing basins in various parts of the kingdom, especially desert regions, for the purpose of replenishing ground water with fresh, low-salt water, irrigating lands near the dams, and reforesting the area.

About the importance of these dams, Dr. Kamil al-[Radayidah], director of the Water Resources Administration in the Ministry of Water and Irrigation, said that the ministry had worked to construct nine desert dams in various regions: Sama al-Sirhan Dam in al-Mafraq Governorate (aggregate type, eight meters high, storage capacity 1.7 million cubic meters); al-Ghadir al-Abyad Dam, also in al-Mafraq Governorate (concrete type, 11 meters high, storage capacity 700,000 cubic meters); and Burqu' Dam in al-Mafraq Governorate (earthen type, five meters high, storage capacity 1.5 million cubic meters).

He said that the ministry had also worked on constructing al-Buwaydah Dam in Irbid Governorate (concrete type, nine meters high, storage capacity 570,000 cubic meters), so that its water could be used in irrigation operations. There is also al-Khalidiyah Dam in al-Mafraq Governorate (aggregate type, 16 meters high, storage capacity 1.1 million cubic meters) for the purpose of replenishing ground water.

He added that the ministry also had constructed Abu-Sawwan Dam in al-Zarqa' Governorate (earthen type, storage capacity 250,000 cubic meters, four meters high) for the purpose of farming the dam basin and watering livestock, and al-Muwaqqar Dam in the Capital Governorate (earthen type, four meters high, storage capacity 70,000 cubic meters) for the purpose of replenishing ground water.

He said that the ministry had worked on constructing al-Qatranah Dam in al-Karak Governorate (aggregate type, 12 meters high, storage capacity 1 million cubic meters) to replenish ground water and for drinking and irrigation; and al-Sultani Dam, also in al-Karak Governorate (aggregate type, eight meters high, storage capacity 1.2 million cubic meters) for irrigation, drinking, and replenishing ground water.

About the ministry's plan to construct more desert dams in the future, Dr. al-Radaydah indicated that the ministry, in cooperation with the Agriculture Ministry, has invited bids for the construction of North al-Ruwayshid Dam (10 million cubic meter storage capacity) and Wadi Rajil Dam in the al-Azraq area (nine meters high, storage capacity 3.5 million cubic meters of water a year). Implementation of the two projects will begin soon.

Dr. al-Radaydah said that designs for two dams were ready, but needed funding: al-Suwaqah Dam in al-Qatranah district (storage capacity 2.5 cubic meters of water a year, 19 meters high), and Wadi Jirdan Dam in Ma'an Governorate (storage capacity 700,000 cubic meters of water a year, 12 meters high).

MB Spokesman Abu-Ghanimah on Political Program

92AE0001B Beirut *AL-SHIRA* in Arabic
12 Aug 91 pp 25-27

[Interview With MB (Muslim Brotherhood) Official Spokesman Ziyad Abu-Ghanimah by Majdah Sabra; place and date not given; "Ziyad Abu-Ghanimah, MB Spokesman in Jordan: Not All Islamists Are Angels; If Arabists Adhered to Islam, We Would Let Them Lead Us in Prayer; We Don't Believe in Coups, Instantaneous Change; We Reject Any Alterations Intended to Shake Jordan's National Unity; We Seek To Gradually Revitalize Second Article of Constitution, Namely 'Islam Is Religion of State;' We Are People Most Pleased With, in Greatest Need of Democracy"]

[Text] Now that a broad margin of free political movement has been experienced in the Jordanian arena, the religious organizations and parties have engaged in public movement. These parties include the Muslim Brotherhood [MB] movement, that has gained this year the highest degree of their participation in the Jordanian political, student, and labor union life.

The House of Representatives includes 22 MB deputies, meaning that the Brotherhood holds one-quarter of the House seats. Moreover, 'Abd-al-Latif 'Arabiyyat, the House speaker, is from the MB. The Brotherhood also held five ministerial portfolios in the previous cabinet. However, it has been excluded from the latest cabinet composition. This has motivated the Brotherhood to oppose this cabinet and to characterize it as a cabinet for peace with the United States.

Moreover, the MB has gained the majority of seats in the municipal councils of the various Jordanian towns and in the labor, student, and teacher unions.

The Brotherhood was able to partially impose the segregation of sexes that it had been demanding in official and public establishments. This segregation was initiated in the Ministry of Development and Environment, was headed by Minister Yusuf al-'Azm (from the MB). An attempt was made to apply this segregation to the Ministry of Education in preparation for spreading it to schools. But exclusion of the Brotherhood from the new Jordanian cabinet has abolished all the manifestations which accompanied the Brotherhood's control of the five ministerial portfolios and normalcy has now been restored.

In a study of the left's retreat, which has benefitted the predominance of the religious tendency, Dr. Hani Hawrani says: "The Jordanian left, with all its forces, leads only a small number of labor unions and it does not have a befitting influence in the professional unions. Meanwhile, the Jordanian University elections have demonstrated the decline of the left's influence in favor of the religious forces, which pose a serious challenge at the level of the women's, youth, and government teachers' organizations, and of the labor and professional unions."

Dr. Hawrani adds: "At the level of charitable and voluntary social action, the left's contribution to this action is almost symbolic, considering that the arena is free for the religious forces, tribal organizations, and bourgeois elites."

Before we record the current condition of the MB in the Jordanian arena through an interview with Ziyad Abu-Ghanimah, we will backtrack to the start of MB activity in the mid-1940s, through a study by Dr. Sulayman Suways who says:

"In the mid-1940s, the first MB branch was founded in Jerusalem by Jamal al-Husayni. The movement's activities in Palestine gained official approval and recognition in October 1946. Other branches were founded in Jordan, where the movement got the blessing of King 'Abdallah, who expressed his confidence that the MB would devote itself to God absolutely.

"Al-Hajj 'Abd-al-Latif Abu-Qurah headed the MB movement until 1953. He was succeeded by Muhammad 'Abd-al-Rahman Khalifah, who became the movement's first leader from 1954 to the mid-1960s.

"In 1957, the MB was officially recognized as an organization, contrary to the majority of the political parties. Even after the Jordanian Government issued that year a decree dissolving all the political parties, the MB continued to engage in its activities publicly, as it had done previously.

"MB meetings were attended by official government representatives, by army officers, and by prominent

religious leaders. In his writings on the Muslim movements in Jordan, Dr. Musa al-Kilani says that this integration between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jordanian regime was most obvious in the parliamentary elections. The MB took part regularly in the elections of 1954, 1956, 1962, and 1967.

"It is to be noted that the MB is the sole political organization that has been operating legally in Jordan since 1967, and that it is still not considered a political party."

The objectives which the movement seeks to accomplish, which are contained in the Jerusalem Charter are summed by Dr. Suways in the following:

- "The educational objective of purifying Islam by returning to the pure original principles and by harmonizing these principles with the requirements of the modern age.
- "The practical objective of uniting the Islamic countries by coordinating their viewpoints and establishing firm communication among their peoples.
- "The economic objective of developing the Islamic world and of making certain of the fair distribution of its wealth among the peoples.
- "The social objective of promoting charity and alms and of uprooting poverty, ignorance, and disease.
- "The national objective of implanting the spirit of pan-Islamism in the hearts of the Islamic peoples.
- "The international objective of making Islam the basis of a unique international civilization.

Brotherhood's Election Program

In the 1989 parliamentary election campaign, the MB spread the slogan of "Islam is the solution." The Brotherhood's election platform included the call for abolishing martial law, releasing public liberties, dealing with the economic situation, and supporting the Palestinian intifadah through the Hamas Movement. Twenty-one MB deputies forming a single bloc, plus 10 other deputies belonging to the independent Islamic tendency, won in that election.

The MB has issued a number of publications in Jordan, including AL-KIFAH AL-ISLAMI [ISLAMIC STRUGGLE], a weekly published in the 1950s. In the mid-1960s, Kamil al-Sharif (who was a Brotherhood leader in Egypt) supervised publication of AL-MANAR [THE LIGHTHOUSE], a daily, after he had fled Egypt during President 'Abd-al-Nasir's administration. This paper, financed by Mahmud al-Sharif, Kamil's brother, dealt with the Brotherhood's positions and ideas in Jordan. AL-RAYAH AL-ISLAMIYAH [THE ISLAMIC BANNER], a weekly, was issued in 1990. The weekly AL-RIBAT [THE BOND], the Brotherhood's organ in Jordan, is issued currently.

Muslim Brothers consider themselves part of an Islamic movement that encompasses the Arab and Islamic countries. This is why they weave relations of mutual solidarity and support with Islamic organizations outside

Jordan, regardless of whether this support is political, propaganda, or material support.

In response to the question "Who are you?" Ziyad Abu-Ghanimah, the MB official spokesman during the election campaign, said in his interview with AL-SHIRA:

"We are the Muslim Brotherhood, a group of Muslims. We never claim that we are all the Muslims. Moreover, we are a part of the Islamic movement and we never claim that we are the entire Islamic movement. What we mean is that we believe that the Islamic action arena is very broad and that it can accommodate whoever wishes to serve this religion under any name.

"For cooperation with those working with Islam, the MB has embraced a formula established by the martyred Imam Hasan al-Banna, namely that we cooperate on what we agree on, excuse each other for what we disagree on, and do not allow differences of opinion to be cause for division and fragmentation.

"The Brotherhood is an Islamic group that works to restore God's rule to the land and to liberate all Islamic soil wherever Islamic land is afflicted with colonialism or oppression. We believe that the only solution to all our Arab and Islamic nation's problems is a return to the rule, faith, thought, and heritage of Islam.

"I also believe that one of the MB's most important objectives is to achieve unity among all Muslims and to have this unity accomplished gradually so that unity of the Arab countries can be established first, considering that these countries constitute a single geographic region that is easy to unite. When Arab unity is accomplished, we should then proceed to achieve comprehensive unity among all Islamic countries."

[Sabra] Debates have been kindled and conferences have been organized on Arabism and Islam. Here are your words demonstrating the presence of common points that unite you with the pan-Arabists.

[Abu-Ghanimah] We do not deny that our pan-Arabist brothers are no less loyal to their Arab homeland and their Arab nation and that they wish, as we do, to rescue our nation from this humiliating tragic condition that is currently engulfing it. But we disagree greatly with our pan-Arabist brothers on the means which leads to this objective. Very regrettably, they continue to steer clear off embracing Islam as a means, or a sole means, to lead them to what they desire. They replace Islam by Marxism at times, by the socialist theory at other times, and by secularism a third time. Islam rejects and fights all these means. This is why we believe that our pan-Arabist brothers are urged now, and we say this with utter sincerity, to reconsider their means. Should God open their hearts, God willing, to embrace Islam as a creed, a system of life, a law, and a constitution for Muslims, and as a heritage and a civilization for non-Muslim Arabs, then we urge them to reconsider Islam and to adopt it as a course for achieving the Arab

nation's objectives. Should this happen, we will have met with the pan-Arabists, not only on objectives, but also on means.

We promise our pan-Arabist brothers that if they adhere to Islam as we adhere to it, and if they embrace Islam as we embrace it, then we are prepared to give them the reins of leadership and to be their soldiers in accomplishing the Arab nation's objectives through their adoption of Islam. We never seek to become leaders. We are prepared [to give up the leadership] if we are completely convinced that our pan-Arabist brothers have abandoned their Marxist, communist, and secular principles and adopted Islam totally. Islam, my honorable sister, is not a painting in an exhibit to be looked at, admired, and then forgotten as soon as one moves to the next painting. Islam is a faith which incorporates prayer, alms, adherence to God's law, and it covers the permissible and the proscribed. We want the pan-Arabists to understand this concept. It is not enough to say that Islam is one of our sources of strength or our sole source of strength. Despite all the dialogues we hold with our pan-Arabist brothers, the only thing we hear from them are admiring words. We have not despaired yet. We will rejoice when we find that our pan-Arabist brothers precede us to the mosque and we will let them lead us in prayer.

[Sabra] Who says that the pan-Arabists are less Muslim than others? Many of them perform their prayers on time and embrace Islam as a religion and a practice.

[Abu-Ghanimah] I am not talking of individuals. I am talking of forces. There are brother pan-Arabists who are pious and fear God. But I am talking of forces. We want certain Arab forces to say: 'We have embraced Islam.' We want them to tell their members universally: 'We have embraced Islam as a faith and a worship rite.' These words do not mean that whoever belongs to the Islamic movements is an angel. There are among us those who err and who abandon prayer for a time. This is human nature. We do not engage in oneupmanship and allege that we are more religious than others. We acknowledge people's due and virtue. But I am talking about the pan-Arab groupings. To date, we have not heard that any pan-Arab group has abandoned Marxism, whereas the originators of Marxism have abandoned it.

Islam and Arabism

[Sabra] But not all the forces are Marxist.

[Abu-Ghanimah] The majority are. The Arab nationalists and others are.

[Sabra] But the Arab homeland's Nasirist and Ba'thist forces are not Marxist.

[Abu-Ghanimah] This is true. I don't believe that the Nasirist forces constitute any influential presence among the masses now. I believe that there are now in Jordan symbols that no longer have an actual presence. The real presence belongs to the organized party forces, such as the Arab nationalists and others who project themselves

as the Popular Front, and to the Ba'thists. We have engaged in dialogue and we have explained to them the nature of the erroneous ideas that these parties have formed about the MB. We have tried to persuade them that we are vastly ahead of them in the belief that there is no difference between Arabism as an affiliation and Islam as a faith. Martyr Hasan al-Banna wrote for us in the 1940s that "action in the interest of Arabism flows into the interest of Islam and action in the interest of Islam flows into the interest of Arabism." When he wrote his messages, al-Banna opened them with the words "my brothers in Islam and Arabism." Some brothers in Pakistan asked him to suggest a name to give to a publishing house there, and he suggested "Dar al-'Urubah" [Arabism House]. To date, it is one of the biggest publishing houses there. Our pan-Arabist brothers were surprised when we familiarized them with this information during our dialogues.

[Sabra] Do you see a future for these dialogues?

[Abu-Ghanimah] Yes, the dialogue goes on and I hope that we will reach a point where our objectives and means will meet with theirs.

[Sabra] What is the program you have projected at the domestic level?

[Abu-Ghanimah] Our program in any country is channeled to serve our goals: to establish God's law on earth, to liberate any part of the Muslim homeland if it is occupied, and to achieve Arab unity. This is why we are trying gradually, i.e., with persuasion and not with force, to revitalize Article 2 of Jordan's constitution, which states that Islam is the official state religion. What this means is that we are trying to purge, with persuasion, any Jordanian laws that violate Islamic law [shari'ah]. As the MB, we do not believe in coups or in instantaneous change.

Therefore, our objectives are to proceed toward applying Islamic law to all aspects of Jordan and to keep Jordan strong and impregnable, so that it could be the nucleus for liberating Palestine, because we believe that the prophet, may God's peace and prayers be upon him, promised us that Jordan will be the land where the forces will be amassed to liberate Palestine. In a confirmed Prophetic tradition [hadith], the Prophet said: "You will fight the Jews. You will be east of the river and they will be west of the river. You will kill them and the stone and the tree will say: 'O Muslim, O servant of God, there is a Jew behind me. Kill him.'"

This is a confirmed hadith, which we believe to be genuine and true. This is why we seek to keep Jordan and its security impregnable. This is why we reject any changes that may weaken security. This is why we want Jordan's national unity to be impervious and why we, as the MB, call for reinforcing national unity among the citizens. We fight regional jingoism (Palestinian and Jordanian) as we fight sectarian jingoism (Muslim and Christian).

[Sabra] What are the means or methods that you embrace?

[Abu-Ghanimah] We embrace all the means and methods we can to educate our masses as to the importance of national unity, and to try to build bridges with all of the country's forces. We invite the pan-Arabists to our rallies, in which we deliver addresses reflecting our eagerness for national unity. We also take part in rallies sponsored by our brothers in the Pan-Arab Grouping, which encompasses the leftist parties, in order to express national unity. We also reject any attempts by Muslim or Christian radicals to create sectarian sedition. We do not at all condone the occurrence of such sedition under the circumstances currently engulfing us from every side. What concerns us is to see Jordan strong economically. This is why we fight corruption. Our brothers in Parliament are fully eager to fight corruption.

Fighting Corruption

[Sabra] How will you fight corruption?

[Abu-Ghanimah] First, by ending all forms of current corruption. The truth is that we can say that the presence of the House of Representatives and the efforts of the MB deputies and other deputies [go into this fight]. We do not allege that we are the only ones concerned with the country. The other deputies are also concerned. These efforts have curtailed and diminished the various forms of corruption in the country, which are no longer as they were in past years and before democracy.

Second, we want to open the dossiers of past corruption. Our brothers in the House of Representatives persistently urge the opening of corruption dossiers. But there is difficulty. He who steals and takes graft money does not leave behind easy proof and evidence. This is why they now find it difficult to pursue past incidents of corruption. But God be thanked, corruption has diminished greatly and control has become good. These are our phased objectives in Jordan.

[Sabra] What are the practical plans that you have submitted in the Jordanian arena?

[Abu-Ghanimah] The MB is an Islamic group that understands Islam comprehensively and completely. We are, as Imam Hasan al-Banna characterized us, a political, social, sufi, and fundamentalist group, as well as a group concerned with the public well-being. This is why we operate on all fronts. In the political arena, we have our presence in Parliament and among the other political forces. Socially, we have our activities in all parts of Jordan through charitable associations founded by the Muslim Brotherhood, especially the Islamic Center Charitable Association, which has founded the Islamic Hospital. This Islamic Hospital is a fruit of the Brotherhood movement.

[Sabra] Where do you get the financing?

[Abu-Ghanimah] The hospital is now self-financing. Initially, financing came from the contributions of charitable men, and not necessarily MB members. The hospital has the so-called Poor Patient Fund. From the time this fund was established at the end of 1982 until the present time, we find that it has aided tens of thousands of patients with nearly 1.5 million dinars. This is a sum that not even governments can afford.

We also have educational institutions for males and females in al-Zarqa' and the Dar al-Arqam chain of schools in Amman. It is one of the kingdom's largest schools. Registration for enrollment in this chain is closed even before it is announced.

[Sabra] And what about its fees?

[Abu-Ghanimah] Among the lowest school fees in the kingdom, because we proliferate our ideas through these institutions. Among private hospitals, the Islamic Hospital charges the lowest fees and helps numerous poor patients. We also have alms committees in refugee camps and villages. They collect donations from Friday congregations and from donors, and they distribute monthly stipends to orphans and widows.

These projects serve the movement. In our dealings with people, we also try to bring them closer to God and urge them to adhere to Islam.

[Sabra] At the outset of the Islamic revolution in Iran, this tide covered the entire Arab region. Now that this tide has receded relatively, the Brotherhood movement has become more active than before.

[Abu-Ghanimah] The truth is that this is a monstrous historical error. The Islamic tide was present before the Iranian revolution, and the proof is that it was being fought in all the Arab countries. In Egypt, for example, the MB tide was one of the reasons behind the success of the Egyptian revolution, as acknowledged by the very leaders of that revolution. But then, we have our own opinion on this issue, and this is not the place to discuss it. This movement was suppressed in Egypt and in other Arab countries over a period of 20 years.

But the movement has had a strong presence in Jordan, and this presence has surfaced openly or gone into hiding, depending on the circumstances. The Brotherhood was the party damaged most by the government of Zayd al-Rifa'i, in particular. What I mean is that the [anti-Brotherhood] measures reached the extent of dismissal from the university and detention. The truth is that the Iranian revolution is different from the Islamic tide generated by the MB and the Islamic movements, in that it has attained power. Its attainment of power gave it a strong momentum in realizing its presence. Initially, we supported the Iranian revolution. But now we have numerous reservations about it, and we have informed them [the Iranians] of these reservations.

Family of Several Homes

[Sabra] What is the extent of the coordination between you and the Islamic movements?

[Abu-Ghanimah] We consider every Muslim Brotherhood organization in any part of the world a fraternal organization. We consider any harm afflicting such an organization a harm afflicting us, and any good fortune befalling it a good fortune befalling us. Each of these organizations is independent of the others. It is exactly like a family with several sons, with each son having his own home and his method of work. But when any harm is suffered, all meet like a single family. We in Jordan have our independent decision-making, but we feel that we are part of the big family called the brotherhood group. There is coordination among Islamic movements in all parts of the world, [including] Islamists in Turkey, Malaysia, and Pakistan.

[Sabra] What is your assessment of the Brotherhood conditions in Jordan now that a democratic climate has been restored?

[Abu-Ghanimah] We are the people most pleased with democracy because we consider ourselves the people who need it most. We will protect it with all our might because we benefit from democracy by the same degree as all other people benefit from it. We always urge that democracy be spread to all the Arab countries. What we demanded of Iraqi President Saddam Husayn when we supported him during the Gulf war was to grant true democracy to everybody in Iraq, including the MB, which is denied a presence in Iraq to start with.

We demand that democracy be spread to Tunisia, Algeria, and the various Arab countries, and that people in these countries be allowed free expression and permitted to practice their rites as they wish.

Communist Party Head on Members' Crisis of Confidence

92AE0001A Beirut AL-SHIRA' in Arabic
19 Aug 91 pp 28-29

[Interview With Ya'qub Zayadin, Jordanian Communist Party Secretary General, by Majdah Sabra; place and date not given; "Jordanian Communist Party Secretary General: 'What Communism Has Experienced Is Earthquake That Has Caused Us To Lose Confidence in Socialism; Our New Policy Is To Open Up to All Tendencies, Including Religious Ones; House of Representatives Needs Policy of Few Words, Lot of Action; If We Are Not Given Freedom, Democracy, We Will Resume Underground Activity; We Are Trying to Reorganize Ourselves; There Will Be Change in Our Real Situation; During Gulf Crisis, Only Opinion Supportive of Saddam Was Allowed'"]

[Text] The Jordanian Communist Party is one of the first political parties known to Jordan. Some sources even

consider it the first party established in the early 1950s on precise organizational and party bases.

After the West Bank of Palestine had been annexed to the Kingdom of Jordan, the Jordanian Communist Party was formed in mid-1951 as a result of a merger between remnants of the National Liberation League (Communist Party) in Palestine and the Marxist cells that were spread in the East Bank.

The Jordanian Government's position toward the Communist Party has always been intolerant and unnegotiable. In early 1948, King 'Abdallah issued a law to fight communism. The penalty for violating this law was a three-year prison term or banishment. This law—law number 91-1953—was founded on the assumption that communism in Jordan sought to replace the kingdom's government with the system prevalent in the communist countries and to establish a proletarian dictatorship. This ban was also applied to the World Peace Movement and the National Front. The Communist Party and the Front were never recognized in Jordan and continued to be persecuted. The government also tried to prevent communist influence from infiltrating labor unions through financial aid.

Ex-Prime Minister Mudar Badran abolished the "law to fight communism" at the beginning of 1990.

The Jordanian Communist Party embraced Leninist Marxism. When the party was first founded, its political program called for abrogating the Jordanian-British treaty, Arabizing the army, allowing democratic liberties, and developing the country's economy.

The party was able to make several accomplishments and to experience a popular tide. In cooperation with the other national parties, the Communist Party organized and led numerous movements against colonialism and against British influence in Jordan and in the other Arab countries.

Indian Researcher 'Aql Haydar 'Abidi submitted to New Delhi University a doctorate thesis characterizing the Jordanian Communist Party as the best-organized party with the most precise activity. The party moved among middle-class professionals and received a broad response from the Palestinians for its opposition to the Zionist bourgeoisie. There were two factors that curtailed the party's influence: First, the ordinary Jordanian citizen's hatred for communism and, second, this citizen's denunciation of this party's close cooperation with its counterpart in Israel.

In 1953, the Communist Party issued AL-JAMAHIR and then AL-JABHAH newspapers. It also participated in the 1956 parliamentary elections and gained two seats in the House of Representatives, with Fa'iq Warrad representing Ramallah and Ya'qub Zayadin, the current party secretary general, representing Jerusalem.

In wake of the extreme repression to which the government resorted after dismissal of al-Nabulsi's national

government in April 1957, the Jordanian Communist Party and other national forces were subjected to pursuit, incarceration, and persecution. Harsh jail sentences were given to numerous party leaders, and other circumstances in the following years helped to weaken the party and curtail its political and popular influence in the late 1960s.

In wake of the 1967 setback, ideological and political differences (e.g., the position toward the Palestinian resistance) surfaced among party leaders. In early 1970, the party formed the al-Ansar [Partisans] Organization to fight against the Israeli occupation. The party then issued AL-WATAN newspaper in the West Bank. The party branch in the bank developed and called itself the Palestinian Communist Organization in 1974. In February 1982, the organization became the Palestinian Communist Party by virtue of the remarkable developments occurring in the Palestinian issue.

Currently, the Jordanian Communist Party is fighting to secure democratic liberties for the masses, to solve the masses' economic and living crises, and to support the Palestinian people's and PLO's struggle to wrench the right to self-determination, to defeat the Israeli occupation, and to establish the Palestinian state. The party ran in the parliamentary elections of November 1989 in numerous towns and districts. 'Isa Madanat, a party Political Bureau member, won a seat representing al-Karak Governorate.

The party has organizations in various sectors and evident influence within the labor union movement. It also has relations of cooperation with the country's other national political forces and parties, and firm relations with the Arab communist parties and with the world's other communist parties. It currently issues AL-JAMAHIR, a monthly; AL-HAQIQAH, a quarterly; and other periodicals, such as AL-AMIL.

The party convened its council in 1987. Since the party was founded, its post of secretary general has been held in succession by Fu'ad Nassar (died in 1976), Fa'iq Warrad, and, finally, Ya'qub Zayadin. Party leaders include 'Isa Madanat, Emily Naffa', and 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-'Ata.

A book entitled the "Social Conflict Issues in Jordan" was published by the party unofficially. Dr. Ya'qub Zayadin also published the book entitled "The Beginnings" in 1980. It is an autobiography about 40 years in the Jordanian national movement.

Openly

AL-SHIRA' interviewed Ya'qub Zayadin, the Jordanian Communist Party secretary general, who talked about the party's experience with the government and its connection with whatever goes on in the Jordanian and international arenas.

Describing the party's present condition, Zayadin has said: "We in the party are now working through the

office of Deputy 'Isa Madanat. We meet in this office freely and we publish the party statement and the secretary general's statements in the press. This is something to which we have not been previously accustomed. Thus, the party has moved from underground activity to public activity. Now that the issue of licensing parties has been raised, we hope to apply for a license. We will try to have a free platform and to hold dialogue and debate with the youth on our issues and on how the international developments affect us."

[Sabra] How have the developments in the Soviet Union and in the East European countries affected you?

[Zayadin] The concepts and confidence of numerous comrades and friends in socialism and in the Soviet Union have been shaken. What has happened in the Soviet Union and in the eastern countries has affected and left its impressions on a large number of people. We must acknowledge this fact. We, as Communists, have also contributed to this condition. It is true that socialism has not fulfilled our aspiration and that we made a mistake by opting for it. We did not take control of government and we made a mistake. But we signed and approved of everything that happened in those days. We advocated socialism and defended it. Now, we see that it was wrong. We have accepted part of the responsibility before the people, before ourselves, and before our conscience.

The party is now suffering the consequences of this earthquake which has affected the minds of numerous comrades, as it has affected past convictions to which they had become accustomed. We are trying to reorganize ourselves. We are also trying to apply [ourselves] and examine our conditions more thoroughly. There will be changes in our program, our alliances, and our reality. As Jordanian Communists, we have to be objective now and we must devote attention to the issues developing in the Jordanian arena. We must be independent in organizing our policy, but not in isolation from what happens in the world, of course. This is why we seek to move freely and openly.

[Sabra] To reach this phase, how are you moving in Jordan?

[Zayadin] We have an underground newspaper and we have our private printing presses. There has recently been a development which we consider to be a relative development. We issued some editions, which were printed on regular presses. Consequently, we were pursued anew. The police stormed these regular presses and warned them of the consequences of printing our newspaper without getting a permit from the intelligence agency. I believe that we will go back to our underground printing presses. So you see that democracy in our country is not as deep as people abroad think. If full freedom or democracy is not granted, we will resume the underground activity with which we have gained experience for many years. We are capable of standing fast.

[Sabra] More than one faction has split away from the Jordanian Communist Party. Will these splits affect the party's march?

[Zayadin] It is normal that differences will occur within any party that grows and develops. The party experienced some splits in 1970 and 1978. But modification and change are being made within our ranks. This is something normal to all countries and all parties.

[Sabra] Have your programs undergone changes?

[Zayadin] We are now preparing to convene a congress. An extensive study is being conducted on the programs of the Lebanese, Iraqi, and Algerian communist parties. We will try to take advantage of these parties' programs.

[Sabra] Didn't you benefit from the experience of these parties in the past?

[Zayadin] We benefited greatly, and we will benefit even more if we devote attention to pan-Arabism, Arab unity, democracy within the party, and to bolstering new relations and alliances. In the past, we were a little too strict and isolated.

Now, we are interested in change and in alliance with the other political parties. Moreover, we now embrace a policy of greater openness toward the religious tendencies than in the past, considering that there are moderate Islamic parties that are also seeking change and that see no objection in opening up to the other political parties.

[Sabra] To what degree have you established coordination with the other Arab communist parties?

[Zayadin] We have good relations with the Lebanese Communist Party, and with the Syrian and Iraqi parties. In August 1990, we held in Damascus a conference of Arab communist parties which was attended by 11 parties. We emerged with full agreement. We exchanged experiences and we evaluated the party's internal conditions and the Arab political conditions.

[Sabra] Internally, to what degree have you coordinated with the other national forces?

[Zayadin] There is coordination with these national forces and our relations with them are good. We participate effectively in the Jordanian National Pan-Arab Grouping, which excludes the Islamists, who have another grouping. We have contributed well to making this grouping successful and we are in full agreement with the other parties. Our causes and objectives are not in conflict on the issues of democracy, negotiations, the demand for a fair solution to the Palestinian problem, establishment of the Palestinian state, confronting the U.S. domination in wake of the Gulf crisis, the evacuation of foreign forces from Iraq, and the restoration of democracy to Iraq. We are in agreement with all parties on these demands. There is no problem here.

[Sabra] How do you view the proliferation of religious parties in Jordan?

[Zayadin] Religious parties have multiplied everywhere, and this is no longer confined to Islamic or Christian religious parties. There is a reversion to religion in the United States and France, and I say that the reason for this reversion is the failure of the entire socialist experiment in the Arab world and in Europe. The progressive, democratic, and leftist forces need to examine this condition, unite their ranks, and find better means to reach the masses.

Qualitative Step

[Sabra] What is your assessment of Jordan's democratic experiment?

[Zayadin] There is no doubt that the incidents that occurred in Jordan in 1989 and the subsequent reelection constituted a qualitative move in Jordan's life after all the years of suppression and intimidation, beginning with the days of the British mandate. During the elections, I had just come out of jail after my detention in the wake of the conditions and demonstrations witnessed in the Jordanian arena in April 1989. The party leaders had disappeared from sight for a period of six months, and our activities were taking place in utter secrecy.

[Sabra] How many times have you been jailed?

[Zayadin] In 12 years, 12 times. Always, the charge was that I was a communist. I was never brought to trial. When I applied to run as a candidate in the 1989 election, they asked me for what is called a "clear criminal record." It was then that I discovered that I had been sentenced to a 21-year prison term in absentia on the charge of taking part in a coup attempt in 1957. I knew nothing about the nature of this sentence. Fortunately, a general amnesty was issued for all political cases. So the sentence was canceled and I was allowed to run for election.

We experienced full freedom in the 1989 elections. We talked to the masses at length in symposia. This was our first experience with appearing publicly since 1956, i.e. when I was a physician in Jerusalem and was elected as deputy representing the city, keeping in mind that I am a Jordanian from the south, i.e., from al-Karak. Excluding this experience, we have not felt any democratic action other than the release of a large number of political detainees, the reinstatement of a large number of politicians in their jobs, and permitting numbers of people to return to Jordan. We have also enjoyed the permission to travel as in the past. But democracy requires deeper action. It needs institutions; youth, student, teacher, laborer, and farmer unions are still prohibited and the media's doors are still closed to some notables and parties.

One of the worst indications of Jordan's poor democracy is what happened during the Gulf crisis. Dissenting opinion was totally prohibited and only one opinion, i.e.,

the opinion supportive of Saddam Husayn, was permitted. I am one of those who were violently attacked by the press for two full weeks just because I expressed a different opinion.

The Jordanian press fell into the pits of overblowing and exaggerating the Iraqi army's size and its ability to destroy the other armies. When Iraq hit Israel with Scud missiles, some people packed their bags in hope of returning to Haifa and Jaffa. Let us return to democracy. Democracy requires that the House of Representatives be a democratic institution. It requires deputies to steer clear of oratory and to embrace the policy of few words and a lot of action. We hope that this experiment will be entrenched to serve the people's interests. Democracy is not for Jordan alone, but for all the Arab countries.

Returnees, Visitors Create Amman Transportation Crisis

92AE0003B Amman AL-RA'Y in Arabic 4 Sep 91 p 4

[Article by 'Isam Qadmani: "Returnees From Kuwait Create Transportation Crisis. Transportation Agency Tries Hard To Import New Buses To Deal With Situation"]

[Text] Whatever the reasons for Amman's present transportation crisis—whether a shortage of public and private vehicles or the enormous sudden population increase involving returnees from Kuwait and large numbers of other visitors—there is a suffocating crisis that lasts from early morning to late at night.

The crisis is concentrated in Amman and the neighboring governorates of al-Zarqa' and Irbid. The reason is that the majority of returnees have settled in Amman and al-Zarqa' and have avoided the other governorates.

Preliminary studies indicate that all types of transportation have so far been unable to absorb the great number of citizens who depend primarily on these means for their movement.

An observer who tours the taxi and bus depots in Amman and al-Zarqa' clearly sees from the long lines of citizens waiting for a bus or taxi how bad the crisis has become. One sees it at depots like Raghdan and the one for out-of-town trips in al-Zarqa', for example—these two depots, in particular, service the bulk of passengers wishing to travel between the two governorates or within the capital district, not to mention the fact that they are very constricted in space.

What is the solution? What can the relevant government agencies do?

Mr. Sulayman al-[Habab]bah, director of the Public Transportation Agency, told AL-RA'Y about the agency's complicated concerns. He said that the agency, with the new buses, had a fleet of 290 small and large buses.

He said that this small number serves the capital and some of the surrounding cities. With the increase in demand, the agency has been facing real difficulties in developing its operation and covering the lines on which there is now a critical need to operate buses. He said that 30 large buses out of the agency's total bus fleet were old and operating with great difficulty. At this particular time, it is impossible to renovate any of them, because it costs 15,000 dinars to service a large bus so that it is restored to normal condition.

He added that the agency, which began its work of serving citizens in 1974, had made minor adjustments in fares, the last of them in 1982. He stated that the failure to adjust fares despite rising costs for replacement parts, maintenance, and salaries could be attributed to the government's contribution to them to support citizens in opposing the dominance of privately-owned buses, which had not been subject to definite, clear regulations at the beginning of their operation.

He said that the agency wants to import 40 medium-sized buses to keep up with the high demand and support its lines in the capital.

Mr. al-Habab]bah stated that the reason preventing the agency's operations from extending outside the boundaries of the capital and nearby cities was lack of support.

Given this situation, what is required from the government, as represented by the ministries interested in this sector (Interior and Transportation), is cooperation to find a way out of this predicament. There is heavy traffic by returnees. There are large numbers of private groups that have chosen sites for themselves near the capital, while the government has not yet taken any measures to deal with these new facts.

Delay in Industrial City Services Stymies Investment

92AE0020A Amman JORDAN TIMES in English 11 Sep 91 p 3

[Text] Amman (J.T.)—Following the end of the Gulf crisis and in the wake of the return to the Kingdom of thousands of expatriates, the Jordan Industrial Estates Corporation (JIEC) has been flooded with requests by investors to set up industrial projects in the al-Hassan Industrial City in Irbid, according to JIEC Director General Fayiz Suhaymat.

But, he said, the investments have been delayed because of the incomplete infrastructure in the industrial city, particularly electricity, water and telephone services.

In July, Dr. Suhaymat said that four new industrial companies have [been] established in the industrial city, altogether investing about 800,000 JD [dinars].

However, Dr. Suhaymat said that the delay in establishing power supply services have been hampering further investments.

To speed up the procedures, the JIEC has been in contact with the Irbid District Electricity Company (IDEC), the Telecommunications Corporation (TCC) and the Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) for supplies. Dr. Suhaymat said in a statement to the Jordan News Agency, Petra.

He said that the IDEC has responded favourably and will supply the electric power shortly. The company director, 'Abd-al-Ra'uf al-Shaykh, said that electricity will reach all the factories within 10 days.

As to the TCC, its Irbid Department Director, Nabil Khiyali, said that part of the telephone network installed by a foreign firm will be operational and work is underway to offer telephone service to the rest of the network.

In reference to the water situation, Dr. Suhaymat said that because of the scarcity of the water resources available to the WAJ the JIEC has drilled an artesian well solely to supply the industrial city in Irbid. The coming two weeks, he said, will witness the start of water distribution from that well.

In 10 days most of the areas remaining in the industrial city will be occupied by factories.

Dr. Suhaymat said in July that the Sahab Industrial City near Amman encompasses 213 industrial projects but JIEC was trying to provide further space for additional factories.

The al-Hassan Industrial City in Irbid was built recently on 42 dunums of land and has facilities for 80 factories.

KUWAIT

Economic Life Returns to Normal

91AE0628A London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 31 Aug 91 p 4

[Article by [Mai] Rumani: "Normal Life Returns, Thanks to Firefighting Teams; We Expect To Control All Fires Before March"]

[Text] The governor of al-Ahmadi, Shaykh Muhammad al-Khalid al-Sabah, has announced his intention to make a tour next week of the Burqan oil field, in order to learn about the practical measures taken by fire-fighting teams to hasten the extinguishing of fires burning in the field's oil wells, considered to be one of the largest producing fields in the world.

Shaykh Muhammad al-Khalid expressed his gratitude for the efforts of workers in the Kuwaiti Oil Company (KOC), and of those of sister states' companies participating in fire-fighting operations in the governorate. He praised their work, describing it as "humanitarian."

Last Wednesday, 28 August 1991, the governor of al-Ahmadi conducted a field inspection of burning wells in the governorate. He was accompanied on this tour by a delegation from the KOC, Engineer Sa'ud al-Nashmi,

the director of his office, certain governorate officials, and a delegation of media persons. The purpose of this inspection was to learn firsthand the nature of the damage left behind by the iniquitous Iraqi invasion.

Shaykh Muhammad al-Khalid stated that he was ready to join in with the work teams that will begin fire-fighting operations on 4 September 1991 in the Burqan field. In his statements to journalists, he added that he has had discussions with members of the governorate's council to prepare field arrangements in the governorate to assess the present situation and to review problems, starting with education, health, sports, and consumer cooperatives, in order to report conditions to the relevant authorities and reach appropriate solutions.

The governor said that he had visited 65 families that have martyrs or missing persons, in order to learn their situations and understand their problems. He stressed that, in light of these visits, the work of the Office of Families of Prisoners, Martyrs, and Missing Persons would receive attention, in order to learn their conditions and report them to the relevant authorities.

Concerning security conditions in the governorate, Shaykh Muhammad al-Khalid stated that there were certain shortcomings that have resulted in the creation of mobile inspection posts. This was cited in the statement of Crown Prince and Prime Minister 'Shaykh Sa'id al-'Abdallah al-Sabah that "every citizen is a sentinel." The governor emphasized that action in the governorate will be in accordance with those words, and that security officers need citizen cooperation. He expressed his support for assistance in implementing reconstruction projects through the establishment of public gardens, athletic fields, or amusement parks within the governorate. He praised the efforts of everyone concerned with Kuwait's reconstruction plan, and the return of normal life to Kuwait in this rapid fashion.

On the other hand, Engineer Sa'ud al-Nashmi of the KOC stated that the oil well fire-fighting teams in al-Ahmadi Governorate were using high-tech equipment, capable of changing oil well valves with great rapidity. He expressed optimism on the possibility of extinguishing all burning wells before next March. He said that the Iraqi enemy's iniquitous work was sabotage, in which wells were blown up by technical means carried out by Iraqi engineering specialists, who planted charges so that no well was safe from explosion. For this purpose, they built temporary networks connecting every five wells together, timing them to explode over a period of three to six hours, which made it easy to blow up a huge number of wells in a relatively short time.

With regard to the teams taking part in extinguishing the burning wells, he said: "There are teams from many friendly countries, including America, Canada, Britain, France, China, the Soviet Union, Hungary, Romania, Argentina, and Iran. These teams work under dense smoke in three directions, similar to what is done in

military planning." He pointed out that extinguishing one burning well facilitates the job of other teams.

Eng. al-Nashmi explained that the work process is coordinated. There is a team in both the al-Rawdatayn and al-Manaqish fields, with 15 teams in the large Burqan field, which contains 432 wells, including 365 that are ablaze, according to objective statistics. He stressed that the number of wells under control as of 28 August was 340.

He referred to the training plan drawn up for Kuwaiti teams by Canadian and American companies over a period of four months. They have produced excellent results in association with the work of American and Canadian companies, which benefit from their knowledge of the geology and composition of the land, as well as from sketches of each well. Without this, it would be impossible to gain control over the wells. Eng. al-Nashmi said that these companies were holding on to their Kuwaiti members now and won't allow them to leave.

Eng. al-Nashmi commended the efforts of the Iranian team, which has so far gained control over two wells and has moved on to a third. He said that this team has expertise gained from a tragedy similar to the one Kuwait has experienced, when the Iraqis blew up their oil wells. They eventually succeeded in gaining control and extinguishing the fires. Al-Nashmi expressed his appreciation for their efforts aimed at extinguishing the burning Kuwaiti wells as rapidly as possible, so as to end the damage from the fires.

Eng. al-Nashmi also praised the efforts of the American teams, which he described as humanitarian and not just materialistic. He said that some slight burns have been suffered, including two serious cases. He mentioned that those two injured persons had expressed their willingness to rejoin the work teams as soon as they recovered. He pointed out that one of them will return to work soon, after his convalescence.

Work Methods

With regard to procedures followed in extinguishing the fires, Eng. al-Nashmi said that the work is done through pumps to drain off the oil and store it. The oil is then sold, either with its contaminants or after it is refined in the Kuwaiti refinery, where it is processed for sale from there. There are international companies that are being called on to drain the oil from the lakes and process it. Until 3 March 1991, it was difficult to determine a specific number in the process of extinguishing fires because of the dense smoke. He added that, so far, five of the Burqan wells have been put out using a cooling process to prevent the wells from reigniting from the intense heat. He said that in view of the oil's abnormal outpouring, damage had been done to the machinery, in addition to the mixing of salt with oil because of the seepage of ground water from a depth of 6,000 to 10,000 feet.

Return of Production

Eng. al-Nashmi stated that as of this date, all wells in the al-Maqwa' and al-Ahmadi fields have been extinguished. They will be evaluated later for the purpose of resuming production at the appropriate time. He said that present production is at an average of 170,000 barrels per day. He added that a schedule has been drawn up by the KOC to repair the wells.

Eng. al-Nashmi said that operations to repair production complexes had begun. The northern platform has been repaired and is currently in use, while the artificial island and the southern platform are still inoperable.

He explained that 10 drilling rigs will be brought into use in mid-September, and that there are operations to drill new wells in accordance with the new program of rapid production. Regarding the most important problems that they face in this process, he said that the obstacles are numerous, from oil lakes, to dense smoke, to destroyed installations and production networks. Examples of this are wellheads and pipes. However, the present priority is the fire-fighting operations. Most of the equipment that Kuwait has received has come from America, and is now being used in these operations. Paralleling this simultaneously is the production operation.

Eng. al-Nashmi also referred to the problem of mines and cluster bombs, which have not yet been cleared from the ground. He explained that there were 10 teams doing this clearing, in addition to special teams carrying out this operation in accordance with guidance from the KOC. So far, operations in this area have not resulted in any accidents or difficulties.

Fertilizer

With regard to uncovered land, he explained that dealing with it will begin soon, and that the obvious damage lies in the surface oil lakes. These lakes will be treated by using special chemicals, so that—in the future—they can be transformed into natural fertilizer.

Reassembling Family Structure Proves Difficult

91AE0628B London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic
21 Aug 91 pp 14-19

[Interviews with various relatives of Kuwaiti prisoners in Iraqi jails, and with Dr. Badr al-'Umar, director of the Executive Office of the National Committee for Prisoner and Missing Persons' Affairs, by Husayn 'Abd-al-Rahman: "3,000 Still in Iraqi Jails; When Will the Prisoners Return to Kuwait?"; first 16 paragraphs are AL-MAJALLAH introduction; Kuwait, date not given]

[Text] Despite the passage of seven months since Kuwait's liberation from Iraqi occupation, Kuwaiti official and popular circles believe that the liberation has not been completed, and will not be completed, until the the prisoners being detained in Iraq are released. A

visitor to Kuwait senses this as a result of popular and official circles' concentration on this subject, which has become a national issue. This matter comes up more than any other issue on all occasions, both official and unofficial.

When I visited Kuwait on 2 August 1991, the first anniversary of the Iraqi invasion, the principal theme for every ceremony held on that occasion was "liberation will only be complete with the prisoners' release."

There are more than 2,400 Kuwaiti and Arab prisoners held by the Iraqi regime. This number of missing persons represents a national tragedy and a source of psychological pressure on the government and citizens of Kuwait, who consider the number of individuals of Kuwaiti origin to be limited.

A Kuwaiti official says that the subject of prisoners will continue to cause anxiety in the Kuwaiti household. Among the prisoners are some from the ruling family and other Kuwaiti citizens. The Iraqi regime knows that the prisoner issue is the remaining card that it has in its hand. Therefore, it wants to hang on to that card until the last moment.

This official, who occupies a high diplomatic post, added: "The problem we face is that we are dealing with a regime that is barbaric and ruthless. Human life means nothing to them. Accordingly, you will find them refusing to answer inquiries about lists of actual prisoners. At the same time, it releases innocent people who are not prisoners at all, because they are in fact persons who went to Iraq during the occupation in pursuit of their missing ones, or in an attempt to contact the outside world as a result of the Iraqi occupation authorities cutting Kuwait off from the world. When the war broke out, they were unable to return and stayed in Iraq. The number of these persons exceeds 8,000."

The Kuwaiti official thinks that the issue calls for a decisive position by the international community to insure the prisoners' release. Therefore, this issue must be supported, i.e., Kuwait must hold discussions about it with other nations of the world. The first issue that is raised with a visitor to Kuwait is the issue of prisoner release.

The Kuwaiti official believes that Kuwaiti society has a right to fear the world's indifference to this issue, and that Kuwait will be left alone to confront the Iraqi regime. Accordingly, the Kuwaiti initiative should not stop, either on the private or official level. There are official meetings and diplomatic contacts, as well as fora, parades, and organized sit-in strikes on the popular level, that can be utilized. Moreover, relatives of prisoners should send appeals to ambassadors of influential countries, so that their countries do what they can to obtain the prisoners' release.

Popular Complaint

If the Kuwaiti official thinks that the government of his country has fully played its part to insure the prisoners' release, some of their relatives believe that the government's activities do not match the size of the problem. However, the government cannot resolve the matter, because the Iraqi regime is still procrastinating. There is also another issue, which is the lack of concern for the affairs of families of prisoners and missing persons, because these families are in misery as a result of their losses. This has forced some of them to resort to certain organizations that have emerged to care for prisoners' affairs, such as the Committee for Defense of War Victims, which posts ads on the door of its building, setting forth these families' requirements.

Even the Kuwaiti oil minister, Dr. Hamud al-Ruqbah, who was accompanied by his small son al-'Abdallah to the eastern al-Maqwa' area, al-Ahmadi City, to witness the extinguishing of the last burning well in that area, did not escape criticism from the wife of a Kuwaiti prisoner, who asked him: "Who will accompany my sons Jasim and Fahd to school this year? My husband is still a prisoner today in the jails of Iraq."

The tragedy of the Kuwaiti prisoners highlights the dire situation that Kuwait faces following its liberation. The Arab and Western media have begun to ignore this problem, while mothers, wives, and children wait everyday at the Shaykhan al-Farsi Hall in the al-Surrah area, hoping to hear a report of the release of some prisoners. This is the official headquarters of the National Committee for Prisoner and Missing Persons' Affairs, which has had its share of the stinging criticism by members of the Kuwaiti National Assembly in one of its public sessions debating the prisoner issue. One Assembly member, Khalifah al-Kharafi, said at that session: "If this is the extent of the government's action, then it's all over for our prisoners."

The head of the Executive Office of the National Committee for Prisoner and Missing Persons' Affairs, Dr. Badr al-'Umar, who is also a professor at the University of Kuwait College of Education, has complained that the state has not yet set the committee's budget, so that it can perform its role. Therefore, during a visit inside the Shaykhan al-Farsi Hall, one could not find anyone to give out printed material about the prisoners for the use of foreign journalists, which would give a clear picture of the situation.

I went to the office of Kuwait's information minister, Dr. Badr Jasim al-Ya'qub, one of four ministers forming the membership of the National Committee for Prisoner and Missing Persons' Affairs, and I asked him: "Do you feel that the committee's media role is weak?" He replied, yes.

I then said to him: "The failure of any media efforts to highlight the problem of prisoners in Iraq is a failure of the Kuwaiti media, for which you are responsible."

Dr. al-Ya'qub said: "This is correct. I feel that there is an information shortage in this regard."

Every day Sharifah goes to anyone she can find to hear if there is news about the prisoners, because her son 'Adnan Muhammad [Bahbahani], who is 21 years old, is a prisoner in Iraq today. Sharifah (Umm-Jasim) said: "There is no official to whom I have not gone to learn the fate of my son 'Adnan. He works for the Ministry of Public Works. Iraqi secret police came at 0200 to our home in the [al-Da'iyah] area. They banged on the door, saying that they wanted to search the house. The soldiers and secret police forced their way into the house and searched the rooms. They asked about my son 'Adnan. I noticed that one of the soldiers was holding 'Adnan's civilian identification card."

[Abd-al-Rahman] Where was 'Adnan at that time?

[Sharifah] He was out of the house. Some local boys were spending nights guarding houses and sleeping during the days. His brother 'Ali went out then to look for him, but he was shocked when the driver of a military truck said to him: "Don't bother yourself; your brother 'Adnan is with us." 'Adnan went away in October 1990 with Iraqi soldiers and secret police, and I don't know what's happened to him.

[Abd-al-Rahman] Have you gone to the National Committee for Prisoner and Missing Persons' Affairs?

[Sharifah] On behalf of my son 'Adnan, I went to see the emir, whom I felt was sympathetic. He was very affected. He said: I pray to God to release them; I pray for your son." Both the emir and the crown prince constantly express their anxiety concerning the prisoners in Iraqi jails. But the national committee in Shaykhan al-Farsi Hall has no information. When we hear that a batch of prisoners will arrive in the country, this committee is the last to know about the prisoners. We see the effectiveness and activities of the Kuwaiti Society to Defend War Victims. It expends huge media efforts. Moreover, the Solidarity Fund to Care for Families of Martyrs and Prisoners issues publications and posters about our imprisoned sons. These are private committees that are not subsidized. What if a subsidy was provided to them?

[Abd-al-Rahman] What about 'Adnan's monthly salary? Isn't it given to you?

[Sharifah] We don't receive 'Adnan's salary. When we consulted the committee, they said that the salary is sent to the bank. We cannot benefit from it even if we were in need.

[Abd-al-Rahman] Did the national committee visit you at home to learn your circumstances?

[Sharifah] We don't want them to visit us, but we do want them to be there in the hall and to make our lives easier.

Before my talk with her ended, Umm Jasim said: "The national committee still refuses to register my daughter Fatimah as one of the missing Kuwaitis!"

I asked her for the story of her daughter Fatimah, and at this point her son 'Ali said: "My sister Fatimah was in the Kuwaiti resistance. After the liberation, she carried a weapon. She went in her car to the al-Ahdath prison on the morning of liberation day, 27 February 1991, in order to release our brother 'Adnan who, it was said, was imprisoned there with the rest of the Kuwaitis. However, she didn't find him and, as of today, my sister Fatimah has not returned home. Her son Bishar is still waiting for her return.

[Abd-al-Rahman] Does Bishar know his mother is missing?

[Ali] Yes, we told him that. We went to the Ministry of Social Affairs to obtain her allowances, but despite the fact that we have a general power of attorney, the Office of Social Services would not recognize this power of attorney as official. Why is my sister's son being denied the allowances that the Office of Social Services was giving to her before the invasion? How can the children and families of prisoners and missing persons look after themselves?

[Abd-al-Rahman] Why did the national committee refuse to register your sister's name as missing?

[Ali] The national committee says that we came after the date set to register the names of missing persons. The committee deals with the families of prisoners and missing persons with this kind of logic.

When you look at Umm-Jasim and say goodbye to her, you can feel the extent of suffering in which this mother lives, a mother who has lost her son and daughter.

The Story of Wafa'

Kuwaiti student Wafa' Haydar 'Ali Muhammad al-Mahmid is 18. She was in her final year at the Khalidah Bint al-Azwar Secondary School in the Salwa district, when Iraqi soldiers forced their way into her house. Since that fateful day, Wafa's family has had her picture published in the Kuwaiti daily press, asking people for their help as to whether she has been seen in one of the Iraqi regime's jails. Wafa's family still awaits their daughter's return.

National Committee—Last to Know

The tragic story of another Kuwaiti prisoner begins when—following the liberation—Umm-Faris returned to Kuwait and was shocked to learn that her husband, Abu-Faris al-Sha'ir Fa'iq 'Abd-al-Jalil, was still a prisoner.

Umm-Faris told AL-MAJALLAH: "I was with my children in our forced exile outside of Kuwait in the United Arab Emirates. My children are Faris, who is 18; Ghadah, 21; Raja', 12; Sarah, 8; and Nawf, 7. We left

Kuwait before the invasion. Abu-Faris continued to resist in Kuwait, just like the rest of the citizens."

[Abd-al-Rahman] When was Fa'iq captured?

[Umm-Faris] We know that Fa'iq was with a group of his colleagues, including al-Mulhin 'Abdallah al-Rashid and Khalil Idris. They were meeting in one of the Kuwaiti districts in al-Salimiyah. By chance, the apartment was an ambush, and Fa'iq was captured on 3 January 1991.

[Abd-al-Rahman] What is the latest word on him?

[Umm-Faris] We are at God's mercy, but it is said that Fa'iq was imprisoned in al-Ramadi prison.

[Abd-al-Rahman] Has Fa'iq's salary been paid by the government?

[Umm-Faris] We haven't received any salary. We checked with the committee, and they asked us to open an account at the bank. We did that, but we haven't seen any money in it.

Umm-Faris went on to say that living conditions were easy for her.

Faris expressed his high morale, as did his sister Ghadah, who said that she was prepared to provide AL-MAJALLAH with pictures of her imprisoned father, as though she was sending a message to the world, imploring all international organizations to put pressure on Iraq to release the prisoners. Faris said: "When we hear any news about prisoners arriving, we call the National Committee for Prisoner and Missing Persons' Affairs in Shaykhan al-Farsi Hall, in order to confirm the truth. We find that no one there knows anything about any report."

Prisoners' Classified Ads

The prisoners' tragedy has led to a section being created within the classified ad section of the newspaper AL-FAJR AL-JADID, where pictures of prisoners and missing persons are published.

In the context of dealing with the subject of prisoners, AL-MAJALLAH met with Dr. Badr al-'Umar, director of the Executive Office of the National Committee for Prisoner and Missing Persons' Affairs in Kuwait, in order to shed light on what the Kuwaiti government has done, and is doing, to ensure their release. The following is the text of the interview:

[Abd-al-Rahman] Can you give us an idea about the national committee and when it was formed?

[al-'Umar] The National Committee for Prisoner and Missing Persons' Affairs was established on 5 May 1991 by order of the Council of Ministers. It is chaired by Counselor Ghazi 'Ubayd al-Samman, the minister of justice and legal affairs. Its members include three other ministers—the ministers of interior, defense, and information—and four members with prominent qualifications. They are Dr. Ghanim al-Najjar, professor of

political science at Kuwait University; Dr. 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Kharafi, a professor on the General Board of Applied Education, who is chairman of the Sponsorship Committee; Mrs. Dalal al-Zaban; and Professor Fahd al-Hizam.

The National Committee for Prisoner and Missing Persons' Affairs, as ordered by the Council of Ministers, is concerned with the subject of prisoners and pursues their status. It has established two offices: the Executive Office, for which we are responsible; and the Office of External Communications, whose headquarters is in Riyadh. The Executive Office is the bureau that implements decisions and recommendations. In order to insure the implementation of these directives, the office has established five main committees: the Information Committee, Media Committee, Public Relations, Social Committee, and the Fiscal Administration Committee.

[Abd-al-Rahman] What is the most significant directive issued in the context of pursuing prisoners' affairs?

[al-'Umar] The committee is obligated to the community, the prisoners' relatives, and to the prisoner himself. Its basic mission is to provide the community with all facts connected with the prisoners and with statistics, and reports about prisoners who are released, as well as about contacts that occur between the government and other authorities regarding the release of prisoners. As for the committee's obligation to the families of prisoners, it attempts to provide the needs of prisoners' families, especially persons whose provider is a prisoner. This care is provided by the Social Committee.

[Abd-al-Rahman] Do you think that concern for the affairs of prisoners' families was at the desired level?

[al-'Umar] If we say that we have begun in the desired fashion, I would be in error. However, I think that we are making increasing progress toward achieving what is desired. It is well-known that the committee was formed in May. Its establishment was completed, the employees retained, and the actual start of work was in July. In this case, one cannot expect that we could do the best we could at the beginning of this period.

However, with the passage of time, we felt that we could do better. We have been able to pay the prisoner's salary owed by his place of work to the family, in addition to providing financial aid to the family. In this regard, we are visiting families that have members being held prisoner to learn their needs first hand.

[Abd-al-Rahman] What is the biggest need that prisoners' families have?

[al-'Umar] Most needs are financial.

[Abd-al-Rahman] As of now, what is the total number of Kuwaiti prisoners in Iraq?

[al-'Umar] The figures available to us are equivalent to the reports of the prisoners' relatives, that is, those that they have missing. To this moment, those reports total

2,480, including 1,830 Kuwaitis, with another 435 from the group without [citizenship]. The rest are spread among 13 nationalities. We are still receiving new reports, but after investigation, we note that reports coming six months after the liberation of Kuwait are suspicious and doubtful. We are beginning to investigate them. During the investigation, we note either a conflict of testimony or lack of concern. Certain reportees do not quarrel about insisting on the report. This increases suspicion.

[Abd-al-Rahman] What are the possibilities that those prisoners or missing persons were killed after the liberation or even before the liberation?

[al-'Umar] The problem depends on credible, accurate data. As long as no information is available to us that the missing person or prisoner was killed, we cannot be certain about that. However, the fact is that Iraq has imprisoned a large number of citizens, visitors, and Gulf state persons. Moreover, I cannot be sure that they are all prisoners. Some might have been killed during torture or detention, etc. However, because of the lack of data in this regard, I consider the person missing, and I call on Iraq, even if he was killed in Iraq, to inform me officially of that, so that I can obtain his body, or at least his death certificate.

[Abd-al-Rahman] It is said that the basic problem facing Kuwait is the paucity of data coming from Iraq, or its inaccuracy, because the country was destroyed. Is this claim true, or is the Iraqi Government procrastinating?

[al-'Umar] This is not true. The proof is that our prisoners are in jails controlled by the Iraqi regime that clings to the reins of power in Iraq. I don't believe that this claim is correct; rather, it is a kind of procrastination that we are used to from the Iraqi regime. It is procrastinating with regard to all Security Council and UN resolutions.

[Abd-al-Rahman] Iraq finally officially admitted to 1,800 prisoners two weeks ago.

[al-'Umar] If Iraq admits to a specific number, it must send whatever data it has. We know what it means. It means it has groups of illegal residents in the country, most of them labelled as "lam al-shami" [the disunified]. They are a group that migrated to Iraq for one reason or another, and were unable to return home. Their roads have been blocked. Iraq would have us believe that they are prisoners. The fact is that they are not prisoners, but rather, a group of families, most of whom are from groups that do not have legal residence in Kuwait, either. Iraq wants to dump them on us as being prisoners. If Iraq is sincere, there are 2,470 prisoners whom we ask it to release.

[Abd-al-Rahman] Will there be an attempt to infiltrate into the [group of] prisoners what might later become a fifth column of illegal residents?

[al-'Umar] That has, in fact, happened. According to my information, there are some who have been received, who are persona non grata in the country.

[Abd-al-Rahman] On the lists that you have received, are there prisoners who were killed during torture or as a result of the war?

[al-'Umar] The truth is that this has not been determined, because many of the martyrs' identities are unknown. They were killed and buried without ascertaining their identities. This was in Kuwait. With regard to the situation in Iraq, we don't know whether there were some killed during torture, or executed, etc. We always rely on documented information, instead of data that has no source.

[Abd-al-Rahman] Iraq has captured entire families. What is their percentage, and what is the percentage of female prisoners?

[al-'Umar] You will find on our lists reports of the loss of entire families, including husband, wife, and children. I cannot now recall the total number of these families. Females total more than 450, divided among officials and others. In terms of age, there are children, infants, and elderly. However, the majority are young girls.

[Abd-al-Rahman] What efforts are being made by the state to insure the prisoners' release?

[al-'Umar] Official efforts are confined to contacts with heads of state who have a direct influence on decision-making. Therefore, there are contacts between the government and heads of state in this regard. Our permanent UN representative, Muhammad Abu-al-Hasan, submits statements and data to the UN from time to time in order to raise the issue of the prisoners. At the Foreign Ministers' Conference in Turkey, our foreign minister brought up the subject of the prisoners. The government is beginning to take greater and more widespread action than it has in the past.

[Abd-al-Rahman] Do you think that the international campaign will reach the desired level?

[al-'Umar] Personally, I think that the political campaign will play a part, but not enough. I am convinced that the political initiative must be accompanied by military pressure, as was done with the matter of the Iraqi nuclear reactors.

[Abd-al-Rahman] What is the expected period of time before Iraq ceases to procrastinate and hands over your prisoners?

[al-'Umar] If Iraq remains at the pace it now has, the period will be a long one, but the period could be shortened if there were serious world pressure.

[Abd-al-Rahman] It is well-known that Iraq is saving the matter of the prisoners as a pressure card in any discussions or political negotiations.

[al-'Umar] I agree with you, especially since the prisoner card is the last card. Iraq has revealed all its cards. It has agreed to all demands and has lost all its cards; nothing remains except the prisoners.

[Abd-al-Rahman] After the international inspection team finishes with the nuclear installations and Iraq's military capabilities, are you afraid that Kuwait will be left on its own to face Iraq vis-a-vis the case of the prisoners?

[al-'Umar] I don't think so, because the international community maintains its humanitarianism. This matter is purely humanitarian. The international community has begun to raise the question of reducing the economic blockade out of concern for the humanitarian circumstances of the Iraqi people. Therefore, if the world's point of departure is humanitarian, I don't believe that this world will forget the prisoners. However, it has not made the great efforts in this matter that it could have.

[Abd-al-Rahman] What is the nature of the contacts between you and the countries that have citizens imprisoned, such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Egypt? Is there coordination between you and those countries?

[al-'Umar] Yes, we considered those prisoners to be our prisoners from the start. Therefore, we will not hesitate to receive them, most especially our brothers in the Gulf Cooperation Council and the brothers who supported us in this ordeal.

[Abd-al-Rahman] Will some prisoners be released soon?

[al-'Umar] We have no report concerning the release of prisoners. Iraq has permitted the departure of the so-called "lam al-shaml" group.

[Abd-al-Rahman] How many persons or prisoners have been turned over so far?

[al-'Umar] Prior to 11 April, 7,200 persons were released. After the official cease fire, we received no more than 160 prisoners.

[Abd-al-Rahman] What actions are taken with regard to the prisoners after they reach Kuwait through Saudi Arabia? Do they end at this point?

[al-'Umar] We are the official source of everything pertaining to the prisoner, whether it concerns his education or employment. If he faces any problem, we will intervene with whatever information we have, so that he can return to his job and his normal life. We provide any information we have to the prisoner.

[Abd-al-Rahman] Does the hopelessness of relatives of prisoners reach such a point that they want to know any information, no matter what?

[al-'Umar] Yes, many families come to us and request that. They say, tell us any information, even if the person is dead. At least then they will know the fate of their prisoners.

Bank Head on Economic Policy, Progress

92AE0011B London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 30 Sep 91 p 9

[Interview with Central Bank Governor Salim 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sabah, by Madi al-Khamis in Kuwait; date not given: "Value of Shareholder Rights and Share Price To Be Determined When Banks Merge;" first five paragraphs are SAWT AL-KUWAYT AL-DUWALI introduction]

[Text] The governor of the Central Bank, Shaykh Salim 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sabah, said that responsibility for dealing with inflation does not rest solely on the shoulders of the Central Bank, and that a number of institutions must work together to eliminate this phenomenon.

The governor of the Central Bank explained that the Kuwaiti dinar's status in the world market is determined by the exchange rate policy that the bank pursues.

In a special interview with SAWT AL-KUWAYT, Shaykh Salim 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Sabah added that most of the demand for the dinar outside Kuwait is for monetary remittances.

The governor said that severance payments to guest workers whose employment has been terminated will not affect the liquidity in local banks or the level of economic activity. The following is the text of the interview:

Inflation and Rebuilding Operations

[Al-Khamis] How will the inflation that developed in the post-liberation period be overcome, given the government's commitment to reconstruction and the fact that large amounts of money have been pumped into citizens' hands?

[Al-Sabah] Responsibility for dealing with inflation does not rest only on the shoulders of the Central Bank. Many concerned institutions must work together. The bank, for its part, is taking many steps, including:

1. Commitment to the exchange rate policy for the dinar that has been followed since 18 March 1975. This is to stop any inflationary effects that might result from fluctuations in the exchange rate of the dinar in relation to the currencies of our most important trading and financial partners.

2. Regulating domestic liquidity and bank credit levels. This is because a rise in the money supply would have a negative effect on domestic prices, especially given the shortage of available goods and services compared to the demand for them that arose during the months following the liberation of Kuwait. The Central Bank, therefore, set an upper limit on customer withdrawals from accounts with commercial banks for the period between 24 March and 2 August 1991.

Other concerned bodies took additional measures to deal with the causes of the rise in local prices, including:

- Government material assistance to cooperatives to reduce commodity prices to levels near what they were before 2 August 1990.
- Reopening Kuwait's three seaports, thereby enabling direct importation from producing countries and the lowering of the cost of imported goods.
- Setting up inspection centers in various parts of Kuwait to protect consumers and ascertain that food merchants are adhering to the announced prices for subsidized and unsubsidized goods.

In addition, there were several positive international developments. Beginning on 15 August 1991, international insurance companies lowered their premiums on cargo operations to and from the Gulf as a result of the end of the war to liberate Kuwait. This will lead to a reduction in the cost of goods imported to Kuwait.

The efforts mentioned above worked together to stop the rise of domestic prices. According to the domestic price movement index prepared by the Central Bank of Kuwait, price levels dropped from 84.9 percent on 13 April 1991 to 12.8 percent [as published] at the end of the first week of September, compared with prevailing prices before the brutal Iraqi invasion.

Dinar Exchange Rate Policy

[Al-Khamis] Based on Central Bank directives, when will the Kuwaiti dinar return to its status in the international market?

[Al-Sabah] First, I would like to explain that the currency's international market status is not determined on the basis of Central Bank directives, but by the exchange rate policy that the Central Bank follows. This policy reflects the fundamental underpinnings of the currency—economic and financial—with regard to the soundness and health of the balance of payments in its two halves, trade and capital.

One can thus say that the dinar's status in the international market is determined by the exchange rate policy of the Central Bank of Kuwait. This policy has restored the dinar to its pre-invasion level. The dinar has continued to follow this policy, maintaining its level within the framework of the limits and rules prescribed by the policy of a basket of currencies weighted according to Kuwait's foreign trade and financial relations. The Central Bank has followed this policy for a number of years to arrive at the value of the dinar and its relation to international currencies.

If, by the dinar's return to its international status, you mean its again circulating in the markets and its having its price in relation to other currencies set overseas, we would like to state that it is only a question of a few institutional and structural obstacles, not any fundamental weakness or defect in the status of the dinar. These obstacles include:

1. Problems related to the changing of the Kuwaiti currency, which took place successfully in accordance with regulations set by the Central Bank.
2. Structural obstacles, including the delay in restoring communications media such as the telex to operation at the same capacity and with the same time and geographic coverage that they had before Iraq's brutal invasion of Kuwait.

We want to emphasize to citizens and residents that these matters are beyond our control. They are contingencies that require a certain amount of time for their effect to abate. At the same time, we affirm that, despite all the obstacles, the exchange rate that the Central Bank sets for the dinar is the rate applied in all international transactions. It is the rate used by international institutions, especially the IMF.

Talk about the dinar's status internationally suggests that we consider another important aspect, namely that the Kuwaiti dinar is not an international currency in the normal sense, inasmuch as our main exports are valued in dollars. The bulk of non-oil sector foreign trade basically consists of imports. These are funded in dinars on the basis of the dinar exchange rate vis-a-vis other currencies set by the Central Bank, one of whose goals is to limit the effect of foreign inflation on domestic prices. On this basis, the current pricing of the dinar has restored the major part of our foreign trade to its former state and status.

We would like to point out that most of the demand for the dinar outside Kuwait is for monetary remittances, either from companies that have obtained building contracts in Kuwait or remittances of individuals for the purposes of travel or investment.

From the preceding we see that the status of free foreign transactions in the dinar—transactions that form the backbone of the dinar's status overseas—became subject to the Central Bank's exchange rate policy within a short time after liberation. Despite these facts, we can still understand that readers are confused because they no longer see the exchange rates of the dinar overseas—as was the case previously—in the offices of foreign settlement businessmen such as money changers and others who deal with tourists. As we said, this situation will end with time, when the aforementioned structural obstacles cease. We all hope this will happen within a short time, God willing.

Bank Merger Plan

[Al-Khamis] How long will the proposed merger require?

[Al-Sabah] Regarding how shareholders will be treated in the merger operation, it should be pointed out that the Central Bank has set standards and principles for guidance in the merger operation. One of these is the standard for financial statements, which must reflect the fair value of assets. It will thus be possible to arrive at the real value of shareholders' rights and the price of a share by definite principles. In this case, there will be a price for

a share of the new institution that results from the merger. By assessing the value of a share of each separate institution, it will be possible to calculate the amount of stock in the new institution to which each stockholder in the merged institutions is entitled. The direction in which we are moving is to call on the help of specialists to evaluate the assets and obligations of the institutions to be included in the banking merger and to proceed with the necessary measures to complete it. As for how long the merger might take, it depends on how long it takes to complete the procedures that the merger requires before the general meetings of the institutions included in the merger give their approvals. It also depends on how long it takes to complete the legal steps regulating the merger, the procedures for evaluating assets and obligations, and many other things related to the merger.

[Al-Khamis] To what extent are domestic banks and the Kuwaiti economy affected by the outflow of guest worker entitlements and savings?

[Al-Sabah] First we must distinguish between guest workers' entitlements and their savings. Guest worker entitlements consist of severance compensations due to those who had been working. Because these had never arisen in the past, they were not previously included in private-sector deposits in local banks or within the Kuwaiti economy. Therefore, neither such payments to guest workers whose services have been determined to be redundant, nor their outflow, will have any effect on the liquidity of local banks or the level of economic activity in the country.

As for guest worker savings, these may entirely or partially fall into the category of private-sector deposits with local banks. Withdrawals from deposits and overseas remittances have generally been observed to be at an acceptable level after last August 3rd's heightening of restrictions and regulations on withdrawals and transfers. They reflect a feeling that the dinar is stable and confidence in the national economy and banking system.

A number of important factors contributed to these encouraging results. These included the government's full guarantee on deposits, the relatively high level of dinar interest rates, which created a positive margin in favor of the dinar against major currencies such as the dollar, and the deepening confidence in the exchange rate of the dinar.

We can say that the private-sector deposits base has not been affected by the outflow of these entitlements and savings; it has in fact grown, despite the size of the withdrawals to which it was subjected during the post-liberation period. We therefore do not expect any negative effects to occur to the banking system and the Kuwaiti economy.

Free Market and Economy Mechanism

[Al-Khamis] As a member of the Committee to Stimulate the Kuwaiti Economy, how do you think one can

end the business recession, given the population composition the government is trying to realize?

[Al-Sabah] The activity of the economic stimulation committee is not restricted to a particular sector, but includes all economic sectors. Any attempt to stimulate any economic sector must proceed from a comprehensive perspective that takes into consideration effects on the other sectors and on the economy in general. For this reason, the economic stimulation committee espouses a free-market philosophy based on leaving the market mechanism to operate without tangible state interference.

As for the population composition the government is trying to realize, as everyone knows, the honorable council of ministers has formed a committee to discuss this important matter. When the committee finishes its work to define the desirable population composition and figure, the economic stimulation committee will be able to base many of its ideas and recommendations on this [figure].

[Al-Khamis] Regarding international reparations, will preparations be made for them starting now, so that individuals and companies will obtain part of what will be earmarked for these companies, instead of having only foreigners obtain these reparations?

[Al-Sabah] Perhaps you mean the reparations imposed on Iraq under Security Council resolutions on the subject for damages resulting from the Iraqi regime's violation of the principles of international legitimacy and the rules of international law in invading the country of Kuwait and the damages this brutal invasion has caused to public and private property in Kuwait, as well as damages that Iraq's brutal invasion caused to countries and parties other than Kuwait.

Since Kuwait was the country on which Iraq's brutal aggression fell directly, causing great damage and destruction to public and private property and inestimable suffering and pain to Kuwaitis' persons and dignity; furthermore, since there is a pressing need for funds, particularly in the private sector, to rebuild what the invasion destroyed, we expect that the UN Reparations Fund established for this purpose will appreciate this, and we expect that priority will be given to compensating public and private property in Kuwait for the damages it received.

For its part, the state of Kuwait has issued a statute creating a public organization to calculate compensation for losses from the Iraqi invasion. The law sets procedures for the organization's work in assessing damages resulting from Iraq's brutal invasion and the manner in which reparations will be paid to injured parties within the limits of the sums that the Kuwaiti Government receives from the money that Iraq is obliged to pay as reparations to Kuwait.

[Al-Khamis] What about the basket of currencies, and how will the international money market control Kuwait's cash reserves?

[Al-Sabah] Since March 1975, the dinar exchange rate has been linked to a basket of major currencies. The currencies in the basket and the weight of each reflect Kuwait's trade and financial relations with the outside world.

Perhaps the most important advantage of this policy is the role of this basket in relieving pressure on the dinar's exchange rate from the sometimes very sharp fluctuations in major currencies' exchange rates due to various factors. Furthermore, linking the dinar's exchange rate to a basket of major currencies has contributed relatively to the stability of the dinar's exchange rate against these major currencies. This has had a positive effect on domestic price levels and their fluctuations.

The Central Bank has foreign currency and gold reserves. These reserves, which are different from the state's monetary reserves, form the monetary backing of the dinar. Using them, the Central Bank can defend the dinar exchange rate and keep it at the announced levels. The Central Bank of Kuwait invests these reserves in international money markets, and in this way they are influenced by developments in the international market. Consequently, we cannot say that these markets control our foreign reserves.

Official on Status of Religious Education

92AE0011A London SAWT AL-KUWAYT
AL-DUWALI in Arabic 26 Sep 91 p 4

[Article by Dr. Mahmud 'Abd-al-Qadir: "We Are Reviewing Our Program; Halting Student Exchanges Harmed Us"]

[Text] The director of the Department of Religious Education, Dr. Najib al-Rifa'i, stated that there is a need to resume the system of student exchanges. He announced an intention to review the course of religious education, especially regarding evening classes. He indicated that the invasion had hindered the development of the educational programs that had previously been prepared.

Al-Rifa'i said in a special statement to SAWT AL-KUWAYT yesterday that there are currently 520 religious education students in Kuwait—400 men and 120 women, divided between the middle and secondary level. In addition to the subjects studied in general schools, they learn Islamic sciences such as Koranic recitation, exegesis, jurisprudence, and logic, in addition to the remaining subjects—mathematics, English, physical education, and art.

Al-Rifa'i explained that religious education students are qualified to assume prominent positions quickly in the fields of work and study in practical life—better than they would in some other courses of study. He said that

Kuwait's religious institutes have graduated able men who have assumed important leadership positions in government. He indicated that "religious education provides the graduate with a widely recognized secondary diploma that qualifies him to enter all the theoretical [liberal arts] faculties of the university—Islamic law, literature, education, and law—as well as the military faculties or the police college."

He added: "If the holder of the religious secondary diploma has a talent for speaking, he will find himself able to perform the duties of leading prayers, preaching, and conducting worship in Kuwait's mosques, particularly if he continues his study at the university's Faculty of Islamic Law."

Girls and Religious Education

Dr. al-Rifa'i said, "Religious education in Kuwait qualifies girls to be excellent parents and good mothers who will raise a good generation that knows its Lord. They will be devoted wives who know their rights and their duties toward their families, husbands, and children."

About the plan for the future of religious education, Dr. al-Rifa'i said, "It includes a review of the course of evening religious education, so that it will be supervised by the Department of Religious Education, not the Department of Adult Education and Illiteracy Eradication, which currently supervises evening religious education."

He mentioned that "there currently is only one secondary-level evening religious institute. On the other hand, the Department of Religious Education has three institutes that operate in the morning. Two of them are devoted to the secondary level (boys and girls), and one is a middle institute for boys."

He added: "Another problem that concerns us involves inspectors of specialized schools. We are working so that religious education will have its own inspectors, particularly in the subjects of Arabic language and the Islamic sciences. This will allow for fair teacher evaluations and transfer of experience, and it will improve the schools."

Dr. al-Rifa'i said, "The invasion set back many projects that the Department of Religious Education had decided to undertake." He stated, "Had it not been for the brutal Iraqi invasion, new texts for Arabic, theology, jurisprudence, and logic would already have been developed and would be in students' hands."

He explained: "There has been an agreement with the Department of Curricula in the Education Ministry, in coordination with Kuwait University's Faculty of Islamic Law and others, to undertake this improvement. Participants in the project have included the dean of the Faculty of Islamic Law, Dr. 'Ujayl al-Nashami, and Dr. Khalid al-Madhkur, both of whom are graduates of the Religious Institute. We have successfully revised our textbooks and developed them to fit our expectations."

Exchange Students

Replying to a question about exchange students not continuing their studies this year, the director of the Department of Religious Education said, "In the past, exchange students represented 50 percent of the institute's students and belonged to 54 nationalities from various parts of the world." He expressed his belief that "their continued study at the Religious Institute constitutes a guarantee of the country's real security, because spending on such students will provide us with people who spread the word abroad. Thus, it is crucial that they return to the institute in the academic year that begins next February. In particular, some of the ambassadors from Islamic countries have told us that the halt to accepting exchange applications has made a negative impression. We have also received letters from students and educational institutions abroad. These have made it clear to us that there is dissatisfaction with the halt to exchange students, who numbered 200. In my view, they are Kuwait's best messengers abroad."

Dr. Najib al-Rifa'i explained the admission requirements for the Religious Institute. He said that each level has its own requirements. The institute does not accept students who have been expelled from Kuwaiti schools, nor does it accept general education students from the fourth year of secondary school.

MOROCCO

Spanish Trade Minister's Visit Detailed

92AF0010D Casablanca LE MATIN DU SAHARA
in French 5 Sep 91 pp 1,3

[Text] In 1993, nearly all of Morocco's industrial products will have unrestricted access to the Spanish market.

Morocco and Spain should work to promote real cooperation and take on an active coordinating role.

An energy agreement has been signed between the SNPP [National Petroleum Products Company] and ENAGAZ [expansion not given].

Spain's minister for trade, industry, and tourism, Mr. Claudio Aranzadi, left Rabat late yesterday morning after completing an official visit of two days in Morocco at the invitation of Morocco's minister of tourism, Mr. Abdelkader Benslimane.

As he prepared to depart from the Rabat-Sale airport where he was accompanied by Mr. Abdelkader Benslimane and by Spain's ambassador in Rabat, among others, Mr. Aranzadi told the press that his meetings with Moroccan officials had been "very positive and fruitful."

He added that he is convinced that relations between Morocco and Spain will develop further, particularly in the areas of tourism, trade, and energy.

Mr. Aranzadi announced plans for Morocco, Algeria, and Spain to sign an energy agreement next year.

During his visit to Morocco, Spain's minister had met with the prime minister, Dr. Azeddine Laraki; the minister of tourism, Mr. Abdelkader Benslimane; the minister of foreign trade, Mr. Hassan Abouyoub; the minister of energy and mines, Mr. Driss Alaoui M'Daghri; the minister of finance, Mr. Mohamed Berrada; and the minister-delegate to the prime minister for foreign investment, Mr. Mohamed Alaoui M'Daghri.

Dr. Azeddine Laraki received Mr. Claudio Aranzadi yesterday morning in his offices in the presence of Mr. Abdelkader Benslimane.

Spain's minister informed the prime minister of the results of his discussions with various members of the government of His Majesty the King, notably in the fields of tourism, energy, trade, and finance.

Mr. Claudio Aranzadi emphasized the priority his government places on increasing the flow of trade between the two countries and on promoting investments by creating a service to inform private Spanish investors of the opportunities offered by the Moroccan economy within a framework of joint ventures.

The prime minister declared that cooperation between Morocco and Spain should be fostered with a view to a complementary relationship so that cooperation will take on a new dimension, and he suggested identifying the fields in which the two countries complement each other, such as hotel facilities, the tapping of shared tourism resources, and professional training.

Also present at the meeting were Spain's ambassador in Rabat, Mr. Joaquin Ortega Salinas; the members of the Spanish delegation; and the prime minister's close aides.

In the course of the meeting, Mr. Abdelkader Benslimane reiterated the importance of the tourism sector and the impact it has had on the Moroccan economy since it was made a priority sector in 1964.

Today, we hope to benefit from Spain's experience in this area, particularly in view of the fact that the two countries are linked, as of last July, by a major bilateral cooperation agreement which is to govern relations between the two countries on a preferential basis.

In raising the prospects for cooperation, Mr. Benslimane expressed the view that tourism is not a sector of competition between Spain and Morocco; on the contrary, real possibilities exist for a complementary relationship because Morocco could serve as an additional destination for tourists, as the distance is so slight and will one day be reduced even further with the completion of a permanent link across the Strait of Gibraltar.

The tourism minister went on to speak of the opportunity for renewing cooperation in the area of training and exchange visits for students and trainees, at the International Institute of Tourism in Tangier, in particular.

Organized activities for tourists constitute another domain in which closer cooperation could be established, a domain in which Spain has good experience. Morocco, he explained, is now taking much interest in this domain and stands to profit from Spain's experience, given the proximity of the two countries and the concern they share for preserving the traditional side of their respective societies.

On the subject of promotion, Mr. Abdelkader Benslimane proposed the idea of marketing mutually-beneficial products, and hoped that tour operators could look into to such possibilities, particularly for South American tourists.

Vast Opportunities

The idea is worth exploring, all the more so because Spain is to become the capital of the world in 1992 with the World's Fair in Seville and the Olympic Games in Barcelona. It is true that Morocco will take part in Seville, said Mr. Benslimane, but as a neighboring country, it could take part in another way if transportation and information were made readily available to visitors interested in traveling to Morocco.

Bilateral cooperation could extend beyond training, activities organized for tourists, and promotion to include joint projects in connection with plans to develop tourism, as Mr. Benslimane indicated. Indeed, there are great opportunities in the Atlantic coast regions and in certain sites between the Atlas Mountains and the Saharan region.

For his part, Mr. Claudio Aranzadi stressed Morocco's enormous potential in tourism and predicted that it will experience a boom in the coming years. From the outset, he made a point of referring to the program currently being pursued in Spain aimed at rendering traditional tourism more competitive.

Spanish tourism, he explained, is about to offer a new product that constitutes a break away from the seaside-resort type (sun and sea) in that it promotes, for example, gourmet dining, art, architecture, etc.

Embracing the proposal to develop bilateral cooperation in the area of professional training and technical assistance, Mr. Aranzadi expressed the view that Spain's role in Morocco could be important with regard to mutually-beneficial products, despite the existence of several undertakings by Spain that have not been up to Morocco's expectations. That is perhaps due in part to the fact that the attention of Spanish developers is currently focussed on the Caribbean and Mexico, as indicated by Mr. Aranzadi who nonetheless believes that investment in Morocco's tourism sector is inevitable given the large volume of investments already made in other fields.

Joint Projects

In addition, Spain's minister raised the possibility of establishing cooperation in tourism oriented toward art, history, and culture by marketing products shared by both Spain and Morocco, despite the competition Spain receives from Morocco and Mediterranean countries on the whole.

In the context of a frank and fruitful exchange of proposals and ideas between Mr. Benslimane and Mr. Aranzadi, both parties agreed on the need to include the professionals of both countries in the process of cooperation and to organize a meeting to work in greater detail within a more structured framework, a meeting that, Mr. Benslimane hoped, might be held in the coming weeks.

In other respects, Spain's minister emphasized his country's willingness to cooperate with Morocco to refurbish certain historical monuments (old residences and palaces) for use as tourist lodgings along the lines of what is being done in the United Kingdom.

With regard to Spanish investment in Morocco, it should be recalled that projects either have been launched or are being planned by Spanish developers in northern Morocco, and that Spanish and Moroccan tour operators have marketed a shared product that consists of a tour departing from the United States and including both the Costa del Sol and Morocco. But difficulties have surfaced, notably with regard to air transportation and problems involving travel agencies.

More than 200,000 Spanish tourists visited Morocco in 1990, and a growing number of Spanish visitors are traveling to our country. During the month of July 1991, 75,775 Spanish tourists visited Morocco, a 35.4-percent decrease over the 117,270 who visited during the same time period last year, but taking into account the exceptional circumstances brought on by the negative impact of the Gulf War, there is a certain constancy in the flow of tourists from Spain.

Indeed, the positive flow of Spanish tourism toward Morocco has made it second to France's in the category of stays by overseas tourists.

Eight Agreements in 21 Years

The minister of finance also received Spain's tourism minister yesterday morning.

Their discussions centered on Moroccan-Spanish relations and on the means to strengthen them, in keeping with the treaty of friendship and cooperation signed by the two country's sovereigns on 4 July 1991.

Between 1970 and the present time, Morocco and Spain have signed some eight agreements involving economic cooperation (1971), double taxation (1985), scientific and technical cooperation (1979), cultural cooperation (1980), social security (1979), and land, air, and maritime transportation (1970 and 1979).

Within the framework of promoting Spanish investment in Morocco (which, at present, falls below the potential of these two countries), a draft agreement to encourage and protect investment was signed in 1989 at the time of His Majesty the King's visit to Spain.

Trade between the two kingdoms is of a fairly high volume and covers a broad range of products, placing Spain second after France as both a client and supplier of Morocco.

The members of the Spanish delegation took part in the meeting.

For his part, the minister of energy and mines, Mr. Driss Alaoui M'Daghri, also received Mr. Claudio Aranzadi.

The meeting took place in the presence of the Spanish Kingdom's ambassador in Rabat and the Spanish secretary generals for energy and mines and for trade, industry, and tourism.

At this time, the two parties reviewed the different domains of bilateral cooperation and examined the means that could be used to expand cooperation in the area of energy, particularly with regard to plans for an electric link-up between Morocco and Spain and the Maghreb-Europe natural gas pipeline. It should be recalled that the pipeline project is proceeding as scheduled to be put into service in the last quarter of 1995.

The two ministers went on to preside over the ceremony at which the National Hydrocarbons Institute (INH) and the National Petroleum Products Company (SNPP) signed an agreement for the creation of a company to develop the use of natural gas in Morocco: SODECAZ [expansion not given].

It should be noted that the founding shareholders of the company are "committed." As a subsidiary of the INH and the SNPP, its capital remains open to potential Moroccan investors as well as foreign natural gas operators, with priority going to investors in the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline.

At the close of the ceremony, the two ministers expressed satisfaction with the excellent relations that the two countries enjoy and the essential role being played by the operators concerned in bringing various projects to completion in the best of circumstances.

Strengthening Joint Ventures

Mr. Abouyoub [Morocco's trade minister] and Mr. Aranzadi presided over working session at which they reviewed the state of bilateral cooperation in economic and trade matters in light of the decisions taken at the Moroccan-Spanish summit meeting of last December and the policies expressed in the treaty of friendship and good neighbor relations signed in Rabat in July.

The two ministers pointed out that bilateral trade has grown perceptibly and that the business communities in both countries are now taking greater interest in joint ventures.

A draft plan to foster joint ventures to a level commensurate with the changes that have occurred in Morocco was agreed upon.

It should be noted that Spain is one of Morocco's primary trading partners. In 1990, Spain ranked second both in imports to our country, with 8.37 percent of the total, and in purchases of exports from our country, buying 9.15 percent of the total. The volume of trade between Spain and Morocco grew rapidly and consistently over the 1980s. It reached the level of 7.9 billion dirhams in 1990 which represented 8.7 percent of Morocco's total foreign trade and 14.9 percent of Morocco's trade with the EEC.

Spain is destined to hold a greater position in Morocco's foreign trade with the close of the transition period related to its membership in the European Community. In 1993, nearly all of Morocco's industrial products will have unrestricted access to the Spanish market. Given this favorable situation, Morocco and Spain see themselves as called upon to promote true bilateral cooperation and to undertake active coordination.

Mr. Claudio Aranzadi was also received by the minister-delegate to the prime minister for foreign investment, Mr. Mohamed Alaoui M'Daghri.

During their meeting, the two parties reviewed the prospects for expanding Spanish investment in Morocco and the means by which it might be strengthened.

In addition, the two parties stressed the particular importance this sector offers for strengthening economic relations between Spain and Morocco.

Finally, it should be noted that Spain's minister visited the Mohammed V Mausoleum Tuesday evening where he paid his respects to the late lamented sovereign.

After laying flowers at the tomb of the Father of the Nation, Mr. Aranzadi signed the Mausoleum's register of visitors. (MAP [MAGHREB-ARAB PRESS AGENCY])

Spanish Investment Activities Summarized

92AF0008B Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE
in French 13 Sep 91 p 3

[Article: "Signing of Cooperation and Friendship Treaty Gives Boost to Spanish Investment in Morocco"]

[Text] The signing last July of the Moroccan-Spanish treaty of cooperation, friendship and good neighborliness has led to the implantation of diverse Spanish enterprises in Morocco with contracts worth 110 billion pesetas, according to MERCADO, a Madrid economic weekly.

Detailing the activities of the most important Spanish firms operating in Morocco, MERCADO announced that "Cubiertas," a Soviet-Italo-Spanish consortium, has a 13.43-billion peseta contract for its contribution to construction of the M'Jara hydraulic complex, while a group of Spanish companies (Dragos, Babcock Wilcox and Bazan) is participating in the building of a thermal electric generating plant.

There is Spanish investment in the engineering sector (Imenosa), goods transport (Transfesa), foreign trade (Focoex), petrochemicals (Ercros), finance (Banque Bilbao-Viscaya, Banco Exterieur, Cajamadrid), textiles (Cortefiel, Liwe, Tavesa-Algodonera San Antonio), distribution (El Corte Ingles), chemicals and energy (Fosforea Espagnola, Enags) and tourism (Groupe Fierro).

In the first five months of this year, Spain logged a solid trade surplus of 18.951 billion pesetas (110 pesetas = 8.30 dirhams), according to MERCADO, which added that Spanish exports over the same period were worth 33.957 billion pesetas.

Ministers Note Development of Saharan Province

92AF0021A Rabat L'OPINION in French
28 Sep 91 p 1,9

[Text] With the prime minister, Dr. Azeddine Laraki, presiding, the council of government held a meeting on Thursday in which it studied two draft decrees. The first of them amends and supplements the decree relative to compensation provided to the members of the clergy who preach in each of the kingdom's regions, and it would extend compensation to all the wilayaat, prefectures, and provinces of the kingdom.

The second draft decree amends and supplements the royal decree that awarded special status to personnel at the Ministry of Health. It would standardize the years of service required for the promotion of the health ministry's principal financial officers to the position of administrator-financial officer, in keeping with the requirement for similar officers in the various sectors of the civil service.

In the course of the meeting, the minister of the interior and information, Mr. Driss Basri, and the minister-delegate to the prime minister for development in the Saharan provinces, Mr. Khali Hanna Ould Rachid, gave a detailed presentation of the development effort that has taken place in the southern provinces since their return to the kingdom.

The presentation covered the range of projects completed in these provinces in basic infrastructure and in economic, social, cultural and other fields as well.

As far as basic infrastructure is concerned, the southern provinces have seen constant building activity undertaken to ensure an accelerated pace of development and to overcome natural conditions in the Sahara so as to

break the region's isolation of the colonial period and enable it to open up to domestic and international trade.

Within that framework, a major network of modern roads spanning several thousands of kilometers has been built. Enormous financial outlays and investments were made to this end, given the characteristics of the Saharan region.

In the same vein, a particular emphasis was given to port facilities and to maritime and air transportation. The Port of Laayoune [El Aaiun] has been built and outfitted to become a major complex handling merchandise, mining products, and fish catches.

Efforts have also included construction of the Port of Boujdor and enhancement of the Port of Dakhla, making it possible to promote activity in the fishing industry in these regions of abundant fishing resources.

In the field of air transportation, major projects have been completed, first among them the Hassan the First Airport in Laayoune, inaugurated by His Majesty King Hassan II, may God bestow glory upon him. Expansion work was performed at the airports of Dakhla and Smara, which were given the necessary means and equipment to accommodate the most modern aircraft.

In efforts to tap water resources, particular attention was given to prospecting for water and installation of a desalination and distribution network to meet the needs of residents and ensure adequate water supply to the farming and livestock-raising sectors.

Rural electrification efforts have been carried out, while the needs of industrial and economic activities have been satisfied.

Improvement of telecommunications has also helped ease the isolation of this region: A technological leap was made when a modern communications system was created, establishing automatic connections for foreign and domestic communications and improving radio and television broadcasting coverage.

In the process of constructing these basic services, local companies gained experience and know-how, private enterprise was encouraged, and employment was provided to the inhabitants of this region.

Activity in the business sector underwent a qualitative transformation from simple traditional activity rooted in commerce and livestock-raising to modern, developed activity.

In agriculture, several projects were carried out—thanks to the support of the government of His Majesty the King—in the areas of farming and agricultural research, the establishment of farming cooperatives, reforestation, and efforts against desertification, with the result of contributing to the expansion of output and to broader horizons for the promotion of the agricultural sector in these province.

Given the abundance of maritime resources, several investments were made and infrastructure installed in the domain of ocean fishing with a view to expanding the fishing catch, encouraging private individuals to invest in this field with the help of state aid, and fostering the formation of cooperatives and the use of modern techniques.

In social matters, the reintegration of the region into the motherland has been a watershed event that has made it necessary to create a new living environment, requiring considerable means to strengthen the social sectors and to provide material to schools, hospitals, pedagogical centers, mosques, sports facilities, youth centers, cultural centers and other facilities, in response to the needs of inhabitants.

As a result, the school enrollment rate in these provinces has been raised to 100 percent thanks to educational institutions built for not only the basic level, but also the nursery school and secondary levels as well, in addition to the professional training centers at technological institutes and other institutions.

In the health sector, modern hospitals furnished with advanced medical equipment and a large number of dispensaries and health centers were built.

The housing and urban-planning sector, in particular, saw great change resulting in the completion of a vast housing program. Several complexes containing more than 10,000 housing units of different categories were built. They are equipped with the means necessary to ensure housing worthy of servants of His Majesty the King, may God bestow glory upon him. Similarly, the cities have been provided with plazas, parks, and gardens.

The presentation made by the two ministers also touched on the projects undertaken as part of the orientation and development plan. These projects involve all areas—social, economic, cultural, etc.

The work already completed and the work still in progress in these provinces are nothing short of a miracle: What was once an untamed and inhospitable desert is now undergoing ever increasing development. Cities and towns are springing from the desert and newly constructed roads span several thousand km. All of it is thanks to the effort by His Majesty the King to launch sweeping changes that have brought this region up to the level of the other provinces of the kingdom in less than 15 years, much to the admiration and surprise of all the international observers and journalists who have seen with their own eyes the total rebirth that these provinces are experiencing.

This major transformation has modified the views of the Moroccan citizen who is the primary beneficiary of the development effort. He feels its impact in his daily life and contributes to it directly or indirectly by participating in the representative organizations and institutions and elected councils, and thanks to the fact that he

enjoys full political and economic rights after having been deprived of them during the entire colonial period.

What has been accomplished in this region, thanks to the special interest taken by His Majesty the King, may God glorify him, brings honor to the Arab, African, and Muslim countries and constitutes a tangible model of development in these regions as well as an example of effective integration and complementary effort at all levels. At the level of the Maghreb, it is a living example of what can be achieved given the geographic situation of these provinces.

All of these achievements are the result of a historic symbiosis between the inhabitants of these provinces and His Majesty King Hassan II, may God bestow glory upon him. The upcoming referendum will give His Majesty's faithful subjects in these provinces a new opportunity to reaffirm with pride before the world their attachment to their Moroccan identity and to the religious and political ties that have always joined them to the glorious Alawite throne and to the august person of His Majesty King Hassan II, may God bestow glory upon him.

This is a symbiosis that they have reaffirmed in the course of history since the beginning of colonization and particularly following the independence of the northern regions of the kingdom by fighting in the liberation army, by their repeated uprisings against the colonizer, notably in 1970, and by taking part in and supporting the glorious Green March which enabled them to reunite with their brothers in the northern part of the kingdom. It was this that they expressed during the royal visits of His Majesty King Hassan II to Dakhla in 1980, Laayoune in 1985, and Smara in 1991.

Last, Mr. Driss Basri, minister of the interior and information, informed the Council of Government of contacts and meetings that have taken place between the members of MINURSO [the UN mission charged with organizing the referendum in the Western Sahara], leading figures and chieftains of the Saharawi tribes, representatives, elected officials, and members of the royal Advisory Council, former members of the liberation army, certain founding members of the Unity and Liberation Front and of the Saharawi National Union Party as well as certain founders of the Polisario [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro] who have rallied to the motherland in response to the royal appeal: "The homeland is clement and merciful." During these meetings, they reiterated to the UN officials the need to consider the right of all Saharawis originating from the Saharan provinces—including Saharawis residing in the kingdom's northern provinces—to participate in the referendum of self-determination as they have fought for the independence of all the regions of Morocco and for the return of the late King Mohammed V, may God rest his soul.

At this time, the government of His Majesty the King reiterated the need to consider the request by the Saharawis and their participation in the referendum, with proof and information to confirm their right to participate and the fact that they belong to the recovered Saharan provinces.

Newspaper Defends Idea of New 'Green March'

Territorial Integrity Invoked

92AF0012A Rabat L'OPINION in French 21 Sep 91 p 1

[Editorial by Mohamed Idrissi Kaitouni: "Permanent Mobilization To Protect Our Territorial Integrity"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] In a communique published in New York on Thursday, the Polisario mercenaries announced that Morocco intends to organize another march on the Sahara, ordering the people of certain towns, including Tan-Tan and Goulimine, to head toward our Saharan provinces.

First, we want to remind the mercenaries and all those who support them that the Sahara is an integral part of Moroccan territory, and that all Moroccans have the right to settle in any town of the kingdom, without any restriction. This right is guaranteed in the Constitution and enjoyed by all Moroccans, whether Saharans or from other Moroccan provinces.

The Moroccans, without any exception, are free to move and settle throughout the country, and they do not have to ask anybody's permission if they want to go to the Sahara or from the Sahara to other towns in the north.

In addition, the Green March is a permanent one; for while at first this mobilizing march made it possible to decolonize our Saharan provinces and recover them peacefully, it goes on to protect the Moroccan character of the Sahara, to repel aggressions against our territory, and to foil the plots against our soil and our national sovereignty.

From Tangiers to Lagouira, the Moroccan people are unanimously agreed on defending by all means the Moroccan character of the Sahara and foiling the machinations of the enemies of our territorial integrity.

It is the march of 25 million of Moroccans mobilized behind His Majesty the King to preserve the country's territorial unity, ready to answer the call of duty and to consent to all sacrifices to protect the national sovereignty, the dignity of Morocco and its independence, for there can be no true independence without territorial integrity.

Besides, the international community, and in particular the defenders of human rights, cannot tolerate that genuine Moroccan Saharans should be deprived of their right to protect their identity by going to the polls and by confirming that they are Moroccans.

Just because these thousands of Saharans fled colonial repression and settled in the north does not mean that they should be prevented from exercising their right and fulfilling their duty.

The people who were born in the Sahara and who settled in other Moroccan towns have the right to go back home, among their families, and to settle freely in the Sahara, and nobody can deny them this right.

Besides, even the UN plan provides for that right and the referendum process cannot be implemented if the identification commission does not grant the right to vote to all Saharan Moroccans included on the lists submitted by Morocco.

On the other hand, we should never forget that the referendum has only value of confirmation, and that Morocco is sovereign and cannot tolerate any attempt against its attributes and its right to exert them as it pleases throughout its entire territory, from Tangiers to Lagouira.

Infiltrations Denounced

92AF0012B Rabat L'OPINION in French
21 Sep 91 pp 1, 3

[Commentary by Jamal Hajjam: "Moroccan Sahara; Infiltrations: Within the International Borders of the Sahara, There Is No Sovereignty But Morocco's; Morocco Has the Right To Forbid Any Infiltration and Any Presence of Mercenaries in the Sahara"]

[Text] The security walls built by Morocco in the Sahara, as part of its defense strategy, do not in any way serve as borders. The international borders of the Moroccan Sahara are known, and confirmed in the report of the UN general secretary. Therefore, within these borders, there is no sovereignty but Morocco's, whether on this side or on the other side of the defense wall.

Any infiltration within these borders is considered by Morocco as an attempt against its sovereignty. The cease-fire that came into force on 6 September does not imply that our country should remain idle in the face of the infiltrations of mercenaries undertaken under cover of the United Nations and the cease-fire.

Although, until now, the United Nations has not done anything to prevent these infiltrations, Morocco remains within its rights when it protects its sovereignty. And if, as was reported by some press agencies, the Moroccan Air Force made reconnaissance flights over the territories located between the internationally recognized borders of the Moroccan Sahara and the security wall, this could in no way constitute a violation of the cease-fire, but a confirmation of Morocco's sovereignty over these regions which—need we recall—were also recovered according to international law, i.e., based on the consultative decision of the International Court of Justice and on the Madrid agreement of 1975.

Rather, if there was a violation of the cease-fire, it was when secessionist mercenaries, acting under cover of the United Nations, infiltrated the area between the security wall and the international border of the Sahara and attempted to settle in various points of that area.

The responsibility for this situation, however, is incumbent essentially on the United Nations, with which Morocco has agreed to a cease-fire in the context of the peace plan.

It is the responsibility of the United Nations to ensure compliance with the cease-fire, which implies that mercenaries should be kept out of the Saharan provinces, as was the case when the cease-fire came into force. The United Nations know perfectly well that, until 6 September, the Royal Armed Forces [RAF] controlled all of the Saharan provinces, on both sides of the defense wall.

Similarly, the RAF had always prevented such infiltrations.

This task is now the responsibility of the United Nations, which has a duty to intervene and demand a return to the situation that prevailed before 6 September.

Until now, the United Nations does not seem to have made up its mind to stop these activities.

Yet, it is clear that, through such entirely illegal actions, the Polisario is trying to turn things to its advantage, to the detriment of the very UN settlement plan.

If the United Nations wants the referendum they are planning to organize in the Sahara to retain its full credibility, it has an obligation to give up its passive attitude in this respect and to take fast and firm measures.

Morocco cannot remain indefinitely idle in the face of a situation that is an open attempt against its sovereignty.

Polisario 'Fears'

92AF0012C *Rabat L'OPINION in French*
21 Sep 91 pp 1, 3

[Unattributed article: "The 'Polisario' Fears the Moroccans' Mobilization Capacity"]

[Text] An AFP wire dated from New York, claims that, on Thursday, the Polisario accused Morocco of intending to organize a new Green March.

According to a communique, the inhabitants of South Morocco were ordered to head toward Saharan towns in order to "alter the composition of the electorate."

The operation is said to involve 170,000 people, including "50,000 fake voters." This actually amounts to acknowledging the presence of 120,000 Moroccan Saharans who live outside the Sahara and have the right to vote.

According to the AFP, the information was refuted by well-informed Moroccan sources, but the AFP wire added that Mr. Ali Skali, Morocco's permanent representative to the United Nations, met with the UN general secretary on Monday to "inform him of the Moroccan Government's proposal to gather in the Sahara all those who consider themselves Saharans...." The wire also pointed out that the AFP had been unable to obtain "official confirmation" of this plan in Rabat.

This communique from the Polisario once again uses the fear of Morocco's ability to mobilize to defend its rights with the same readiness to fight as at the time of the Green March. And, undeniably, the Sahara being Moroccan territory, under Moroccan sovereignty, any Moroccan retains in full its right to live there. What is shocking, on the other hand, is that the other party will not allow the people illegally confined in Tindouf to move freely and return to the motherland.

We should also point out that, before the Polisario communique, this information was peddled by the Algerian press agency, dated from so-called "liberated territories" controlled by the "SDAR" [Saharan Democratic Arab Republic], in order to misinform international public opinion and fuel tension about the referendum.

Status of Inter-Maghreb Trade Examined

92AF0008A *Casablanca LA VIE ECONOMIQUE*
in French 13 Sep 91 p 7

[Article by Mohamed Benfadil: "Inter-Maghreb Machinery Fully in Place, But Businessmen Still Hesitant"]

[Text] Now that three years have passed since the signing of the Treaty of Marrakech, it is a good time to see how much progress has been made in inter-Maghreb trade. Previously such trade took place under the auspices of various bilateral conventions, such as the 1986 convention between Morocco and Tunisia. The obvious imperfections of that agreement were corrected in the recent supplementary accord of 19 June 1991, establishing two lists of products allowed to be freely traded: Commerce in products on one of the lists entails payment of a 17.5-percent compensatory tax, unless the rule of origin (the minimum percent of value added locally) is satisfied.

In August 1989, a cooperation accord was concluded between Morocco and Algeria covering "free circulation of people and goods" and development of border zones. The convention was also intended to deter "informal trade." Also, as noted at the time, the convention was intended to minimize the differences between the legislative and regulatory provisions and the customs procedures of the two countries (cf. *LA VIE ECONOMIQUE*, 11 August 1989).

Uphill Struggle

Things started moving once the Maghrebian "train" got on track. But much, if not most, of the real work of "Maghrebian integration" still lies ahead. Now that the political will has been clearly demonstrated, it is time to get into action and achieve real economic complementarity within the UMA [Arab Maghreb Union], a fundamental prerequisite for development and optimization of commerce. We must also, and above all, work together on a Maghreb-wide basis to enact and effectively implement measures to harmonize fiscal, economic and monetary policies. That is certainly no easy task, given the bilateral interests enshrined in the bilateral conventions, but the supremacy of the general language adopted in the Treaty of Marrakech and specific language in follow-on agreements should give impetus to effective implementation of their provisions.

Also, the various meetings of ministers and officials concerned (the joint industrial project in Tunis, PTT [Posts, Telegraph, and Telephone] in Rabat, Transport in Tripoli, the meeting of the central bank governors in Tunis, etc.) need to be translated without further delay into concrete steps to meet the challenge from the [European] Community north of the Mediterranean. While the building of the Maghreb may not be easy, many officials seem to think it necessary to "exploit our convergences to reduce the divergences." The same officials also believe we need to create a "Maghrebian frame of reference," so we can begin to "think Maghrebian" and "consume Maghrebian."

Several enterprises in UMA countries are disposed to cooperate to achieve industrial integration, particularly in the automobile sector. In fact, this sector offers a noteworthy example: It is possible to produce 100-percent Maghrebian-made vehicles (In this case Algeria accounts for 70 percent, but 30 percent of the work is done in Morocco).

For this reason, it is believed that abolition of family-owned enterprises on the one hand, and partnerships between different Maghrebian enterprises on the other, may give the needed impetus to what so far has been the uphill struggle for UMA economic development. When the Treaty of Marrakech was signed, the five UMA states agreed to assume the costs of building the Maghreb; and, as pointed out in 1989 by My Driss Alaoui Mdaghri, then-secretary of state for UMA affairs, those costs should be equitably shared (cf. LA VIE ECONOMIQUE, 22 September 1989).

Libya

In 1990, Moroccan trade with UMA countries was a relatively small percent of Morocco's exports and imports. However, Libya maintained its preponderance in Morocco-Maghreb trade. In fact, Libya exports more to Morocco than any other UMA country, but globally it is our country's 15th largest supplier, accounting for only 1.86 percent of Morocco's total imports. Table 1 gives some idea of the relative importance of the four UMA

countries as suppliers for Morocco.

Table 1: UMA Country Shares of Moroccan Imports¹

Rank	Country	Percent of Total Imports
15th	Libya	1.86
25th	Algeria	0.55
31st	Tunisia	0.39
82d	Mauritania	0.14

1. Source: Office of Trade.

Thus the volume of Morocco's trade with its Maghrebian partners is still far short of optimal, in terms of our hopes for the future of what some even now are openly calling the "Maghrebian Common Market."

If one considers that the total volume of Morocco's exports to destinations in the UMA is only on the order of 264,688 tons, and that this corresponds to an annual turnover estimated at a mere 2 billion dirhams, one can understand the imperative need to accelerate the process of building the economic UMA that is so ardently desired.

By way of comparison, the total figure for Morocco's exports comes to more than 30 billion dirhams. In other words, we have scarcely begun the work of meeting the challenge.

Tables 2 and 3 show relative import and export levels for each of the four Maghreb countries and the total estimated tonnage and monetary value of our trade with them.

Table 2: 1990 Moroccan Imports from UMA Countries¹

Country	Volume (tons)	Value (thousands of dirhams)
Algeria	142,280	3,415,075
Libya	543,251	1,059,553
Tunisia	125,568	223,665
Mauritania	361	2,516
Total	811,460	4,700,809

1. Editor's Note: Based on data provided by the Office of Trade.

Table 3: 1990 Moroccan Exports to UMA Markets¹

Country	Volume (tons)	Value (thousands of dirhams)
Algeria	82,645	472,929
Libya	71,129	976,356
Tunisia	108,735	509,263
Mauritania	2,179	34,877
Total	264,688	1,993,425

1. Editor's Note: Based on data provided by the Office of Trade.

To get a clearer idea of the low level of Moroccan trade with the rest of the UMA, it is useful to consider the important example of finished goods.

One notes that in this category Morocco's exports to the 7.139-billion dirham Maghreb market are valued at only 364,383 million [as published] dirhams, an infinitesimal 5.1 percent.

As for imports [of finished goods] from the Maghreb, the statistics are even more bleak. In fact, these countries account for only 0.08 percent of our total imports. That is very insignificant.

Tables 4 and 5 below are eloquent illustrations of this state of affairs.

Table 4: Percentage of Moroccan Finished Goods Exports Absorbed by UMA¹

	Volume (tons)	Value (thousands of dirhams)
Overall total	70,497	7,139,136
UMA share	3,510	364,383
Percentage	4.9	5.1

1. Source: BCME [Moroccan Foreign Trade Bank]

Table 5: Maghrebien Finished Goods Exports As Percentage of Moroccan Imports of Same¹

	Volume (tons)	Value (thousands of dirhams)
Overall total	141,247	10,998,034
Morocco's share	605	8,513
Percentage	0.43	0.08

1. Source: BCME.

These facts justify sounding the alarm once again—although it has already been done many times before, both here in these columns and by diverse economic operators—that it is a matter of great urgency to enact the legislative and regulative measures needed for UMA, and to implement them with the appropriate celerity, rationality and effectiveness.

Polisario Founding Member Discusses Career

92AF0005A Rabat L'OPINION in French
6 Sep 91 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Hassana Ould Lamdaïmigh, Polisario founding member, by Fatima Belarbi; place and date not given; quotation marks as published]

[Text] In an interview with L'OPINION, Hassana Ould Lamdaïmigh, a founding member of the Polisario [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro], stated that:

- 200 Saharawis have been executed and 800 others imprisoned on the orders of the Polisario leaders in Tindouf;

- bombs were to have been planted in Marrakech and Laayoune [El Aaiun] with the collaboration of the ETA [Basque Fatherland and Liberty];
- the Polisario has done nothing but stir up tribal sentiment by favoring certain tribes;
- the "Saharawi cause" is being used as a money-making pretext by the leaders who have amassed fortunes;
- the Canary Islands are a major center of operations for the Polisario.

Desertions and defections from the Polisario are on the rise. Hardly a day goes by without new additions to the number who are fleeing Tindouf's camps. What is happening there? What is causing Saharawis to return finally to their motherland? In the end, the truth comes out, we were told by Hassana Ould Lamdaïmigh, a member of the first founding cell of the Polisario.

Born in Laayoune in 1953, Hassana was a mere 17 years old when he was enrolled in the movement. Hassana was later to hold important positions in this movement of mercenaries. Polisario representative in the Canary Islands and in Andalusia, coordinator of the pro-Polisario campaign in Spain carried out by so-called "support committees for the Saharawi people," and an influential member of the movement's external relations department, Hassana returned home to Morocco just one week ago. He spoke to us at length about his adventure with the Polisario, a contrived movement that he says is manipulated by foreign entities with the purpose of causing distress to Morocco. It took us some time, he added, but fortunately we came to that realization. Misappropriation of funds, embezzlement, shameless propaganda, distortions of history, imprisonments, assassinations, terrorism and the like are the main preoccupations of the Polisario's leaders. These truths, known to many foreign governments and many organizations, should inspire greater caution, all the more so because the Polisario's schemes have done nothing more than inflame tribal sentiment in Tindouf's camps. Executions (more than 200) and imprisonments (more than 800) have turned Tindouf into a veritable ghetto ravaged by hatred and rancor.

[L'OPINION] After years in the Polisario, you fled the movement. Can you tell us the reasons behind your break with it?

[Hassana] The truth is that in 1982, I and a group of friends—some of whom have already returned to Morocco, while others have not yet managed to do so—began asking ourselves many questions about the path we had taken in embracing the Polisario's cause which, in the final analysis, was leading nowhere.

It is true that we were young when we joined—full of enthusiasm and therefore easily recruited. We lived with the Polisario, experienced what it really is, and in time we realized that it is nothing more than an artificial

movement created by foreign entities for the purpose of not only harming, but also destroying the country we were fighting at that time, our country Morocco. It is true that we shamelessly distorted history, and five years ago, after deep reflection, we had already reached the following conclusion: that this conflict cannot lead to the independence of the Sahara. In talking with many people, some of them highly politicized, we realized that we were nothing more than an instrument in the hands of foreign entities.

We were manipulated by the Polisario which, itself, was manipulated by foreign entities.

Certain truths came out with the passing of time and we became aware of our mistakes. For example, at the start of it all, we were constantly told that the Moroccan regime would collapse, that it was merely a matter of time. Yet, it has proved itself to be the most stable regime in the region and history cannot deny that.

That realization had repercussions on the structure and internal life of the Polisario.

In the camps, the situation changed, and the situation became intolerable with the Polisario. All powers and privileges belonged to individuals from certain tribes, while the others served as mere instruments.

This raised questions in the minds of those who had come from Laayoune, Boujdour or Dakhla, and they began prepare their return to Morocco. Some of them—including important figures—have returned; others have not yet succeeded in doing so.

The leaders of the Polisario reacted to this situation, which was a dangerous one for them, by resorting to heavy-handed means, imprisoning or murdering anyone who dared to dissent. I can tell you that more than 200 persons have been killed and nearly 800 others have been imprisoned. Most of them are people from the coastal cities of the Sahara. While that is the case, it must not be forgotten that there are people in Tindouf who continue to work desperately to destabilize and destroy Morocco.

[L'OPINION] You resided in Spain, in particular in the Canary Islands. What was the Polisario's interest in that?

[Hassana] The population of the Canary Islands has a strong liking for the Polisario because many of them were born and have lived in the Sahara. They retained a feeling of nostalgia for it.

Bachir Mustapha Sayed (appointed as coordinator with MINURSO [the UN mission charged with organizing the referendum in Western Sahara]) tries to enlist Canarians by promising to provide them with jobs as soon as the "Saharan Republic" is proclaimed. He also attempts to recruit Canarians to carry out various missions in Morocco. He contacts the Canarian separatists and tries to inflame their nationalist sentiments with the purpose of sowing discord on the islands. He wants to turn them into another Lebanon.

Thus, the Canary Islands, given their proximity to the Sahara, represent a strategic point for a campaign to undermine Morocco and for contact with the population of the Sahara and Mauritania.

Since 1988, however, a few friends and I tried to restore the truth. To all the Saharawis who came to the Canaries and who visited us—merchants, students, young people, and even entire families, we explained who the Polisario really were and recommended that they go home to Morocco and settle there permanently. We advised the young people to continue their studies and to think of their future, as only their country, namely Morocco could assure them of a future.

[L'OPINION] What did your work in the Canary Islands consist of, exactly?

[Hassana] In the past, we did recruitment work by way of propaganda against Morocco to enroll Saharawis in the Polisario. Among other things, we showed them films depicting armed soldiers, festivities in the camps of Tindouf, in order to condition them so that they would go to the Polisario's camps. Many young people, merchants, and entire families who had a blind belief in us went to Tindouf. Our propaganda work also consisted in writing pamphlets, which we were able to pass on to the others through Spanish intermediaries who entered Morocco as tourists and delivered the pamphlets to Saharawis. We paid for the tickets and living expenses of several Spaniards so that they would be able to carry out these missions.

[L'OPINION] Who were these Spaniards?

[Hassana] Some of them were friends; others were journalists, merely Polisario sympathizers. Some Spanish Army retirees who had been posted in the Sahara and who traveled to Morocco, to Agadir and Laayoune, transmitted to us a great deal of information about the situation.

[L'OPINION] Did you receive material aid from Spain?

[Hassana] Yes, but it must be said that not all of the aid reached Tindouf, and consequently not all of it benefited the Saharawis in the camps. An example: Less than one year ago, the parliament of the Canary Islands approved 30 million pesetas in aid to build a hospital for the Aousert camp.

The Polisario leadership instructed that 10 million pesetas be transferred into a bank account in Geneva.

[L'OPINION] To whom does the account belong?

[Hassana] It belongs to Mohamed Khedad who was the intelligence chief (of the Polisario) before he became right-hand man to Mohamed Abdelaziz (president of the Polisario) and a member of the team that carried out his dirty work.

Another example: The "director of the Red Crescent" in Tindouf, a Saharawi, is also misappropriating funds. He

has asked all the humanitarian organizations that have helped us to make a deposit into an Algerian bank account, claiming that the money would serve to build storage sheds and warehouses for the food products we were receiving. Worse still, even the food and medical aid sent to us by these organizations (milk, sugar, flour, etc.) were resold to Mauritania, Mali, or Algeria. All of these operations were supervised by the Polisario's ruling team: Bachir Mustapha Sayed; El Haj Ahmed Ould Hmier, the Polisario's representative in Madrid, but actually of Mauritanian origin, a member of the tribe of El Gahr and Nouadhibou; and his brother Boukhari. As for Mohamed Ben Abdelaziz, who has his own acolytes, he is now sitting on top of a vast fortune. In particular, he took possession of the 15-year pensions of Saharawis retired from the Spanish Army. That sum—imagine how much it comes to—has been placed in a Madrid bank account, while the retirees receive small scraps of the financial aid supplied by Algeria.

In Tindouf itself, he formed a poultry-raising company run by Mohamed Islim Ould Miless, and it even sells to the Algerians.

As for El Bouhali, he has profited by reselling the military vehicles and weapons to the Mauritians and Malians. He also raises sheep. The Polisario officials have become a veritable mafia whose sole purpose is to amass money. Nothing else really counts for them. But the big loser in this story is the Saharawi population.

About 100 Saharawi retirees who realized what was happening have already transmitted complaints to the retirement office in Las Palmas demanding that their pensions no longer be sent to the Polisario, but held in Las Palmas instead. By the way, a Spanish commission came to Tindouf and, after hearing the retirees' complaints, made an investigation.

[L'OPINION] Does the Polisario practice terrorism?

[Hassana] Indeed, in 1986, the Polisario—in collaboration with the ETA (the Basque separatist movement)—attempted to plant a bomb at the Club Méditerranée in Marrakech. Young Saharawis went to Marrakech to survey the situation, but were not able to accomplish anything. There was another, similar attempt in Laayoune at the Club El Massira. I was present at the discussions concerning the operation, but I did not take part. I also know that they gave special training to young Saharawis in the launching of SAM-7s, as they wanted to shoot down the plane in which His Majesty King Hassan II was to travel to Madrid for his 1985 visit to Spain, which was later postponed. There was also the operation against the ship "Cruz Del Mar" in 1979. I know—because I was present during the discussions—that this operation was prepared by Ould Salek Bachir, Hakim and Ben Abdelaziz and that they later informed Commandant Abderrazak in the Algerian military security force so that he would inform the Algerian authorities. The objective of this operation was to attack the Spanish

ship "Cruz Del Mar," to kill all its passengers, and to let Morocco take the blame for it.

This operation had been programmed during the visit of a UN mission to the Sahara, but the Spanish security services figured out where it had originated. It was the Spanish press that was fooled and I would say that to this day, some Canarians think that the Moroccans were behind the attack that took the lives of some Spaniards.

[L'OPINION] What is the situation inside the Polisario at this time?

[Hassana] A little more than a month ago, there was a meeting of security officials, because—as I explained earlier—the situation is very dangerous due to tribal tensions and conflicts, which could result in intertribal violence. Hatred has taken hold of the camps because certain tribes have lost everything as other tribes have enriched themselves at their expense. Suspicion and distrust are so pervasive that people meet only with others of their same group, in other words, their same tribe. Previously, that was not the case.

As everyone knows, tens of defections have already occurred, and the desire to desert exists. Several individuals are beginning to talk, giving information about what is really happening inside the Polisario. Even the Saharawi "army" is riddled with tribal dissension. Many Mauritians who recently tried to return to Nouadhibou were harshly prevented from doing so.

Several countries and several international and humanitarian organizations have been informed of this situation and supplied with proof. The camps in Tindouf harbor the seed of another conflict that is only just beginning: an intertribal war.

Istiqlal Party Publishes CC Communiqué

91AF0010A Rabat MAROC SOIR in French
11 Sep 91 p 1,3

[Text of a communiqué by the Central Committee of the Istiqlal Party; the text published by MAROC SOIR is a French-language translation of the original; first paragraph is MAROC SOIR introduction]

[Text] In a communiqué issued by its Central Committee, the Istiqlal Party declares that the Sahara is an integral part of Morocco and that the people will not allow any force to detach the southern provinces from the motherland. It calls for the mobilization of all citizens to take up the challenges and engage the battle for unity.

At the close of its proceedings, after an in-depth discussion, the Central Committee adopted a communiqué of which the following is a translation:

I. The Istiqlal Party considers the Sahara to be Moroccan and an integral part of the country within the context of its natural and historic unity. The return of the Sahara came about after an ardent struggle by the people against

Spanish colonialism and the colonialist alliance between Spain and France, and after the Green March, which was conceived and organized by His Majesty the King.

The Moroccan identity of the Sahara was confirmed in accordance with international legality, namely by virtue of:

- the advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice in 1975; and
- the negotiations held with the Spanish colonial authorities culminating in the Madrid Agreement of 1975 which is registered among the documents of the United Nations.

The citizens of the Sahara expressed their Moroccan identity through legal and constitutional avenues, namely:

- their renewal of allegiance to His Majesty the King in the capital cities of the three provinces, Laayoune (El Aaiun), Dakhla, and Smara; and
- the elections at the commune and legislative levels as well as the referenda that have been organized in Morocco since the return of the Sahara to the motherland.

In view of the foregoing, at a time when the Sahara question is entering a decisive phase, the Istiqlal Party reiterates the following:

1) Morocco has definitively recovered its Sahara and our people will not allow any force to deal another blow to Moroccan unity and detach the Sahara from the motherland.

2) Transformations at the national, African, and Maghreb levels, as well as the changes Morocco has experienced in recent years, have caused us to consider the referendum that the United Nations plans to hold in the Sahara to be no longer necessary.

3) The Party takes note of the blatant infringements of the principle of national sovereignty contained in the plan by the UN General Secretariat for organizing the referendum, and warns against any measure or practice undertaken by the UN's mission in violation of this principle. It also takes note of multiple breaches of the referendum plan and timetables, regarding which the United Nations had come to an agreement with the Moroccan government. This raises doubt as to whether the referendum can be held in a sound fashion that would reflect the true will of the Saharawi citizens, both of those who reside in the Saharan provinces as well as those who have had to leave these provinces to escape the persecution and terrorism to which they were subjected by the former colonial authorities.

Within this framework, the Party reiterates that the lists Morocco has presented of Saharawi citizens must be accepted so that the citizens whose names appear on the lists will be able to take part in the referendum that is planned.

4) The Party reiterates that any attempt by the secessionist mercenaries to infiltrate illegally into the Saharan provinces under the cover of the cease-fire must be repelled with force.

The cease-fire must not serve as an instrument for the occupation of portions of the Sahara in an attempt to prove the presence of mercenaries on the slightest tract of Saharan land.

5) The Istiqlal Party issues a fervent appeal to all citizens, men and women, residing in the Sahara and north of the Sahara to exercise vigilance and caution, to mobilize in response to the challenge Morocco must face in the coming months, and to live up to their patriotism characterized by sacrifice, so as to engage the battle for unity and end the era of tension, anarchy, and aggression against the country and its citizens.

The Party pledges to mobilize all its activists and its every means in the pursuit of victory for Morocco.

6) The Istiqlal Party pays homage to the combat and sacrifice of the Royal Armed Forces, led by the Supreme Commander His Majesty King Hassan II, since the recovery of the Sahara to defend the national soil and territorial integrity, and to counter every aggression perpetrated by the mercenaries based abroad.

The Party reflects the opinion of all citizens in regarding the Royal Armed Forces as the shield that protects Morocco against all colonialist attempts to violate its unity and sovereignty (...).

The Central Committee of the Istiqlal Party recommends to the Executive Committee that, as part of its responsibilities in leading the party, it arm itself with firmness and vigilance in the face of the questions that Morocco will confront in the coming months, whether it be the Saharan question or political and economic questions; it reiterates the need for a general mobilization of the people, for the mobilization of the party's officers and means in response to the maneuvers plotted by Morocco's enemies against its territorial integrity, and for the mobilization of all popular potential in order to confront any danger that threatens this integrity or violates the determination of the inhabitants of the Sahara and all those who belong there in the expression of their will for union and to end the tension directed against Morocco ever since it began its fight to achieve full territorial integrity and drive foreigners from its territories.

National Demographic Trends Examined

Family Size Decreases

92AF0003A Rabat ALMAGHRIB in French
30 Aug 91 p 2

[Article by Narjis Rerhaye: "Married Couples in 2005"]

[Text] The number of Moroccan households will double between 1982 and 2005. That is contained in a report by

the Center of Demographic Studies and Research, which will certainly not please hardened bachelors.

This study, which was contained in a recently published analysis under the title, "Population in 2062," also tells us that if the number of households in Morocco continues to increase, we will see at the same time a reduction in the average size of these same households. In short, these modern couples have heard of family planning and will behave accordingly. Therefore, households will have a tendency to have fewer children. However, the fact remains that we are still far from the nuclear or separate family. By 2005 Moroccan households will have slightly more than five persons in them. However, one thing is sure. From one household to another, we are seeing a rather substantial decline in the fertility rate in our country. This is not intended to discourage the family planning campaigns, which finally are leaving aside the use of veiled language.

According to the same study, people are marrying at a later age in cities and, moreover, for good reasons. Education is the first argument advanced against having larger families, followed closely by the economic constraints of life in an urban setting. Hence, it is easy to conclude that marriage appears to be a considered action that people decide on as carefully as they would in deciding to start up a business.

Between now and 2005 the practice of comparing marriage to something like a bolt of lightning, where you live on love and fresh water, will clearly tend to disappear. However, rest assured: the number of urban households will make up nearly 63 percent of the Moroccan population between now and 2005, whereas it amounted to only 47 percent in 1982. The number of people marrying young will be still smaller. That is why heads of family under 30 years of age, who amounted to a little more than 14 percent of the total population in 1982, will total no more than 8.9 percent by 2005.

And as if to confirm more clearly that people are putting off marriage as long as possible, statistics, which are as stubborn as all figures, tell us that Moroccan heads of household between 30 and 59 years of age will constitute more than 79 percent of the total in the cities and a little more than 64 percent in the countryside, because of the ongoing, rural exodus. And we should realize that the urban dream and the lights of the cities will continue to attract people and that the youngest people will continue to desert our countryside.

Whether or not the Directorate of Statistics has decided to play the game, even so the transparency of the questions (especially after a good long time) will still remain before us. Over the coming years, when the fertility rate shows a tendency to decline, many people will ask themselves whether their standard of living and their purchasing power are so much better than previously.

Number of Households

92AF0003B Rabat ALMAGHRIB in French
30 Aug 91 p 2

[Text] Between the 1960 and 1982 censuses the number of Moroccan households has risen from 2,426,884 to 3,419,282, or a 40-percent increase over the initial number in a period of 22 years. The number will increase to 6,285,000 by 2005, if the past trend continues. The number of households will have almost doubled between 1982 and 2005. This was indicated by the Center of Demographic Studies and Research (part of the Directorate of Statistics) in a just published analysis entitled "The Population in 2062."

This rapid increase in the number of households will take place, despite an apparent decline in the propensity of adults to set up their own establishments. Adults 30 years of age and older who have the greatest potential to become heads of household (and therefore reflecting the number of households) will increase by 2.17 times between 1982 and 2005 after increasing by 1.56 times between 1960 and 1982.

In effect, the number of heads of household increased from 3,864,000 to 6,038,000 between 1960 and 1982 and will total 13,108,000, according to the average variant of population projections.

The publication notes that by comparing the number of households to the projected total population (the average variant) we find that the average size of households will undergo some reduction, although varying from one household to another, while continuing to have more than five persons per household.

As a result, the average size of households will reportedly decline from 5.9 persons in 1982 to 5.2 persons in 2005. This decline is caused by the reduction in the number of children per household (that is, a decline in fertility). The number of adults per household will remain practically the same. It was 3.5 persons in 1990 and will be 3.4 persons in 2005.

If the rates of growth of heads of households remain constant for the period from 1982 until 2005, we would see a different evolution in the number of households and their average size if we consider the demographic impact on the formation of households.

Using only the projected evolution in the size of the population, the number of households would reportedly increase from nearly 3,433,000 in 1982 to 7,341,000 in 2005. Therefore, there would be 516,000 more households if the evolution in the growth of the numbers of heads of households followed the same tendency as in the past.

This shows the importance of the role played by demographic variables (fertility and mortality) on the formation of households. It follows that the average size of

households will decline from 5.9 persons in 1982 to 4.8 persons in 2005, principally because of the drop in fertility.

Cohabitation without marriage is growing more quickly in urban settings than in the rural areas, particularly for people in the median ages. Such a development could be explained, among other things, by the more substantial increase in age at the time of marriage, longer periods of time spent in school, and economic constraints that will have a greater impact in the cities than in the countryside.

Depending on the varying tendencies, the number of urban households will reportedly increase from 1,594,000 in 1982 to 4,282,000 in 2005, or an increase of 2.7 times in 23 years, after having almost doubled between 1960 and 1982. On the other hand the number of rural households will increase only slightly, from 1,825,000 in 1982 to 2,534,000 in 2005, or a 40-percent increase. This is slightly greater than the increase observed between 1960 and 1982, when there was a 10-percent rise.

Furthermore, the proportion of urban households to the total for Morocco reportedly passed the 50 percent level in 1990. Urban households, which only represented 33 percent of all households in 1960 and 47 percent in 1982, will amount to almost 63 percent by 2005.

During the same years the percentage of the urban population was 29 percent in 1960, 42 percent in 1982, and will be 53.2 percent in 2005, respectively. As a result there will be a decline in the average size of urban households of one person between 1982 and 2005. This decline is due simultaneously to a decline in the number of adults and the number of children per household. The number of children per household will increase from 1.8 in 1990 to 2.3 in 2005.

In the countryside on the other hand the number of persons per household will increase before beginning to decline as we approach 2005, principally because of a drop in the proportion of children under 15, which is expected to decline more rapidly after 2000.

The increase in the number of households in both urban and rural settings is closely tied to the increase in the number of adults. It is the adults who will eventually constitute the core of households when they become heads of household, particularly men aged 30 and older.

Whether we consider households or adults, the annual rates of increase are much higher in the cities than in the countryside, due to the rural exodus. Moreover, the annual demographic effect on the increase in the number of households is 8.5 percent in the cities and 1.9 percent in the rural areas, for an average increase of 5.0 percent in Morocco as a whole.

Heads of household under 30 years of age only amounted to 14.4 percent of the total in 1982 (15.4 percent in the

cities and 13.5 percent in the countryside). They reportedly will constitute only 8.9 percent in 2005, according to the first variant (6.6 percent in the cities and 1.8 percent in the countryside). That will reportedly result from an increase in the average age at the time of marriage, the prolongation of the period of school attendance, a delay in taking jobs, and economic constraints.

Heads of household 60 years of age and older will reportedly also see their proportion of the total decline, while the proportion remains higher in the countryside. On the other hand the proportion of heads of household from 30 to 59 will reportedly increase from 68.1 percent in 1982 to 79.8 percent in 2005 in the cities and from 62.3 percent in 1982 to 64.4 percent in 2005 in the countryside.

Death Rate, Aging

92AF0003C Rabat ALMAGHRIB in French
5 Sep 91 p 2

[Article by Narjis Rerhay: "The Secret of the Age Pyramid"]

[Text] The family planning movement is going to be pleased. The raw birth rate in Morocco will be much more moderate after 2030 and will decline slowly but surely toward a stable level of 12.7 percent. We will then be very far from the completely mad birth rate that reached the level of 46 percent in 1971.

This data, reported by the Directorate of Statistics in research that it has just published under the title, "Demographic Studies," also tells us that the raw birth rate in the cities will follow the same curve as for the rest of the country, but at still lower levels. In other words, in the cities there will always be a few less children, which leads us to think that the efforts of the family planning movement are more concentrated in the urban areas and that the "contraceptive" message is not so clear in the countryside as it is in the cities.

By the period 2017-2022 the death rate will also be lower. As a result we will see a decline in the raw death rate, which will drop from 19 percent in 1960 to its minimum level of 5.7 percent by 2017.

However, we should be careful! You planners in all areas, this same death rate will double after 2022 to reach a level of nearly 10 percent. This is because of the aging of the Moroccan population.

And as the projections of the Directorate of Statistics reflect optimism, they immediately reassure us after telling us that the death rate will decline over the years until it reaches a stationary point, similar to that of the developed countries.

Moreover, the natural rate of population increase will only record small declines and will not go beyond 10 percent by the beginning of 2027. Those who are the most concerned about this matter will have to wait for

the 21st century for the rate of population increase to reach a level less than or equal to 5 percent, which is the level in Western countries.

Again, according to demographic projections, urban residents will continue to be more and more numerous. More than ever the dream of city life will be the last temptation of rural residents. Therefore, every year there will be 155,000 people leaving the countryside to go and live in the cities. And the equation is an obvious one: the rural exodus means an increase in the urban population and a reduction in the raw birth rate in the rural areas.

Morocco will continue to be a young country. In 1992 young people under 15 will amount to a little less than 40 percent of the total population. By 2052 the population of young people will become stationary at its long term level of 20 percent.

Still under the influence of the aging of the Moroccan population, there will be fewer and fewer children under 15 in the cities and more and more adults. Thus, the statistics teach us that the adult population will reach a maximum of 68 percent of the total population of Morocco in 2037.

As a result, some questions deserve to be raised. Morocco in the 21st century will experience the disturbing problem of an aging population. In a few years, in 2012, the proportion of adults over 65 will more than quadruple in urban and rural areas, taken together.

Will the Morocco of tomorrow, which has not finished debating with its youth of today, be ready to offer a vital, minimum income to people who are retired?

Birth Rate, Urbanization

92AF0003D Rabat ALMAGHRIB in French
5 Sep 91 p 2

[Text] The raw birth rate, which reached extremely high levels in Morocco before 1971 (46 percent) will experience a rapid decline. However, it will be less rapid than that of the presumed fertility index, for structural reasons. This has been indicated by the Directorate of Statistics in "Demographic Studies," an analysis of the prospects for demographic growth by 2062.

The pace of the decline in the raw birth rate will ease, beginning in 2030, when the raw birth rate will begin to move toward its stationary level of 12.7 percent.

The raw death rate will decline considerably. It will decline from 19 percent in 1960 to its minimum level of 5.71 percent by the period 2017-2022.

After 2022, under the impact of an aging population, the raw death rate will begin a noticeable rise, which will bring it to nearly double this rate (9.6 percent) by the end of the period covered by these projections. However, it is only 30 years later that its level will reach that of the raw birth rate, making it possible, in that way, for it to move toward a stationary level.

Regarding the natural rate of increase, it will only go through a moderate decline, because the decline in the raw birth rate will be compensated for by the decline in the raw death rate, so that the natural rate of increase will not go beyond 10 percent until the period 2027-2032.

It will be necessary to wait until the middle of the 21st century for the natural rate of population increase to reach the levels of countries of Europe or North America (equal to or less than 5 percent).

In urban settings the raw birth rate, in general terms, will follow the same course as that for the whole country, but at still lower levels.

That is also the case for the death rate, which will reach a remarkably low level of 4.5 percent by the period 2007-2012, before beginning a rise due to the aging of the urban population. By the end of the period for which projections have been made, it will reach 9.6 percent, or double its minimum level.

However, the continuation of rural-urban migration throughout this period (there will still be 155,000 persons migrating from the rural areas to the cities every year during the period 2057-2062) will make it possible for the urban population to grow in a sustained way.

In the rural areas the overall population growth will be in the vicinity of 10 percent by the period 2007-2012. Then it will fall rapidly to less than 5 percent by the period 2022-2027, under the impact of a major reduction in the raw birth rate in the countryside, on the one hand, and the continuation of the rural exodus, on the other hand.

This exodus, although it will slow down, will continue to compensate for an appreciable part of natural population growth.

The population has continued to grow younger, which has meant that children under 15 constitute about half of the total population. The maximum level of children under 15 was reached in 1971 when this group amounted to 46 percent of the entire population.

The decline in fertility since 1971 has involved a regular decline in the number of young people, who constituted less than 40 percent of the population in 1992. The number of young people will be less than 30 percent of the population in 2017 and will reach its stationary level at a little less than 20 percent by 2052.

By the end of these projections, or 2062, the population of children under 15 will be 19.2 percent of the total population and therefore near what can currently be seen in the countries of Western Europe, where the demographic transition has practically been completed (20 percent in Northern Europe, 18 percent in Western Europe).

This decline in the proportion of young people will affect the urban areas in a more significant way than the rural areas. Between its maximum level of 44.5 percent of the

population in 1971 and its minimum level of 17.3 percent in 2062, the proportion of young people in the urban areas will have declined by 27.2 percentage points.

In the rural areas, during the same period, the percentage of young people will decline from 46.6 percent to 22.9 percent, or a decline of 23.7 percent.

Consequently, the decline in the proportion of children will result in an increase in the adult population, which will reach its maximum of 68 percent in 2037 (71 percent in the urban areas in 2022 and 66 percent in the rural areas in 2037), before declining under the impact of a rapidly aging population.

The demographic aging of the population will be the principal and, perhaps, the most disturbing characteristic of the demographic changes in the 21st century. For nearly 50 years, or until about 2012, the effect of the decline in fertility will not affect the proportion of people over 65. However, beginning in 2012, the growth of this proportion of the population will be very rapid and will expand by a factor of more than four (urban and rural areas taken together).

1974 Census as Basis for Voter Lists Criticized

92AF0021B Rabat L'OPINION in French
28 Sep 91 pp 1-2

[Commentary by Jamal Hajjam; first paragraph is L'OPINION introduction; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Contrary to the Spanish Senate's opinion, the 1974 census cannot serve as the sole basis for establishing voter lists.

According to information received from the Moroccan Sahara, Mr. Johannes Manz, special representative of the United Nations secretary general for Saharan affairs, is reported to have decided upon 27 January 1992 as the date on which voting will take place in the referendum planned in Sakia Al Hamra and Oued Eddahab [Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro].

The selection of a date would partially explain the intensification in recent days of activity by the United Nations mission in this region, all the more so because the work of the United Nations has fallen far behind, particularly with regard to the identification of voters.

It is, to be sure, a delicate task, but the U.N. mission still does not seem to be moving on this subject, and yet it has reacted to lists presented by Morocco with hesitation, even though the lists are based on a political, historical, and ancestral reality that is indisputable.

These lists, it may be recalled, contain the names of Moroccan Saharawis who were not counted in Spain's 1974 census. They had moved north under duress, fleeing the arrival of the colonizer in 1884 and, later, the colonial persecution that occurred for the entire duration

of Spanish presence in the region—particularly in 1953, 1956, 1958, 1969, and 1971.

Moreover, all of them have legal means by which to prove their ties to the Saharan provinces. One form of proof is the fact of belonging to one of the tribes that constitute the social structure of the Sahara, which can be easily established on the basis of testimonies by the leaders and representatives of these tribes who know very well the families and even the individuals.

The identification commission has only to make up its mind to get to the heart of the matter and hear the individuals and witnesses concerned.

But, whatever the case, and even though the referendum will not take place until this question is solved in a lawful and logical manner, the process seems to be plodding ahead, slowly but surely, and that has stymied the enemies of our territorial integrity—the secessionists and the mercenaries of the "Polisario" [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro] to begin with, the organizations that back them, and certain media in search of support for their own designs.

That is precisely the case of the media in the Canary Islands which, out of a desire to lend credit to the claims and allegations of the "Polisario," has pursued a campaign against Morocco and its legitimate rights, seeing no impropriety in placing itself in the service of the first to come along, and going as far as to give echo to an "anti-Moroccan demonstration" held in the Canary Islands by a local association "of support for the Polisario."

It is more likely that an undertaking of this type, which can only be described as out of place and uncalled for, was intended to harm the interests of Spain, which has just inaugurated a new era of close understanding with Morocco, following the signing of a friendship and cooperation agreement by our two countries.

Unless proven otherwise, the Canary Islands are still under Spanish sovereignty and their media should demonstrate objectivity and impartiality rather than succumb to prejudice by engaging in gratuitous and malicious "anti-Moroccanism." In addition, according to a report by the wire service EFE, on Wednesday the Spanish senate approved a motion of confidence, signed by all representatives of political groups in the chamber, on the application of the U.N. peace plan in the Moroccan Sahara. The motion was introduced by the PSOE (Spanish Workers Socialist Party) caucus as an alternative to a motion by the joint caucus asking the Spanish Government to "condemn Morocco's behavior toward the Saharawi people" and demanding temporary suspension of the agreement of friendship and cooperation between Morocco and Spain.

The motion that was approved requires "that the ceasefire be honored and that the Spanish census of 1974 be considered the basis for the referendum."

While the approved motion means that the joint caucus—which is clearly not won over to Morocco's cause—has failed in its attempt to push the Spanish Government to adopt an anti-Moroccan position, the motion itself is not without ambiguity.

Starting with the subject of "honoring the cease-fire," we see no connection to Morocco that has always displayed a willingness to cooperate with the United Nations and has never failed to honor anything whatsoever. If there is violation of the cease-fire, it is on the part of the "Polisario" that has infiltrated the territory between the defensive wall and the Sahara's international borders, and it has done so with the knowledge of MINURSO [the UN mission charged with organizing the referendum in the Western Sahara]. The Spanish senate's motion lacks precision, and is therefore tainted with ambiguity.

With regard to "considering Spain's 1974 census as the basis for the referendum," the Spanish Senate has excluded de facto all the Saharawis who moved north in circumstances well known to the world and even better known to Spain.

Yet, the Spanish senate is in a good position to know the history of this region and what caused all the Moroccan Saharawis to move to the liberated north. They are also in a good position to know that Spain's census is tainted with imperfections, errors, and omissions, making it unsuitable as the sole basis on which to establish lists of voters.

The Spanish documents on this question no doubt attest to that. It is just a matter of dusting them off....

Cost of Living Continues To Increase

92AF0004B Rabat *L'OPINION* in French
3 Sep 91 pp 1, 8

[Article by B. Ali: "Cost of Living Index: Tendency Toward Increase Continues"]

[Text] During July the cost of living index reached a level of 455.7, compared to 451.1 in June. This indicates an increase of 1.0 percent, according to a report by the MAP [MAGHREB ARABE PRESSE] service, which adds that all groups of products contributed to this increase.

For example, the index for the food group reportedly reflected an increase on the order of 1.7 percent, due to increases in prices for grains (up 1.8 percent), meat (up 4.1 percent), and fish (up 6.0 percent), among other items.

Although this has been reported, it is difficult to place any confidence in these figures.

When they are compared with every day reality, these figures appear to have been "averaged out" too much, in an attempt to mask the deterioration of purchasing power or a decline in gross domestic product. This is all the more true, as we know that increases in the cost of

products, services, and foods are continuing, whereas salaries are both inadequate and have stagnated.

Furthermore, decisions on price increases made by whoever is concerned do not take into consideration in any way material, social, and economic conditions among a broad range of Moroccan social classes.

This is particularly the case when we know that about 10 million Moroccans (more than 40 percent of the population) live below the poverty level, according to IMF estimates.

This flagrant disparity cannot be explained or blamed only on the increase in the cost of living index. Stagnation in salaries and their inability to satisfy the elementary needs of the majority of citizens are also a factor in this deterioration of living standards. Not to mention the job crisis and unemployment, which rage like a ghost in our society.

Furthermore, inequalities also appear in the availability of goods and services, such as housing, medical care, education, or transportation.

In conclusion we might say that the series of price increases that have been imposed on the people, always without their knowledge, has exposed the failures of government policy in the economic field. And it is very much time to think about changing the direction of this policy.

Improvement in Standard of Living Noted

92AF0004A Rabat *MAROL SOIR* in French
11 Sep 91 p 3

[Article by Rachidi El Rhezouani: "Substantial Improvement in Living Standard of Moroccan People; Number of Families With Low Incomes Declined by 31 Percent Between 1971 and 1985; Realities and Assumptions"]

[Text] For some time prices and the living standard of the people have been the battle cry of certain organs of the press and more particularly a daily newspaper published in Casablanca, according to which "10 million Moroccans live below the poverty level."

This unfounded assertion casts discredit on the development effort carried on by our country for more than 30 years and is not based on any objective fact. The different indicators available to us provide evidence of the decline of poverty in Morocco and a qualitative and quantitative improvement in the standard of living of the people.

The decisions made by Morocco to adopt economic liberalism, political democracy and pluralism, decentralization, and regionalism are innovative and forward looking. They are aimed at the future and will bring positive results.

The efforts made by our country during the past 30 years, under the enlightened leadership of the king, have made possible impressive social, economic, and institutional achievements. The structure of our productive

economy has been transformed, and there has been a substantial improvement in the principal, qualitative indicators of development.

Compared to countries at a similar level of development, our country can be proud today of the progress made in the process of building a new Morocco, a Morocco of progress and modernity.

Our social and economic achievements have been reflected in the twentyfold increase in gross domestic product, in current prices, between 1960 and 1990, thereby making possible an improvement in per capita income, which amounted to 8,600 dirhams in 1990, compared to 820 dirhams in 1960.

Overall gross domestic product has reflected substantial, sectoral changes, particularly concerning the processing industry.

In fact the contribution of processing industry to gross domestic product amounted to 34 percent of the total in 1990, compared to 23 percent in 1960. That of primary industry amounted to 16 percent in 1990, compared to 29 percent in 1960, whereas the tertiary sector contributed 50 percent in 1990, compared to 48 percent in 1960.

This change in our economic structure provides evidence of our level of development.

Regarding investment, there was appreciable development. The rate of increase in gross formation of fixed capital was 22.3 percent during the 1970's and 15 percent during the 1980's. The comparative level of

gross formation of fixed capital was more than 20 percent, on the average, during 1970 and 1980, compared to 10 percent at the beginning of the 1960's.

Social, economic, and institutional development was reflected by a substantial increase in the qualitative indicators of development.

As a result life expectancy went up from 47 to 65.5 between 1960 and 1990. This reflects a clear improvement simultaneously in living conditions as well as social services such as education, health, medical care, cleanliness, and so forth. For its part the level of illiteracy was reduced by 30 percent in the course of the past 30 years. Infant mortality recorded a decline in the order of 50 percent, going from 149 deaths per thousand in 1960 to 73.8 per thousand in 1990, due to the improvement of medical and health conditions and the general increase in the standard of living.

In the sector of education and job training, we noted a tripling in the overall number of students in primary, public schools, an increase of nearly 19 times in the number of students in secondary school, while the number of university graduates increased by nearly 60 times between 1960 and 1990.

Achievements recorded in the economic, social, and institutional areas made possible a steady improvement in the living standard of the people. For example, the various studies on family consumption since Morocco became independent show that the living standards of the Moroccan people have continued to improve in real terms, as the following table shows:

Changes in Average Annual Expenditures (DAMP) on Per Capita and Place of Residence Bases

Place of Residence			
DAMP (in Current Dirhams)	Urban	Rural	Together
1959	613	392	450
1970	1,378	662	900
1985	4,915	2,637	3,623

Sources: Studies on Consumption: 1959, 1971, and 1981, Directorate of Statistics, Ministry of Planning

As the above table brings out, average annual, per capita expenditures rose from 450 dirhams in 1959 to 3,623 dirhams in 1985 in current prices, or an eightfold increase.

In real terms the standard of living recorded an average annual increase of 2.3 percent during this period, despite the cyclical, economic difficulties experienced by the country during the 1980's.

This increase in the standard of living of the people was also reflected in structural changes in consumption expenditures.

In effect, the share of food in family budgets continued to decline. It was 70.2 percent of the family budget in

1959, declining to 54 percent in 1970. In 1985 it was estimated at 48.5 percent. Thus, the search for a better kind of life is leading families to allocate a relatively more substantial part of their budget to the consumption of items other than food. For example, money allocated for housing has assumed greater weight in family budgets: from 15 percent in 1970 it rose to 20.1 percent in 1985.

The improvement in the standard of living in real terms has been accompanied by a reduction in disparities in family expenditures. In effect the difference between the 10 percent of families with the highest expenditures and the 10 percent of families with more modest incomes was reduced by 45 percent between 1971 and 1985.

Furthermore, data from the Study of Consumption in 1985 show that the relative significance of families with modest incomes declined between 1971 and 1985. In effect, if you consider families with an average annual expenditure of no more than 2,400 dirhams (in 1971 dirhams), their relative number among all families declined from 33.62 percent in 1971 to 17.4 percent in 1985. This is evidence of a decline in this category of the population as a whole.

Regarding the number of families in this category, it declined from 925,000 in 1971 to 639,000 in 1985, a relative drop of 31 percent.

It would be appropriate to note that all of the progress made by Morocco and the continuous improvement in the living standards of the people has been achieved despite the pressure of a population increasing at a galloping rate.

Moreover, Morocco at the end of the 1980's and the beginning of the 1990's has gone through profound changes and undertaken structural reforms that will necessarily have a positive impact over the medium and long term on the diversification of the economy and its overall and sectoral integration. On this basis it will be reflected by the general improvement in the living conditions of the people and more particularly those of families with low incomes.

The partisan press, which is the first to benefit from the advantages of democracy implemented in Morocco, should not allow itself to reflect too much pessimism. Its mission to inform the people requires that it should inform itself first.

When it has informed itself, the press will know that King Hassan has placed his bets on people and that our ambition to build an economy equal to our advantages has now been made possible by what we have achieved, our geographic and strategic position, and the influence of our culture.

Fisheries Minister on Production, Conservation

92AF0009A London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic
10 Sep 91 p 10

[Interview with Bensalem Smili, minister of ocean fisheries and merchant marine, by Atahami Ben Azouz; place and date not given]

[Text] Rabat—There are enormous fish resources along Morocco's 3,500 km of coasts on the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean Sea. Moroccan sovereignty now extends over more than 1 million sq km of sea, after the range of territorial waters was extended to 200 miles. This development required a strategy to optimally exploit Morocco's fish resources. The most salient foundations of this strategy include the establishment of a special ministry concerned with the maritime sector, the development of the capabilities of Morocco's fishing fleet (currently the leading maritime fleet among the Arab and

African countries), and the curbing of illegal fishing operations by foreign fleets. In an interview with AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT on the future of Morocco's fishing industry, the Minister of Ocean Fisheries and Merchant Marine, Bensalem Smili, stated that the agreement between Morocco and the EEC emphasizes Moroccan sovereignty over the fish resources in its territorial waters and the treatment of these resources according to the principles of the law of the seas. He indicated that the agreement defines the activity of European fishing fleets and the monetary compensation to be paid to Morocco by the EEC in exchange for permission for its boats to fish in Moroccan waters pursuant to specific terms. The following is the text of the interview:

[Ben Azouz] The fishing yield in Morocco increased last year by 6.71 percent compared to the previous year, from about 529,000 tons in 1989 to about 564,000 tons in 1990, and the value of the fish yield increased by 19.9 percent, from 2.974 billion dirhams to 3.567 billion dirhams.

About 172,000 tons, or 3 percent of total production, were channelled into the domestic market. Exports of fish products jumped sharply to about 187,000 tons worth \$540 million. What are your estimations regarding production and exports this year?

[Smili] It is difficult to make estimates in the fishing industry, which is influenced by a number of natural and biological factors, especially given that coastal fishing accounts for 75 percent of the yield. Nonetheless, production during the first four months of 1991 increased by 11.6 percent compared to the same period last year. The value of production also increased by 18 percent.

Exports are expected to grow substantially, especially in light of contacts to export Morocco's fish products to new markets.

[Ben Azouz] What measures have you taken to safeguard fishing resources in Moroccan territorial waters, especially against depletion and coastal pollution as a result of certain fishing methods?

[Smili] Our method is to achieve a balance between the fish reserves and the volume of exploitation through several measures to regulate fishing grounds and support coastal monitoring capabilities. Also, violators are subject to severe penalties. For example, we have increased the fines for violations of directives regarding fishing nets, fishing in prohibited areas, and catching small fish not on the commercial list. It has also been decided that three marine surveillance planes will begin regular survey operations of territorial waters toward the end of this year.

Briefly, our efforts to counter pollution include: the monitoring of fishing operations; supervision by specialized committees over fishing grounds; and a requirement that certain documents be obtained to engage in fishing operations, such as an international safety certificate and insurance policies. Regarding the new maritime law, we

are seeking to organize a legal agency to protect ocean waters from pollution caused by boats. Also, the administration is making efforts to counter the effects of pollution on fishing grounds and protect the fish reserves in Moroccan territorial waters. We have decided to establish a center to monitor the Strait of Gibraltar in support of scientific efforts to fight pollution. There is also an intensive program for cooperation among the countries on the Atlantic and Mediterranean to counter the dangers of pollution in the region.

[Ben Azouz] Could you discuss plans for channeling production to processing? What measures have you taken to intensify the introduction of modern equipment?

[Smili] The maritime resources processing industries in Morocco are participating effectively in developing the country's economy. Their products enjoy an international reputation for quality based on Morocco's substantial experience in this field. In general, the products of these processing industries must meet international quality standards. These products have the merits of the Moroccan trademark, which is distinguished internationally by virtue of our continuous quality control operations.

The ocean-fishing fleet provides industrial units with 60 percent of their total annual production. About 37 percent of the coastal fishing yield is made into fish powder and oil, 21 percent is canned, 1.4 percent is frozen, and 0.6 percent is salted.

State agencies and private-sector organizations are striving to increase production while maintaining quality. Various concerned parties intend to increase the production of industrial units that have failed to utilize their full design capacities for a number of years due to the seasonal nature of coastal fishing and related industries. In this connection, factory owners have been encouraged to furnish their plants with refrigeration equipment to enable them to store fish, so that production can continue throughout the year.

In addition to the fishing industry's distinguished role in providing food, it also provides many jobs and hard currency.

[Ben Azouz] What are the most salient features of the new cooperation agreement on ocean fishing between Morocco and the EEC, and the Moroccan-French protocol on ocean fishing?

[Smili] The principles of the agreement between Morocco and the EEC stipulate the affirmation of Morocco's sovereignty over its fish resources and the treatment of these resources based on the principles of the law of the seas. This agreement, which calls for reducing the foreign ocean fishing effort, sets the terms for the activity of European fleets, demarcates fishing zones, and determines the distance separating the coasts from fishing zones. The agreement also stipulates the

cessation of fishing operations for one month each year, so that mollusks and some fishes can proliferate.

In exchange, the EEC is providing compensation to Morocco, which includes fishing rights worth about \$120 million per year, the exemption of 17,500 tons of Moroccan fish industry exports from customs duties, and the provision of about 800 jobs for Moroccans in European fishing fleets, so that Moroccan fishermen can enhance their expertise.

[Ben Azouz] Have relations with the ECC countries extended beyond commerce to include investment partnerships?

[Smili] Morocco is making efforts to implement a number of projects under fishing agreements, such as the equipping of several ports, the financing of fishing projects, the transfer of European technology, and the support of joint companies.

State investments pertain only to the establishment of infrastructure, such as ports, and to projects that the private sector cannot implement. The private sector and joint companies with foreign partners are concerned with ocean fishing and related industries. For your information, the property of companies that were subordinate to the Moroccan Fishing Bureau before the creation of a pertinent ministry has been transferred to the private sector.

[Ben Azouz] What are the prospects of a partnership with the Soviet Union? How successful is the surimi product experiment with Japan?

[Smili] The agreement that Morocco ratified with the Soviet Union specifies aspects of cooperation in the area of ocean fishing and the practical terms that must be met by Soviet ships when fishing in Moroccan waters off of the Atlantic coast. It provides for cooperation between the two parties to control the exploitation of fish resources based on the principles of the law of the seas (the Treaty of 1982). It also stipulates that Moscow shall support scientific research efforts pertaining to fish resources in Morocco, develop conditions for the exploitation of these resources, train advanced fishing cadres, and exchange technical expertise and equipment. In addition, under the agreement, Soviet fleets are required to give 15 percent of the value of the fish they catch [in Moroccan waters] to Morocco in hard currency.

The agreement sets a ceiling on the catch during the first year at about 750,000 tons, in addition to 100,000 tons to be channeled to mixed companies. In the fourth year, the catch will be limited to only 450,000 tons, but it will increase for mixed companies to 150,000.

The Soviet Union will provide two boats to the Moroccan Scientific Institute for Ocean Fishing and three boats to the Vocational Training Center for instructional purposes. The agreement also provides for the opening of new markets for sardines and the direct

supply of fish to canning factories, and it permits the export of canned sardines to the Soviet Union under a preferential system.

Regarding the surimi experiment, which is a cooperative effort with Japan, the surimi factory, which cost 17 million dirhams to build, is a model unit considered the first of its kind in Africa and the Arab world.

Surimi is a paste extracted from fish meat. Sophisticated Japanese techniques are used to process it into products with substantial nutritional and commercial value that are used to prepare ready-made foods borrowed from the Moroccan kitchen, which are made from the sardine catch. Oil and fish powder are also extracted from a portion of the sardine catch.

This method will help diversify Morocco's processed fish products, especially with respect to bluefish, which is found in abundance in Moroccan waters. The surimi industry will reflect positively on producers and fishermen and will strengthen Morocco's export capabilities.

[Ben Azouz] What are the biggest problems facing the shipping sector in Morocco? What are your plans to cope with them?

[Smili] Maritime transport handles about 98 percent of Morocco's total foreign trade. Despite intense competition from foreign fleets, the Moroccan fleet's share of this transportation activity has increased to about 34 percent, compared to no more than 2 percent in 1973.

The development of the maritime shipping sector in Morocco is based mainly on encouraging exports through favorable pricing policies, expanding the network of lanes to include regular lanes to new markets, increasing the country's hard currency income (maritime transport represents about 10 percent of the total value of Morocco's foreign trade), and creating new jobs.

The ministry maintains direct, ongoing contacts with maritime transport workers to ascertain problems impeding the growth of the Moroccan fleet, so that the appropriate measures can be taken to solve them. Despite the recent shocks and developments in the international arena, the Moroccan fleet has been able to maintain its foreign trade activity, especially regarding several strategic Moroccan exports, such as citrus, early vegetables, and phosphate products, in addition to general freightage on regular lines.

The maritime transport sector in Morocco is characterized by openness to the world in a climate of free competition between Moroccan companies.

[Ben Azouz] What are the main results of the Senegal conference on ocean fishing?

[Smili] The conference, whose eighth session was held in Senegal last month, examined cooperation projects that a number of parties have agreed to finance, including an

inventory of African member countries' fishing capabilities and the establishment of a regional maritime information bank.

Agreement was also reached on implementing cooperation projects over the next two years with the participation of international organizations in the area of preparing and developing fishing grounds and developing fishing industries, in addition to cooperation on maritime laws and monitoring. The conference called upon the UN Economic and Social Council [UNESCO] to help the African countries on the Atlantic Ocean develop their fish resources and counter illegal fishing.

Nador Port Potential Discussed

92AF0004C Rabat ALMAGHRIB in French
11 Sep 91 pp 8-9

[Text] In his speech delivered in September 1968 in Berkane the king said: "...However, there is another project, which in any case, must be completed and as soon as possible. This concerns the port of Nador. The development of the land to be irrigated by the Mohammed V Dam, estimated at 70,000 hectares, makes this port an absolute necessity. Most of the products from these 70,000 hectares will be earmarked for export: fruit, early season vegetables, and cotton. Therefore, the production of early season vegetables in this region implies the development of a port at Nador...."

"...However, in reality the city of Nador needs two ports: one for export and the second to accommodate pleasure craft. We know the substantial profits that certain Mediterranean islands make from their ports for pleasure craft...."

In accordance with the farseeing policy of King Hassan II in the development of a modern Morocco, the national port structure has been expanded with the inauguration of the port of Nador by the king. The essential objective of the port of Nador consists on the one hand of serving as a new center of attraction suited to supporting the government decision to decentralize domestic economic activities and, on the other hand, making it possible for Morocco to have a large, deep water Mediterranean port, which will enable us to open up the eastern area of the country to the other continents through the use of sea transportation. The port of Nador also makes it possible for fisheries to develop in this area. This will aid in the development of industries related to fishing activity and will thus create thousands of new jobs for the people of the region.

An analysis of the potential of the hinterland of the port of Nador, both from the point of view of mining as well as handling agricultural and miscellaneous merchandise, makes it possible to anticipate that by 1995 annual traffic in this new port will amount to more than 2,635,000 tons. By the year 2000 the annual traffic will be more than 3,720,000 tons.

By 2000 fish products passing through Nador will exceed 100,000 tons per year, or half of the current "fish" traffic of the port of Agadir.

It is expected that, beginning in 1995, agricultural products of the region covered by "the Plain of Zebra and of Bouareg, which consists of about 70,000 hectares," will be the foundation for a potential export traffic in citrus fruit and early season vegetables. In addition this area will be used for the import of 500,000 tons of grain annually to feed the eastern area of the country.

Trade in other products should also grow substantially (coal, miscellaneous goods, container traffic, and cargo from Ro/Ro [Roll-on, Roll-off] ships).

Passenger traffic on the order of 200,000 persons annually is expected by the year 2000. Petroleum traffic on the order of 400,000 tons per year will also pass through this port by the same year.

The trade in minerals remains a major factor for the port of Nador, with forecasts on the order of 1.5 million tons annually by 2000. Trade in steel products amounting to 470,000 tons, in connection with the activities of SONASID [Moroccan National Steel Company], is also anticipated by 2000.

Nador: Large-Scale Port Facilities

Preliminary economic research, in addition to the data coming from the SONASID project and various mining projects, has considered the potential of the hinterland of the port of Nador, as well as the trade likely to flow from this area due to the attraction resulting from the construction of a modern port.

After the requirements for required port facilities were defined, a survey and an analysis of the local, natural situation, including the currents, winds, the characteristics of the bottom, as well as the depths of water in the port area made it possible to prepare several overall plans. Tests made in an hydraulic laboratory on a small-scale model led to the adoption of the most appropriate boundary for the port.

The major characteristics of the project for the development of the new port of Nador are as follows:

Protection From the Sea

The facilities to protect the port from the sea consist of a principal jetty to the east, 2,635 meters long, built for water depths ranging between 0 and 16 meters, to protect the port against waves from the northeast and east northeast.

Mooring facilities within the port include two positions connected to the principal jetty for docking tankers, accommodating ships drawing 13 meters of water. These docking positions are suitable for 60,000-ton ships.

There are two positions for car-ferry-type ships drawing up to 7 meters.

There are two positions for Ro/Ro ships drawing from 7 to 10 meters.

There is a large pier with the following characteristics:

400 meters of dock space with a depth of 13 meters alongside, reserved for 60,000-ton ore carriers.

600 meters of dock space with a depth of 10 meters alongside, reserved for ore carriers and general cargo ships.

There is a second pier with 250 meters of dock space with a depth of 13 meters alongside (designated for grain carriers). There are 307 meters of dock space available with a depth of 10 meters alongside for ships carrying grain, citrus fruits, early season vegetables, and general cargo. There are 300 meters of dock space with a depth of seven meters alongside for general cargo ships.

There is an area at the southern end of the harbor with 200 meters of dock space with a depth of seven meters alongside (designated for coastal traffic and fish).

There is a fishing pier 150X50 meters with 5 meters of water alongside. There is an area for installations for drying fish and "port facilities for lifting 300 tons."

An area has been reserved for the construction of a graving dock capable of handling ships of from 25,000 to 30,000 tons. These facilities are part of the long-term development program.

The construction work on this new port was awarded to CONTRASIMEX, a Romanian state owned company after open international bids were invited in 1974.

Phases of Construction

The development of the infrastructure took place in four phases:

An area of sheltered water covering 140 hectares was developed by construction of the principal jetty, 2,635 meters long.

Wharves and different docking positions were constructed, using prefabricated blocks.

The entry into the port, turning zones, and mooring positions along the wharves were dredged.

More than 100 hectares of terraces were developed along the edges of the port.

Dredging and preparation of the terraces has been completed.

Construction of facilities in the port included the following:

The terraces were stabilized and construction was completed on related terracing, access roads, sanitation, provision of drinking and sea water, railroads within the port, electricity, warehouses, special cargo handling equipment, installation of buoys, and aids to navigation.

Construction of these facilities has been completed.

Taking into account the systematic increase in the maritime traffic using the port of Nador, an overall plan was prepared, making it possible to meet the needs for basic structures and port facilities over the long term. As of now, additional infrastructure has been built, including "Wharves and terraces, a ship construction facility, and a fence around the port."

This work has included continuing and extending:

The 250 meters of wharf with a depth of 13 meters alongside for "grains and general cargo."

The 200 meters of wharf with a depth of seven meters alongside for "coastal traffic and fish."

The 150X50 meter fishing wharf with a depth of five meters alongside.

Terracing and dredging in the port area.

Port facilities with a lifting capacity of 250 tons.

Construction of the 3-km-long fence surrounding the port.

This work was accomplished in the framework of the development of the ports in the northern part of the country with the cooperation of the Socialist Republic of Romania.

Development of the Protected Area of the Port

The protected area of the port covers about 140 hectares and is bounded on the east by the principal jetty, 2,635 meters long, sheltering the port from waves from the northeast and east-northeast.

This protected area consists of three ship basins:

The outer basin inside the principal jetty, which has been dredged to a depth of 13 meters.

The central basin dredged to a depth of 10 meters.

The southern basin, the largest in area, dredged to a depth of between 5 and 7.5 meters, reserved for coastal shipping, fishing boats, ship repair, and the car ferries.

The principal jetty is 2,635 meters long. Its construction consisted of building:

A core of general fill material, with materials ranging from 0 to 500 kg.

An outer shell of pieces of natural rock weighing from one to three tons each in the first section and an outer shell made up of 6-cubic-meter concrete tetrapods covering the rest of the jetty.

The structure of the principal jetty is protected at its end by a foundation of reinforced concrete two meters thick, flanked by a guard wall composed of a foundation two meters high, covered by a trapezoidal plate with a maximum height of four meters.

The following quantities of building materials were used in the construction of the port:

General fill material (pieces weighing 0 to 500 kg), with a total weight of 1.3 million tons;

Rough stone (pieces weighing from 500 kg to 3 tons), with a total weight of 400,000 tons;

Large, rough stones (pieces weighing from 3 to 5 tons), with a total weight of 100,000 tons;

Reinforced concrete (34,000 cubic meters).

Construction of Mooring Positions Along the Wharves

All of the mooring positions along the wharves at Nador were built with prefabricated blocks and have the following characteristics:

Specifications of Mooring Positions

Positions	Depth of Water	Length of Wharf
Positions 1-2	13 meters	400 meters
Positions 3-6	10 meters	600 meters
Positions 7, 8, and 11	10 meters	400 meters
Positions 9, 10, and 12	7 meters	400 meters
Tanker Positions 13 and 14	13 meters	100 meters
Fishing Pier	5 meters	280 meters
Coastal Traffic, Fishing Vessels	7 meters	200 meters
Fishing Wharf	5 meters	2 Sides, 150 meters each
2 Car Ferry Positions	7 meters	2 sides, 168 meters each
2 Ro/Ro Positions	10 and 7 meters	

Tried and tested procedures were used for the construction of these wharves. Their construction required the use of the following quantities of building material:

134,000 cubic meters of reinforced concrete
1 800 tons of steel
1.3 million tons of general fill

General Dredging Operations

Dredging operations involved:

Deepening the turning basin to 13 meters;

Deepening the three basins to the following, respective depths along the shore: 7.5, 10.5, and 13.5 meters;

Dredging in the mooring positions and in adjacent areas where ships leave the wharves.

Up to the present the quantities of material dredged are in the order of 2.3 million cubic meters. In large part they have been reused to grade the terraces.

Construction of the Terraces

In the final phase the terraces will cover an area on the order of 500 hectares, 140 hectares of which have already been reclaimed from the sea behind the wharves (Piers I and II) and the fishing wharf.

These terraces for the most part are built with spoil (reuse of dredged material).

This construction required the use of the following materials:

2.3 million tons of dredged material;
1.2 million tons of general fill;
200,000 tons of natural rock.

Construction of Port Facilities

The construction of port facilities included bringing dredged material ashore, building sanitary facilities, providing water, road construction within the port, electricity, railroads within the port, warehouses, and the acquisition of special port equipment (tugs, harbor motorboats, dredgers, cranes, and other equipment). This activity has been completed.

The port now has:

A water distribution system 14,133-km-long and a water storage capacity of 1,000 cubic meters of water;

An electrical network of 10.5 km of medium voltage lines and 19.6 km of low voltage lines, with a 22-kilovolt distribution center and seven transformers turning 22-kilovolt current into 380 volt current;

A sanitation system;

Warehouses with 15,000 square meters of floor space;

A grain silo with a capacity of 1,600 tons;

A fish market;

An ice factory;

Warehouses for fish products;

A maritime passenger station;
Miscellaneous operations buildings.

Operation of the Port

The importance of the new port for stimulating trade required its entry into partial use in April 1978, well before the completion of the construction work. Several mines in the Oujda area were reactivated after this date. With a traffic of 1,052,572 tons in 1987 the port of Nador has become a competitive port, which fully plays its role as a link in the merchandise transportation system. At present this port handles building materials, general cargo, and grains. The majority of Moroccan fishermen now use the port of Nador. It is also a port for exports, since it has taken over all of the exports from the eastern part of the country, including citrus fruit in particular. Passenger traffic has recently developed and a regular line has been opened between Nador and Sete [France].

In terms of organization the Directorate of Ports is charged with the maintenance of the channels leading into the port and the various basins, the maintenance of the dikes, the administration of the port police, and coordination among the various users of port facilities. The Directorate of Ports is locally represented by the Provincial Directorate of Public Works of Nador.

The port of Nador has the following equipment on hand:

- one tug;
- two harbor motorboats;
- seven 6-ton cranes;
- nine 10-ton elevators;
- seven loaders;
- three conveyor belts;
- 12 clamshell buckets for handling grains and minerals;
- 35 tug vehicles with nine and 25 ton capacities;
- eight tractors.

Important Role of Casablanca Port Outlined

92AF0010C Casablanca LE MATIN DU SAHARA
in French 2 Sep 91 pp 11

[Text] Since the beginning of this century, the port of Casablanca has contributed to the spectacular development of the large urban area known as the city of Casablanca. From the time construction of port facilities began in 1906, the port was a magnet for major development. In less than 50 years, it had become a veritable "gateway to the world." It is the largest of Morocco's 20 ports, by far, and one of the continent's largest. It also holds an honorable ranking among the ports of Europe and the world.

By virtue of its geographic location, the facilities it offers, and its optimal connections to the road and rail network, the port of Casablanca serves practically the entire country. Nearly all of our trade (98 percent) takes place by sea, and 43 percent of that is handled by the port

of Casablanca. (Together, Casablanca and Mohammedia account for 60 percent of the nation's traffic.)

The port of Casablanca offers a 100-hectare expanse of water sheltered by a 3,200-meter seawall, the Moulay Youssef jetty; 100 hectares of waterfront space, 30 percent of it covered; 44 berths with a total dockside length of 7 kilometers capable of accommodating all types of ships of up to 20,000 gross registered tons and equipped with a total of more than 100 cranes of 6 to 10 metric tons; specialized installations (a container terminal handling 1.2 million metric tons a year, 3 roll-on/roll-off terminals, a grain silo with a capacity of 10,000 metric tons and capable of handling more than one million metric tons a year, an oil terminal for tankers of 40,000 metric tons, a coal and ore storage yard, a specialized pier equipped with a 22,000-meter² protective hangar for the exportation of citrus fruit, and a highly efficient phosphate loading terminal capable of handling several grades simultaneously and equipped with four loading bridges capable of operating at a speed of 1,250 metric tons per hour and two loading bridges capable of operating at a speed of 600 metric tons per hour); a ship building and repair station with a 150-meter dry dock; refrigerated warehouses; a fish dock; and a pleasure boat marina. It is impossible not to see in all of that a concern for attracting an ever greater share of the maritime traffic which has grown steadily over time. To accommodate this traffic, the port's facilities underwent expansion practically non-stop between 1907 and 1982 with a view to optimal use of facilities and equipment so as to ensure the best service at the lowest cost to the user.

Thus, thanks to the wide range of facilities it offers, the port of Casablanca can receive all types of cargo: ores, hydrocarbons, phosphates, grains, citrus fruit and other produce, containers, general merchandise, etc. Moreover, it is the Kingdom's largest container port.

It should be noted that the cargo passing through the port of Casablanca is increasingly unitized, rather than in bulk form. Indeed, container traffic, which grew by a rate of 11 percent between 1985 and 1988, posted an increase of 15 percent in 1989. Roll-on roll-off and TIR [International Road Transport] traffic grew by 29.8 percent and 21.9 percent respectively.

To respond to this large and rapid growth in unitized traffic, a new container terminal is to be built at the port of Casablanca. Scheduled to enter into service in 1993, it will have:

- 30 hectares of waterfront space;
- 350 meters of dock; and,
- a roll-on/roll-off bridge.

The following are some of the milestones in the port's history since 1953:

- 1955: completion of the citrus exports pier
- 1960: completion of the 3,200-meter Moulay Youssef jetty

- 1970: opening of the container terminal with a roll-on/roll-off ramp
- first use of the protective hangar on the citrus exports pier
- 1982: completion of the transverse jetty, expansion of the port's sheltered water area to 200 hectares [as published]
- 1989: traffic had risen to 15 million metric tons from 7 million in 1953, with a peak of 20 million in 1979-80.

The overall growth in traffic at the port of Casablanca since construction began has naturally brought on in an increase in the number of ships reaching the port and, consequently, the number of sailors passing through Casablanca.

Mining Industry Figures Reveal Growth

92AF0010B Casablanca LE MATIN DU SAHARA
in French 28 Aug 91 p 4

[Text] According to a report by the Al-Maghrib Bank, the mining sector experienced major growth in 1990 despite an adverse international environment characterized primarily by slackened demand and lower ore prices.

A rebound in phosphate production, in particular, brought on a strong rise in the extraction index which had dropped sharply the previous year. Nonetheless, persistent difficulties in phosphate sales, notably the downturn in prices and a lower dollar, combined to offset renewed production, causing a contraction in both the quantities exported and receipts.

The cyclical weakening of the mining industry in 1989 gave way to a marked expansion in 1990. This recovery is, for the most part, ascribable to the surge in phosphate mining. However, sales difficulties—aggravated by the general decline in prices—affected phosphates, copper, fluorite, and iron, and very few ores saw any increase in price. All told, the mining sector grew by 15 percent, but its contribution to the gross domestic product remained limited at 3.4 percent.

Improvement

Against this backdrop, the pit-head value of all mining output has been estimated at 5.8 billion dirhams, a 14.6-percent increase resulting from the expansion of mining output to 22.4 million metric tons, an increase of 17 percent from one year to the next, in contrast to the decline of more than 25 percent that had occurred 12 months earlier.

Conversely, proceeds from exports, valued at 4.5 billion dirhams by the Directorate of Mines, saw a drop of 11.4 percent. In particular, lower revenues from phosphate shipments, stemming from the downturn in tonnages, prices, and the dollar, were accentuated by lower revenues from deliveries of other ores.

On the other hand, shipments to domestic plants rose to a value of nearly 2.9 billion dirhams as compared with 1.7 billion a year earlier. This favorable trend reflects the increase in the quantities of phosphates—and, to a lesser degree, lead—that were shipped to treatment plants. Consequently, the volume of processed ore approached 10 million metric tons, and the rate of beneficiation rose from 29.2 percent to 44.5 percent in one year.

Recovery

At the Group of the Sharifian Office of Phosphates, there was a marked improvement in activity in 1990 thanks to a strong recovery in sales in the processing sector, despite a further decline in shipments of unprocessed ore. Indeed, the latter were limited to 11.7 million metric tons; however, the exportation of 3.6 million metric tons of derivatives brought Morocco's share of world trade in phosphate products up from 23 percent to 27 percent and, in one year's time, raised earnings to nearly 9.9 billion dirhams, an increase of about one-fifth over the previous year. This outcome is all the more encouraging because it was obtained in a rather unfavorable environment of lower prices for both phosphate ore and derivatives and a falling dollar, the currency customarily used for billing purposes.

The production of commercial-grade phosphates, which had declined by more than one-fourth a year earlier, rebounded by 18.2 percent to establish itself at 21.4 million metric tons. Overall sales came to an equivalent tonnage, an increase of more than one-fifth, in contrast to the 29.4-percent decline one year earlier, thanks exclusively to growth in domestic demand. In contrast, exports pursued their downward movement of the preceding year, albeit at the slower pace of 6.1 percent as compared with 12.9 percent one year earlier. Indeed, export volume did not exceed 11.7 million metric tons, the lowest level since 1970. Corresponding revenues fell to 3.6 billion dirhams, a decrease of 13.5 percent.

Distribution

Among the destinations to which phosphate rock was shipped, Europe again predominated, its purchases representing more than two-thirds of the tonnages exported, although 9-percent lower than the preceding year. Sales to the rest of the world stagnated in relation to their 1989 level.

Conversely, 9.7 million metric tons—45.4 percent of output—were delivered to the domestic market, a jump of nearly 83 percent. As a result, the production of fertilizer rose to 2.6 million metric tons, up by nearly one-fourth, and phosphoric acid production experienced an 84-percent increase to 2.4 million metric tons. Fertilizer exports, almost entirely destined for Europe, totaled about 2.4 million metric tons, a rise of 37.5 percent. Exports of phosphoric acid, at 1.2 million metric tons, more than doubled. In all, sales of phosphate derivatives involved 3.6 million metric tons for a value on the order of 6.3 billion dirhams, posting sharp year-end increases.

In recent years, the world phosphate market has undergone major changes and has seen increasing demand for processed products. Responding to this demand, domestic processing was stepped up, and substantial investments were required to expand existing processing plants and to build new ones. With this in mind, it was decided that additional phosphoric acid processing units would be installed with the aim of doubling existing capacity.

Contraction

Output of other ores fell again this year. A total of one million metric tons was mined, representing a decline of 7.5 percent. This trend reflects a drop in the production of the more important ores such as barite, iron, and fluorite. Similarly, exports amounted to a mere 710,400 metric tons, a contraction of 11 percent, and the corresponding revenues—794 million dirhams, or less than 18 percent of the total for the mining sector—fell by 9.1 percent despite a slight rise in the average price of most products with the exception of copper and zinc prices.

The expanded potential of the Touissit mine in particular, as well as stronger selling prices drove lead production up from 91,600 metric tons to 95,300. Similarly, shipments totaled 30,800 metric tons, bringing in 132 million dirhams, a 5.6-percent increase over the previous year.

Retrenchment

Little change occurred from one year to the next in the copper mining output (42,100 metric tons), despite investments made at Bleida in particular. The delivery of 39,100 metric tons to foreign destinations, however, represents a 7.6-percent contraction, and the value of exports fell to 212 million dirhams following a drop in the average price.

At 350,000 metric tons, barite mining fell by 13.2 percent in a year, and the quantities exported were lower by 9.8 percent. Sales of 349,000 metric tons brought in 117 million dirhams, a 3.7-percent decrease despite the more sustained level of prices.

Fluorite production was limited to 86,500 metric tons, a 17.6-percent contraction in sharp contrast to the favorable trend previously observed. The contraction was more pronounced in sales which fell to 81,400 metric tons worth 94 million dirhams, losses of about one-fourth and one-fifth, respectively.

Expansion work at the Imini Center in the province of Ouarzazate resulted in a marked increase in the quantity of manganese mined, from 33,700 metric tons to 43,800. While export volume shrank by 16 percent to 36,300 metric tons, export revenues were practically unchanged at 71 million dirhams thanks to a new upswing in prices.

Lower Prices

The demand for zinc, which had taken a favorable direction in recent fiscal years, showed a slackening in 1990 and led to lower prices on the world market. Consequently, revenues declined by 4.6 percent despite an expansion in exports from 35,300 metric tons to 38,200. Production barely topped 35,400 metric tons, a 2.7-percent decrease from one year to the next.

In iron ore production and sales, the recovery trend observed the previous year gave way to an unmistakable deterioration this year, despite some improvement in prices. Specifically, the quantity of iron ore mined fell by

16.2 percent to 147,500 metric tons, and the quantity sold fell by one-fourth to 65,000 metric tons.

SAUDI ARABIA

Editorial on Economy's Stability, Strength

92AE0033A Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 27 Sep 91 p 1

[Editorial: "Kingdom Is Stable Economic Force"]

[Text] Some years ago, during the so-called oil economic boom, foreign circles cast doubt on how the kingdom would absorb its oil revenues. The battle remained heated, for the other side thought that in absorbing those revenues, the kingdom would not be able to place them in its economic development field. However, when infrastructure projects were completed, when petrochemical factories were established, and when we attained self-sufficiency in wheat, poultry, and eggs, people came who considered this another blow to the world economy—as if the kingdom had to remain captive to importing even its strategic supplies. One foreign official even tried to stir up a storm about the harm caused by government-supported agricultural production, saying that the alternative of importation was more economical than such expensive and lengthy operations. However, when confronted with the fact that his own country was selling its subsidized agricultural products at prices below cost, he threw in his cards and departed.

Foreign countries became angry for the same reasons at the time of what was described as the Arab aggression that triggered the war of oil prices and their rise. However, the most recent person to take a stand against this argument was the American professor Gilbert, who discredited its logic, saying that the West had benefited in return with gains corresponding to oil country profits.

We remember why another crisis erupted when Southeast Asian companies came to work in the kingdom and other Arabian Gulf countries—how they broke a monopoly of venerable Western companies. Opposed media then came out telling us that the workers of Asian companies had come under economic cover, but that their task remained military. One Arab writer even allowed himself to believe this. But it turned out that companies from China, Korea, and other [Asian] countries imposed their might in the world market, including the West, without military intervention.

If the economy is the scene of constant war, the kingdom has overcome these doubts by its presence and work. It has imposed itself as a source of oil and its derivatives. It has been able to deal with the logic of facts in order to enter the international arena as a distinguished power ready to assume its role as a peaceful partner and competitor to the limits of what international relations provide. Testimonials have subsequently come from the same sources that led the battle of doubts, whether economic or information institutions, for truth prevails in the end. Logically, it is impossible to deny the largest

oil-producing and oil-reserve country its legitimate rights to exploit its resources as it deems consonant with its strategies and aspirations.

Now, after the passage of a few short years, we find that the venerable economic institutions cannot hide the facts—how the kingdom's growth has surpassed that of any other country, and how in coming decades the kingdom will remain an extraordinary economic force in oil and industry, and in projects now being planned and implemented in these fields.

Having matured by its experience, the kingdom knows that economic competition will be the focus of debate. But as long as there is a will and political stability, and as long as one deals with the world in the language of logic, the kingdom's course will not stop or retreat. It is a task we have accepted for ourselves. We will defend it with the same strength and ability to which our deeds, not our words, answer.

WESTERN SAHARA

UN Warned Against Haste in Referendum Effort

92AF0031A Rabat L'Opinion in French 25 Sep 91 p 1

[Editorial by Mohamed Idrissi Kaitouni: "Identification: The UN Must Not Make Any Mistakes"]

[Text] To make up for lost time, and in the hope of organizing the referendum in Moroccan Sahara within the time limit set in the general secretary's peace plan, the United Nations is trying to speed up things and actually race against the clock.

In this context, the commission responsible for identifying the individuals allowed to take part in the vote is proceeding with its work; once the basic criteria for the right to vote have been adopted, it will draw up the final list of genuinely Saharan individuals who, as such, will vote in the referendum.

Therefore, the commission must complete two essential tasks:

- it must correct and complete the census made in 1974 by Spanish occupation authorities, which has obvious shortcomings;
- it must draw up new lists including the names of all Moroccan Saharans who are not already on the lists drawn up based on the Spanish census as these people should not be deprived of their right to vote in the referendum and to confirm that they are Moroccan citizens.

This mission is most easy; all it takes is for the identification commission to refer to the testimonies and clarifications supplied by tribal chiefs, dignitaries, representatives of Saharan populations, and all those who rallied the motherland after contributing to the creation of the so-called "Polisario" or who were merely misled by deceitful propaganda.

The Saharan tribes are known, and the relations they have steadily maintained make it easy to determine who is Saharan and who is not.

Therefore, one can safely go back to the beginning of colonization in our Saharan provinces and to the entire occupation period to identify all Saharans who fled colonial repression to seek refuge in the northern provinces, and whose names are obviously not listed in the Spanish census.

These people are genuine Saharans who cannot renounce their right to vote in the referendum.

The United Nations, therefore, has a duty to avoid all precipitation and act objectively in order to preclude errors and ensure that all Saharan Moroccans included in the lists presented by Morocco have the right to vote and express their will. This is a prerequisite to the referendum and to the other stages of the UN peace plan.

Because it is in favor of legality, Morocco demands that the United Nations respect the right of the people originating from the Moroccan Saharan provinces, who are fully and unfailingly committed to their Moroccan citizenship.

Spanish Census Described as 'Superseded'

92AF0031B Rabat *L'Opinion in French*
25 Sep 91 pp 1, 11

[Commentary by Jamal Hajjam: "The Need To Take Into Account the Historical Truth Concerning Saharan Population Movements; The Spanish Census Is Superseded"]

[Text] After being received by His Majesty the King, Mr. Johannes Manz, the UN general secretary's special representative, met with Mr. Driss Basri, minister of interior and information, who introduced him to several representatives of Saharan tribes. Mr. Manz then went to Laayoune on 21 September, and then returned to the Mauritanian capital, Nouakchott, on 22 September, together with his assistant Mr. Zia Rizvi, the Canadian general Armand Roy, and seven members of the "MINURSO" (UN Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara).

In a different context, Mr. Malaire Pedanon, representative of the commission in charge of identifying the individuals who will vote in the referendum, left Laayoune for Tindouf; he was accompanied by members of said commission.

Also, Sunday, seven members of the MINURSO went to Tifariti via Mahbes and Smara, while a UN plane was taking a UN medical team to the same destination. All these movements and all these trips would seem to indicate that the UN mission is trying to make up for lost time and for being behind schedule in its work, something that the United Nations acknowledged. It is quite legitimate for the United Nations to want to catch up, as

long as this does not become a race, with the risk of imperfections detrimental to the peace plan and to the conditions that the United Nations must guarantee if the referendum is to be objective, impartial, and just.

We also note what Mr. Manz said to that effect during his meeting with Mr. Driss Basri, when he emphasized that "we should not take shortcuts" and that "we must proceed slowly in order not to make mistakes that we might regret."

These statements would seem to mean that, 20 days after its deployment in the Sahara, the UN mission has finally realized what the situation is really like, and has made a comparison between the lies propagated by the enemies of our territorial integrity and the concrete and obvious truth.

One of the shortcuts that "we should not take" has to do precisely with the impartial identification of the electorate and, first of all, the question of the registration of the Moroccan Saharans who were not included in the 1974 Spanish census and who settled in the North generations ago.

Mr. Manz, at any rate, could not fail to grasp the importance and legitimacy of this issue when, at the meeting we already mentioned, he listened to the representatives of Saharan tribes and to individuals who have returned to the motherland; and, in view of the historical proofs submitted, he must have been convinced of the need for the United Nations to take into consideration the specificity of Saharan social structures, and to take into account the historical truth which is that, under the pressure of particular circumstances, thousands of people left their regions of origin for the North.

This, therefore, should cause Mr. Manz to acknowledge that the 1974 Spanish census, marred by shortcomings since it overlooked a large number of Saharans and was restricted to certain groups while excluding others in order to achieve purely colonial objectives, is quite obsolete.

When it asked for the organization of a UN-controlled referendum, Morocco called for the adoption of the Spanish census, but only as a basis and in order to disprove the inflated figures put forward at the time by our enemies, who claimed that the Saharan population numbered 300,000 or even 750,000 or one million.

The objective of Morocco's enemies was first to have people believe that the population was numerous enough to warrant the creation of a state, and eventually to be in a position to use that figure in order to give the right to vote in the referendum to all the inhabitants of the Sahara who, in the mid-seventies, fled famine in neighboring countries and found refuge in Tindouf. The return to the Spanish census, therefore, represented a victory for Morocco.

But the adoption of the Spanish census did not mean that we should limit ourselves solely to its lists. As Mr.

[Perez] de Cuellar pointed out in his report, it is essential to update and complete this census so as to be able to determine the identity of the voters and, therefore, achieve impartial identification. And this is precisely what Morocco undertook to do when it presented its own lists based on historical and ancestral truth.

The Spanish census was done in a hurry in September 1974 and it had many shortcomings, due to political objectives dictated by colonialist designs.

Not to take the Moroccan lists into account would quite simply amount to taking sides with Morocco's enemies. Therefore, as Mr Manz said, we must proceed slowly in order not to make mistakes that we might regret. The credibility of the United Nations is at stake.

Formulation of 'National Truce' Urged

92AF0025A Casablanca AL BAYANE in French
10 Sep 91 p 1

[Commentary by Ali Yata: "A National Truce Is Necessary"]

[Text] The referendum process for the Moroccan Western Sahara went into effect with the cease-fire proclaimed on 6 September. If all goes well—that is, if the UN representatives respect the agreements made and there is no infringement on Moroccan sovereignty, the referendum will take place in January 1992.

All thoughtful observers believe the vote will result in a victory for Morocco. Based on the information in our possession, as well as our knowledge of the strong feelings shared by our Saharan compatriots, we too are completely confident of the outcome.

But this well-founded confidence is no reason to sit with arms folded while awaiting the final outcome. Our adversaries, who are masters of intrigue, still have many means at their disposal to use against us. And certain foreign sectors are committed to doing whatever it takes to deprive us of our national rights and territorial integrity. So we must be more vigilant now than ever before, and our zeal and conviction must be translated into action.

More specifically, what needs to be done in this phase of this battle, on which our destiny and future are riding?

First of all, as we see it, everyone must agree on the necessity of ensuring a Moroccan victory in the referendum.

It must be noted, in this regard, that the nation has long been totally united on the fundamental and strategic question of the Moroccanness of the Western Sahara, a fact which has already been amply demonstrated.

Here we stand, and here we will stay: That is the unshakable will of the entire Moroccan people.

In the past, opinions differed on the tactics to be employed to gain "de jure" international recognition of that Moroccanness. The government in 1981 proposed a self-determination referendum. We agreed with this approach, having supported it long before then. Some rejected it. Others, both in the government and in the opposition, initially accepted it but later concluded its time had passed. Today, for all practical purposes, these differences have been overtaken by events. Because the United Nations has voted unanimously for the referendum and the process is already under way. Under these circumstances, it serves no practical purpose to debate, defend or dispute the idea in principle. The issue at hand is how to carry it out successfully to Morocco's benefit. And it is a task for all Moroccans, with no exceptions.

But it is only the first task. The second is to establish a real national front, to coordinate everyone's efforts and thus ensure their maximum effectiveness. By way of example, everyone could reach agreement on certain aspects of the execution of the referendum process, hold public rallies in various parts of our Sahara, work together to welcome our compatriots who will be coming from Tindouf and elsewhere to vote, etc.

At the same time, we need to mobilize the people as a whole, by means of all sorts of initiatives, to ensure they make their weight fully felt in the battle.

The third task is a very delicate one: to create a climate of total mobilization, dignity, and order so that the referendum takes place under the best possible conditions and results in a victory for law and justice, i.e., for Morocco.

That depends, in the last analysis, on the willingness of key Moroccan sectors to participate and sacrifice for the cause. And who could refuse, when the fate of the country is at stake?

Three sectors are of special concern: the government, the economic interests, and the political class.

Governmental bodies, at the local as well as national level, should do nothing that might disrupt the general climate or the cause of national unity. For example, government should flatly reject price increases such as those recently approved. It should not take unpopular measures like expulsion of tenants or harassment of street vendors and have-nots. It should strictly respect the constitution, especially civil and individual liberties. It should make it a point of honor to avoid any political arrests and to resolve any disputes that arise through dialogue and negotiations. Finally, it should release the remaining political detainees.

The economic interests, for their part, should avoid any enterprise shutdowns, personnel dismissals, layoffs, or reductions in wages and bonuses. They should make a special effort to recruit young high school graduates and do their fair share to reduce unemployment.

As for the political actors, they must devote most of their energy to the fundamental national question of territorial integrity. This does not mean abandoning or disengaging from other current issues, such as bread, work, and democracy. It is a question of emphasis, which the political actors can resolve for themselves. To be more precise and blunt, it would be irrational and rash to launch large-scale or general strikes, campaigns or political battles that would divert the attention of the masses from the great task of the hour; in the last analysis, such actions would benefit our adversaries and enemies. In short, over these next five months, nothing should be done that would be detrimental to national unity or territorial integrity, which is now in the final phase of juridical resolution.

It would be misguided to expect these three sectors to ignore their own self-interest completely. Patriotism cannot be commanded, sold or bought. But to save the fatherland and assure its triumph, one must be willing to pay the price—like the militants who sacrificed their lives for national independence, like the valorous soldiers who shed their blood for the liberation of the Saharan provinces—and without trying to make some sort of political or material profit on it.

In sum, the historic task before us now is to conclude a National Truce on the basis of the above-mentioned points. This truce, extending over the next five months, would ensure Morocco's success in the referendum. It would create the conditions for the perpetuation of the union and for the achievement of other fundamental tasks, the most important of which are revision of the constitution, the holding of free and fair elections, and the broadening of democracy.

For our part, we are fully ready to assume our responsibilities within this framework.

(Signed) Ali Yata, secretary general of the PPS [Party of Progress and Socialism].

Former Polisario Member on Rights Violations

92AF0031C Rabat *L'Opinion* in French 25 Sep 91 p 1

[Unattributed article: "Statement by Former Official of So-Called 'Polisario'"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The referendum scheduled to take place in Saharan provinces is superseded because Moroccan citizens of Saharan origin have already expressed their Moroccan character during the events of 1988, when they chanted slogans hostile to the so-called "Polisario" and confirmed the return of the Saharan provinces to the Kingdom of Morocco, according to Mr. Ben Taleb Hussein, a former official of the so-called "Polisario" who returned to Morocco.

In an interview with the daily AL ITTIHAD AL ICHTI-RAKI [mouthpiece of the] (USFP [Socialist Union of Popular Forces]) published on Tuesday Mr. Ben Taleb indicated that human rights violations are a common

occurrence in the Tindouf camps and the jails of the so-called "Polisario," where Moroccan citizens who proclaim their Moroccan citizenship are imprisoned. These citizens endure torture and repression, Mr. Ben Taleb said, pointing out that the so-called "Polisario" exists only in the imagination of the members of its "Executive Committee."

Mr. Ben Taleb also stated that 70 percent of the citizens of Saharan origin who went to Tindouf did so because they were unaware of Spain's "propaganda lies" and understood later on that they were the victims of a plot against Morocco and its sovereignty.

Mr. Ben Taleb, who has held several positions within the leadership clique of the so-called "Polisario," appealed to the citizens illegally detained in Tindouf, urging them to spare no effort in order to return to the motherland.

The United Nations, he concluded, must show objectivity and impartiality in the preparation of the referendum, and it must include the Saharan Moroccan citizens who fled Sahara in 1958 on the lists of voters in the referendum. (MAP).

Polisario Propaganda Campaign Condemned

92AF0035E Rabat *ALMAGHRIB* in French
8 Oct 91 p 1

[Editorial: "A Disinformation Campaign Doomed to Fail"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] The "Polisario" [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro] mercenaries are currently engaged in a disinformation campaign aimed at spreading confusion about Morocco's clear and legitimate position concerning the identification criteria and final lists of voters in the referendum.

The "Polisario's" deceitful allegations are all the more flimsy, all the more unsubstantial, as they are supported by an individual of questionable credibility: Brahim Hakim, whose real name is Brahim Ould Darwich also known as Breihmat, a Mauritanian mercenary propelled to the front of the Polisario scene by the secret services of the country that is behind it all after a rather pathetic career in Nouakchott, where he was a nurse before becoming an insurance salesman....

It was that very same Brahim Ould Darwich who, not so long ago, estimated the Saharan population at 700,000, or even 1 million. Today, for obvious reasons, he clings to the census of the Sahara taken in 1974 by the Spanish occupant under peculiar political conditions: Spain was then preparing to annex the Sahara to its territory, under cover of questionable legality. It was "normal" for the occupants to rid their lists of all inhabitants suspect of Moroccan patriotic activities or feelings, and to "overlook" those who, for the same reasons, had fled colonialist repression to go to the liberated parts of their country.

Besides, repression was not the only reason for this exodus. Let us just recall that, when it was recovered by its true owners, the Sahara had only one primary school, no hospital, hardly any roads and, generally speaking, no infrastructure to provide for a decent life in keeping with modern standards.

Today, Morocco is merely defending the legitimate rights of these populations whose only "crime" was to reject Spanish colonialism at a time when the secessionist dream and the deception fabricated to promote it could not even exist.

These are the populations that the "Polisario" would penalize, following in that the policy of the former Spanish occupant.

Now, whereas such an attitude is not surprising on the part of mercenaries with no ties to the Moroccan Sahara and who can do nothing but stand up and fight to prevent a referendum that will bury their dream forever, we have the right to expect the United Nations and its MINURSO [UN Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara] to have a consistent position concerning the Moroccan demands; otherwise, the entire sequence of the framework-plan may be compromised.

In this case, Morocco is defending what is right, and enemy disinformation shall not weaken its firm position.

United and mobilized behind His Majesty the King to defend their sacred cause, our people will foil all enemy machinations whose sole objective is to postpone the moment of truth that will establish forever the Moroccan character of the Sahara.

Impartial Identification of Electorate Needed

92AF0025B Rabat L'OPINION in French 23 Sep 91
pp 1, 3

[Commentary by Jamal Hajjam: "Success of Referendum Process Depends on Acceptance of Moroccan Lists"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Although the Voter Identification Commission, which has a most important and most sensitive task before it, has not yet completed the phase of adoption of identification criteria, the peace plan is already in motion—first of all with the 6 September entry into force of the cease-fire, and second with the deployment of UN military observers and civilian personnel.

All the same, it is difficult if not impossible to predict the precise date for the international referendum to be held at Sakiat Al Hamra and Oued Eddahab.

The referendum itself and the date on which it will be held are still hostage to implementation of all phases of the peace plan, especially the impartial identification of the electorate.

This task is critical to guarantee that the referendum is in all respects credible and fair.

It is still premature to set a date, especially since the United Nations is already far behind in the identification process: It has not even elaborated all the criteria yet.

In a 10 September interview with JEUNE AFRIQUE, the UN secretary general—while admitting that the identification commission faces an "enormous" task, that "it will take...time," and that "God knows what will happen"—is nevertheless categorical in maintaining that the referendum "should still take place in the second half of January 1992."

Mr. [Perez] de Cuellar's certainty on this point leads us to ask a very legitimate question.

By insisting the referendum be held on some pre-established date, whatever the cost, even though the UN mission is behind schedule (a fact for which ultimately the UN itself is responsible), do we not run the risk that the voter identification process will be flawed, lacking in impartiality and equity, thus depriving the referendum of credibility?

Morocco, which agreed to the holding of a referendum on its own territories with the aim of discrediting the allegations and claims made by the enemies of its territorial integrity and defeating, by legal means, the plots hatched against its sovereignty, is committed to doing everything possible to demonstrate its cooperation with the UN mission—it has never done less—but on condition that the process be carried out "according to the rules."

These rules quite rightly prescribe fair, impartial voter identification procedures untainted by outside influence. No matter how long it takes, the important thing is to establish all the requisite conditions for a free, fair and equitable referendum.

If things are running behind schedule, it is the fault of the United Nations, which must assume full responsibility.

To rush ahead blindly just to make up for lost time, even at the risk of impugning the credibility of the referendum procedure, would quite simply be a grave mistake. Nothing should be done that infringes on equity and justice. Above all, it should not be forgotten that the Moroccan people, fully mobilized and ready to make any sacrifice to defend Morocco's sovereignty and territorial integrity, will never accept any infringement on their national prerogatives.

It is obvious the identification commission still has much to do. First of all, there are the lists resulting from the Spanish census of 1974, marred by imperfections, omissions and errors that will have to be corrected. Second, there is the unavoidable issue of voter registration requests submitted by the Moroccan Saharans omitted from the census because they had taken refuge in the liberated North following their persecution by the

Hispano-French colonial alliance during and after Operation "Ecouvillon" ["Mop-up"].

All these people have the right to participate in the vote, and their applications must be considered in accordance with the provisions of the peace plan.

Who then is in a position to prescribe how long the work of the commission shall take? If problems have been identified, and if problems are currently being experienced, one thing is certain: They were not created by Morocco, but by the UN commissions that have fallen behind in their work.

Morocco has always made its positions clear and offered its support and cooperation to the UN secretary general and the UN mission in their efforts to carry out their tasks as effectively as possible.

So it is up to the United Nations to assume its responsibilities and ensure that everything unfolds in accordance with the provisions of the plan, which requires, in addition to proper voter identification, the establishment of voting centers in urban areas—not out in the wilds somewhere—and finally (an essential point) respect for the cease-fire.

Now in defiance of the peace plan, we are seeing flagrant violations of this cease-fire by the mercenaries of "Polisario" [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro], and the United Nations is doing nothing about it. The infiltration of secessionists into parts of the territory lying between the defense wall and Sahara's international borders threatens the legality and credibility of the UN peace plan.

The United Nations must act quickly and firmly to restore the situation that prevailed on the ground before 6 September—in other words, it must keep the mercenaries outside the Saharan provinces.

The United Nations knows perfectly well that until 6 September the Royal Armed Forces maintained control over all these provinces on both sides of the defense wall and always prevented any infiltration. Once the cease-fire went into effect, it was up to the United Nations to enforce it and to respect the feelings of the Moroccan people, who rightly see this situation as an open attack on their sovereignty. Morocco has always made clear it would not tolerate such infiltrations or allow the mercenaries to establish themselves on its own territory.

It is clear that "Polisario," by resorting to such illegal tactics, hopes to turn things to its advantage, defeating the purpose of the UN operation.

The United Nations is going to have to shake off its inertia and move into action to ensure the referendum's success and above all its complete credibility.

Thousands Cross Moroccan Border to Laayoune

92AF0035D Rabat L'OPINION in French
5 Oct 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by special correspondent in Laayoune, Nabil Arabi: "Over 160,000 Individuals of Saharan Origin Expected at the Unit Camps"—first paragraph is L'OPI-NION introduction]

[Excerpts] All necessary measures were taken to provide for a satisfactory stay of all Moroccan citizens of Saharan origin, settled in other regions of the Kingdom, who, in a surge of patriotism, are intent on making the trip to the territory to denounce the imposture of the "Polisario" and its mercenaries before the UN mission.

At present, some 20,000 Saharans originating from Sakia Al Hamra and Oued Ed Dahab have already been able to make the trip and pitch their tents in the Unit camps set up in Laayoune, Boujdour, Smara, and Dakhla. These camps are now ready to meet all of the demand expressed, which amounts to over 160,000 people originating from the Moroccan Sahara who settled in the northern provinces during the Spanish occupation.

The unit camps are supervised by commissions dealing with reception, housing, equipment, transportation, maintenance, supplies, social affairs, entertainment, health, and civil protection; they are supplied with drinking water, electricity, and sanitary facilities, and some people have started selling lightweight materials and offer a variety of items. This is the case at the Laayoune Unit camp set up on the Hay Moulay Rachid subdivision, right by Hay El Hajari, a neighborhood with permanent houses built in colonial times to house the natives who had nowhere else to go except the Polio, Dayat Oum Saad, and Jarsitu shantytowns. All these shantytowns were eradicated and are now replaced by decent housing that has completely changed Laayoune, giving it today the appearance of a charming and steadily expanding town.

This is to say that the small town that those who are coming back home today used to know has now become another Laayoune. The change is surprising, and they can find their way only at Hay El Hajari, where they go daily to visit relatives who still live there. But Hay El Hajari, too, is profoundly changed; it now extends along the periphery, toward the Smara road to the east and toward the airport to the south, forming a neighborhood that is now as large as those of Casablanca or Rabat, with an impressive number of stores. Urban development has connected it to other neighborhoods that were built in the West, and it thus finds itself part of the town, whereas it used to be an isolated Moslem neighborhood where the Spanish never ventured. [passage omitted]

There are many such heartbreaking cases to be found under each tent of the unit camps. Sipping the unique strong tea that only Saharans know how to make, Galad Ahmed Fouad, of the Ouled Sbaa, born in 1926 at Ouled Sebaa, said that he had spent his entire youth in the

Sahara, moving with the members of his tribe to Ridal, Ain Nakhla, Zaifia, and to Laayoune, here, where he counts 40 elders. The Spanish drove him out in 1956 along with many other members of his family.

Overjoyed at their reunion, the Moroccans originating from the Sahara hurry to report to the Electorate Identification Commission of the UN Mission for the Organization of a Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) which, for its part, is still waiting for some of the staff assigned to it which, according to some sources, should number 2,800. It is understood that, starting next week, these will return to their headquarters in Laayoune.

In addition, according to a document, the 1974 Spanish census that the "Polisario" mercenaries hope will be used to draw up the electoral rolls for the planned referendum, estimated the Saharan population at 73,497, including 38,336 men and 35,161 women. According to that census, the Izargine tribe numbered 19,000, the Ouled Dlim 11,000, the Ouled Tidrarine 9,000, the Laarousine 4,500, the Ait Lahcen 3,000, the Yagoute 1,000, the Ahl Cheikh Maelainine 2,500, the Filala 200, the Toubalte 600, the Mejjat 450, the Ladeica 500, the Lemyar 700, the Chmagla 100, the Ait Moussa 150, the Ouled Bou Sebaa 15, the Azonafid 80, and the Imraguen 49. To these figures, which are far from the truth, the United Nations retains [sic] 30,000 Saharans who fled the Spanish repression and went in exile to Morocco, 4,000 in Mauritania, and 2,400 in Algeria.

Plight of Tindouf Camp Internees Noted

92AF0035A Rabat L'OPINION in French
2 Oct 91 pp 1, 3

[Editorial by Mohammed Idrissi Kaitouni: "All Genuine Saharans Are Moroccans"; quotation marks as published]

[Text] Every day, members of the "Polisario" [Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro] and Saharans who had been deceived by the secessionists' propaganda return to the motherland and proudly and enthusiastically proclaim that they are Moroccans.

They testify to the seriousness of the situation that prevails in the detainees camps of Tindouf, and to the ordeal of the Saharan populations forced to remain in these camps to prevent them from going back home to Moroccan Sahara, to live there entirely free and to enjoy the fruits of 16 years of construction and development in all sectors.

The tragedy that the Tindouf detainees must live day after day should arouse more interest from "humanitarian" organizations who get going and intensify their campaigns and their efforts only when they can thwart Morocco's rights and attack its reputation.

The Saharans who are detained against their will in the Tindouf camps ardently wish to return to Morocco and put an end to their suffering.

They are persuaded that the "Polisario" is nothing but a secessionist movement fabricated by colonialism and by people with hegemonic designs on the region, to stifle Morocco, prevent it from recovering its Sahara, and cut off all its political, economic, cultural, and religious ties with other African countries, in particular those in the South.

They know full well that the "Polisario," who relies on mercenaries and cannot act without the help of those who created it, is fighting for a lost cause, doomed to failure based on wild dreams, usurpation, fraud, repression, and aggression.

The genuine Saharans detained in the Tindouf camps are attempting by all means to escape the life of hell they live in these detainees camps. Thus, as soon as they get a chance, they do not hesitate to return to the motherland and breathe the air of freedom, convinced as they are that the Sahara is Moroccan, as it has always been, and that the mercenaries' allegations can deceive no one and will be believed only by those who persist in stating their opposition to Morocco and its inalienable rights.

The return of those who had gone astray, now that they have become aware of their errors, confirms the legitimacy of the cause supported by the Moroccan people, who remain mobilized and determined to defend their territorial integrity and preserve the Moroccan character of their Sahara.

Detaining women, children, and old people as hostages in order to prevent genuine Saharans from returning to the motherland, Morocco, does not alter the facts of the situation and will not prevent the truth from getting known and masks from being torn down. The genuine Saharans as well as those who were able to escape from the Tindouf camps and those who are still detained there, value their Moroccan citizenship and will express it forcefully, even in the Tindouf camps, if they are allowed to do so freely and without being coerced.

REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

Editorial Denounces Jewish Yemeni Artist

92AE0002A Sanaa AL-SAHWAH in Arabic 29 Aug 91
p 8

[Article by Nasir Yahya: "Emigrants, Sham'ah Is the Solution"]

[Text] No one will be able to object on legal grounds to the television interview with the Jewish singer Sham'ah. She is basically a Yemeni emigrant, just like the Yemeni emigrants who fill the camps of hunger and poverty in Bajil, al-Hudaydah, Bayt al-Faqih, and elsewhere.

The one simple difference between the two is that Sham'ah follows the Jewish religion, which is something that opens doors and makes things easy for her. It allows her to visit Qa' al-Yahud, where a Jewish temple used to exist, and to appear on television, singing, dancing, and reminiscing about Sa'dah, Raydah, Bab al-Sabh, and Suq al-Malh.

Being Jewish nowadays is a great gain. It allows for the beginning of a period of normalization in art and sports, until we reach political normalization. Even before that, it allows for a linguistic normalization that began by making Yemenis listen to songs in "the sister language" of Hebrew!

Perhaps Yemenis should wonder, on constitutional grounds, whether this artistic normalization is the prelude to a campaign for comprehensive normalization preceding or preparing minds for recognition of the Zionist entity. (Even in Egypt, normalization has been too weak to make a Zionist singer appear on television!)

We return again to the emigrants who are living on "candles" [the singer's name, Sham'ah, means "candle"]. The differences between them and Jewish Yemeni emigrants will doubtlessly become clearer when we compare what the television broadcasts and their actual conditions in their country.

First, the Yemeni emigrants do not have the right to appear on television to tell us their stories and artistic memories of the starving-to-death type. Such stories do not help bring American investments to our country!

Yemeni emigrants, of course, do not have the right to present television pictures of their children, whom they buried in the deserts of Tihamah after they had died of hunger, as Sham'ah did when she presented pictures of her sons.

Yemeni emigrants do not have the right to appear on television to dance the dance of loss and disappointment that they performed all last year in customs stations and

government offices, seeking a solution to their problems. Television time is expensive! Only things like Hebrew songs deserve it!

Can the television camera go to the emigrants' camps to photograph the emaciated bodies consumed by hunger and deprivation, at a time when we can learn—childhood lessons are etched in stone—the kinds of henna and dye that Yemeni Jews have preserved in America?

What can the emigrants in the camps talk about except their hunger, their poverty, and how certain official agencies hound them because they are living on lands belonging to the state and religious trusts and are not ashamed to jostle the plunderers of the country's resources and the Muslim religious trusts as they carry out their official duties?

What a difference there is between an emigrant who runs after citizens' cars in the streets for a bite to eat and an emigrant like the singer Sham'ah, who appears on the screen to dance and teach Muslims' wives that dancing and shaking one's belly and limbs are the way to honor, rank, and respect in the "land of faith and wisdom"!

Faithful they are, these Yemeni Jews! They have not forgotten Hilbah and Matit and even their "temple" in al-Qa'. Memories of the past have brought them in secret and open delegations to encourage their brothers to experience eating salad the streets of Haifa and in the neighborhoods of Tel Aviv. They have brought with them "the singer of the East and queen of Hebrew song," even if they have not gone so far as to imagine that she would be allowed to appear on television for more than one hour!

On this basis, the only way to increase the government's interest in the returning expatriates and in solving their educational, health, and food problems is for them to embrace Judaism. Then the media would hurry to host them and would open to them the gates of honor!

BANGLADESH

Final Referendum Results Given

92AS0085A Dhaka *THE NEW NATION* in English
17 Sep 91 pp 1, 8

[Text] The nation in Sunday's historic referendum gave a clear approval to the last month's constitutional amendment by Parliament for a return to parliamentary system of government, according to unofficial results announced by the Election Commission in Dhaka yesterday evening.

A total of 18,342,882 voters voted "yes" approving the 12th amendment to the Constitution unanimously passed by Parliament on 6 August. The number of "no" votes cast opposing the amendment was recorded at 3,385,713.

The percentage of "yes" votes was 48.42 while that of "no" was 15.58.

Out of a total of 62,204,118 voters enrolled, 21,728,595 turned up at the polling centres to give their verdict on the constitutional question put to direct vote of the electorate as required under the constitution.

The turnout of voters recorded at 34.93 percent. Inclement weather due to incessant rains and flooding in many places was mainly attributable to poor turnout of votes. Nearly one fifth of the country remained under flood waters.

Election Commission is likely to announce the official results of the referendum in a couple of days through a gazette notification.

On 6 August, the Jatiya Sangsad unanimously passed the 12th Constitution Amendment Bill which was early introduced in Parliament by the Prime Minister and Leader of the House Begum Khaleda Zia to restore parliamentary system for replacing the existing 16 year old presidential system.

Bangladesh practised parliamentary system of government from 1972 to January 1975 when the then Awami League Government replaced the existing form of government with presidential system and also introduced one-party Baksal rule.

Political observers consider that the restoration of parliamentary democracy in Bangladesh would end the 16-year old controversy over the form of government.

They also said that the presidential system had concentrated too much power in the hands of one man, which the ousted autocrat had misused to the maximum making the system all the more unpopular and controversial.

The Election Commission will have to announce the election schedule for presidential election under parliamentary system within five days of the publication of the

gazette notification of the referendum results. The Parliament members will elect the President under the parliamentary system. Prime Minister and Leader of the House Begum Zia will be the chief executive of the republic. BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] led by Begum Zia commands absolute majority with 170 members in Parliament.

Following are the division-wise complete result of the referendum available from the Election Commission:

Division-wise Chittagong topped the list of "Yes" votes with 88.37 percent, followed by Khulna 88.25, Dhaka 85.03 and Rajshahi 75.68.

Rajshahi division topped the tally of "No" votes with 24.32 percent, followed by Dhaka 14.97, Khulna 11.75 and Chittagong 11.63.

Border Meet Agrees on Steps To Reduce Crime

92AS0007A Dhaka *THE NEW NATION* in English
31 Aug 91 p 2

[Text] Sylhet, 30 August (BSS): The three-day border co-ordination conference between Bangladesh and India ended here Thursday.

The Deputy Director General of Bangladesh Rifles and the Inspector General of Border Security Force (BSF) for Assam, Meghalaya, Monipur and Nagaland frontier level conference began here on 27 August, according to a BDR Press release.

Discussion related to anti-smuggling law and order situation of border areas, trespass, violation of border guide line, cattle lifting, land disputes, kidnapping, dacoity, killing, maintenance of border pillars and allied matters figured prominently among other subjects.

After threadbare deliberations on the issues both the sides agreed to take stringent measures, in order to further secure their respective frontiers with a view to apprehending criminals.

Both the forces also decided to exchange information regarding smugglers and their affiliated organizations in respective areas.

Minor irritants were also ironed out and it was also decided that regular border meeting must be held at sector and battalion levels between the respective two forces in order to solve matters requiring immediate attention.

The conference ended with the understanding that from now on Bangladesh Rifles and the Border Security Force would further strengthen their efforts in keeping their respective borders free from crime and disorder.

Report on Finance Minister's Visit to Nepal

92AS0076A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 14 Sep 91 p 10

[Text] Bangladesh and Nepal Friday expressed their firm determination to make all out efforts to exploit the potentialities that exists to boost trade and economic relations for the mutual benefit of the two friendly neighbouring nations, reports BSS.

Finance and Planning Minister Mr. M. Saifur Rahman who returned to Dhaka on Friday evening after leading a three-member Bangladesh delegation at the just concluded 8th session of the Bangladesh-Nepal Joint Economic Commission [JEC], expressed satisfaction in the deliberations of the meeting.

An agreed minutes was signed on Friday in Kathmandu following three-days of the JEC meeting. Mr. Saifur Rahman and Mr. Mahesh Acharya, Nepalese State Minister for Finance signed the papers for their respective governments.

The two sides while emphasising greater interaction for promoting trade and economic relations, however noted that because of certain constraints, the potentialities remained unexploited, difficulties in direct communication was identified as the major hinderance to the growth of mutually beneficial relations, Mr. Rahman pointed out.

The Joint Commission identified a number of issues for the free flow of trade and development of greater cooperative relations that included setting of joint ventures in garments, pharmaceuticals and cement production: greater cooperation in tourism, cultural exchange, telecommunication and banking also came up for discussion.

Talking to newsmen on arrival at the airport Mr. Rahman said that the absence of direct road links between the two countries was the main "stumbling block" to develop relations. "Unless it is removed, all exercises will turn meaningless," he maintained.

Mr. Rahman said, had there been direct road communication, we could have imported onions, pulse (dal) and chillies from Nepal thereby helping reduce trade imbalance. The Finance Minister expressed the hope with the installation of democratic governments in both Bangladesh and Nepal and practising of free and competitive economy in India. Bangladesh and Nepal, all barriers will be removed for the elimination of defects in our economics.

A member of Bangladesh delegation said Bangladesh agreed to the Nepali request for more scholarships and facilities for self-financing of education. He informed that efforts were also underway to establish direct telecommunication (against existing arrangement of transmission via Hong Kong) between the countries by early

next year. Bangladesh side also agreed to look into the Nepali request to issue multiple visa to students and others.

The Finance Minister during his stay in Nepal was given an audience by King Birendra who stressed upon easier links between the two countries and joint harnessing of water resources for the benefit of the region. Mr. Rahman also called on Prime minister Girija Prasad Koirala and a number of cabinet members including the Irrigation and Agriculture Minister.

The joint commission between the two countries was established in 1978. Nepal is one of the few countries with whom Bangladesh has favourable balance of trade and figure. In the last 12 years, the cumulative export surplus with the Himalayan Kingdom now stands at Taka 1193.25 million.

Foreign Groups Stir Trouble in Hill Tracts

92AS0078A Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English
10 Sep 91 pp 1, 8

[Article by Matiur Rahman]

[Text] For reasons better known to them, some organizations abroad suddenly have become 'active' in launching campaigns for the Chakma tribal people in the Chittagong Hill Tracts with the coming to power of an elected democratic government in Bangladesh.

The whole operation, it seems, is directed by a vested quarter through remote control as the organizations based in a number of countries jumped on the issue raising the question of what they called "violation of human rights" in the Chittagong Hill Tracts with an orchestrated voice.

An organisation named and styled as international work group for indigenous affairs in Denmark with its branches in Germany and the Netherlands has become active about the Bangladesh Chakma tribal population in the Chittagong Hill Tracts.

Another organization in the name of 'organising committee for Chittagong Hill Tracts campaign' with its office in Amsterdam started very openly the campaign against Bangladesh with a view to creating an issue out of non-issue. The Organising Committee for Chittagong Hill Tracts campaign with its postal address of P.O. Box-11699, 1001 GR Amsterdam, the Netherlands, has already devoted itself to the campaign against Bangladesh very recently.

In close cooperation with these, some others started surfacing here and there abroad even with publications of false and concocted stories on the Chittagong Hill Tracts as one Canadian Professor, Mr. Douglas Senders, few months ago formed what he called "an international commission" and presented a report in the House of Lords in Britain recently on Chittagong Hill Tracts about human rights.

The Indian Press, however, is over active in carrying news reports from time to time on all these activities of such self-styled organizations and individuals.

Some of the foreign media even started taking keen interest in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and the Chakma tribal people under the grab of different missions as they often demonstrate. One Dr. Peter Berg, representative of the German Television ZDF came to Bangladesh for a documentary on the subject of health and family planning and moved even to the Hill Tract region with his crew team.

One journalist from Japan representing Yumury Shimbun is learnt to have approached Bangladesh Government for a press interview will a questionnaire solely devoted to the Chittagong Hill Tract where, according to him, repressions are going on against the Chakma tribal population.

Official sources told the NEW NATION the Government is keeping a watchful eye on all these activities and would take the required measures as and when necessary. "Why and how these moves are on, we are keeping watch" the sources said.

The sources said there is no problem we have got with our tribal people save one and that is about the return of the rest several thousands of Chakma tribal refugees from the Indian camps in Tripura where they had crossed over following the insurgency activities by the outlawed Shantibahini elements from across the Indian border.

Many of the Chakma tribal refugees trekked back home from the Indian camps in the recent months and on return they are living in peace and harmony in the Chittagong Hill Tract region, the sources said.

Burmese Refugees Cross Into Bangladesh

92AS0073A Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English
24 Sep 91 p 1

[Text] Chittagong, 23 September: At least three hundred Rohingya Muslims of Arakan, Burma, crossed into Bangladesh on 17 September to escape oppression and repression of the Burmese army, according to a press release of Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) here today.

The refugees mostly children, old men and women were the inhabitants of Ang Dang, 30 miles from Mungdo township in Arakan, and have now taken shelter at Shahparirdip and Safrang across the Naf river under Teknaf, the press release added.

Thousands of Arakan Muslims have already entered into Bangladesh by hilly roads and crossing Naf river risking their lives, RSO President Dr. Mohammad Yunus claimed. He alleged that the military regime of Burma has cut down supply of foodstuff from Akyab to north Arakan with a view to turning the Muslims there into

slaves and beggars and added that the Muslim dominated areas in north Arakan has virtually been turned into a military garrison.

He further alleged that indiscriminate killing, arrest, torture and gang-rape of Rohingya Muslim women had been a regular feature in north Arakan.

The RSO president further said about 30 Rohingya Muslims were killed due to oppression and firing of military junta of Burma during the last two months. The deceased Muslims among others were Md. Hossain, Md. Shafi, Nurul Islam, Hossain Ahmed, Abdul Hai and Md. Salim.

RSO Leader called upon UNO [United Nations organizations?], OIC [Organization of the Islamic Conference], Muslim countries and various other international humanitarian agencies to come forward for helping the Burmese refugees overcome the present crisis.

Paper Reports Prime Minister's Swearing-In

Ceremony Described

92AS0072A Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English
20 Sep 91 pp 1, 8

[Excerpt] Begum Khaleda Zia was sworn-in yesterday afternoon as Prime Minister this time now to lead the Bangladesh Government under a parliamentary system.

With her swearing in as country's first woman Prime Minister, came to an end the sixteen-year-old presidential system that had been in force since 25 January 1975.

Acting President Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed administered the oath of office and secrecy separately to Prime Minister Begum Zia at a simple but impressive ceremony at the glittering Dabar Hall of Bangabhaban.

The Acting President also conducted the oaths to 21 ministers, 15 state ministers and three deputy ministers of the new BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] government.

Earlier minutes before, Prime Minister Begum Zia met the Acting President at this office at Bangabhaban and tendered her resignation as head of the Council of Ministers under the presidential system.

On her resignation, the Acting President dissolved the Council of Ministers, to make way for completing the transition to the Westminster-type of democracy.

Acting President Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed immediately afterward, invited her as leader of the majority party in Parliament to form the new government to become the executive head under parliamentary system that has come into effect with the gazette notification of the results of the countrywide referendum in favour of the 12th constitution amendment bill.

The 12th constitution amendment bill was passed rather unanimously by Parliament earlier on 6 August for reverting to parliamentary form of government from the presidential system.

The new cabinet included four new faces while seven state ministers were elevated as ministers. The four new entrants in the cabinet are Barrister Zamiruddin Sircar, Mr. Abdul Matin Choudhury, Brigadier (Retd.) Hannan Shah and Mr. Zahiruddin Khan.

Prof. A.O.M. Badrudoza Choudhury, Vice-Chairman of BNP and Deputy Leader of the House, who had earlier resigned as Education Minister, was present at the oath-taking ceremony.

Besides leaders of the ruling BNP, the function was attended by the members of Parliament and leaders of the Jamaat-i-Islami, the five-party Alliance, Communist Party of Bangladesh, the JSD [Jatiyo Samajtantrik Dal] and the Islami Oikya Jote.

Leader of the Opposition in Parliament Sheikh Hasina and other Awami League MPs [members of Parliament] who were although vocal for parliamentary system, were conspicuously absent on the auspicious occasion of country's history. The Awami League chief is now on a tour of the flood affected northern districts.

Also absent were the leaders of the Jatiya Party which emerged as third largest party in Parliament after BNP and Awami League.

Deputy Ministers

Abdul Hye: Local Government and Cooperatives, A.B.M. Zahidul Huq: Law and Justice, Serajul Huq: Health and Family Welfare.

Remarks to Press

92AS0072B Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English
20 Sep 91 pp 1, 8

[Text] Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia said yesterday that the coming into being of the parliamentary democracy in the country was the fulfillment of the desire of the people.

Giving her reaction to newsmen at Bangabhaban soon after her swearing-in as head of government, Begum Zia said she felt both happy and sorry on this occasion. She was happy because with switching over to parliamentary system today, the desire of the people was fulfilled and she felt sorry because so many people gave life during the movement against autocratic rule, she said.

The Prime Minister was approached by the newsmen while she was sitting with Acting President Justice Shahabuddin Ahmed, Speaker Abdur Rahman Biswas and some senior cabinet ministers at the southern plaza of Bangabhaban after the swearing-in ceremony.

Begum Zia sought cooperation of all the leaders and political parties for running of parliamentary democracy.

Awami League 'Terrorism' at Polls Alleged

92AS0077A Dhaka THE NEW NATION in English
12 Sep 91 pp 1, 8

[Text] BNP [Bangladesh Nationalist Party] Secretary General Barrister Abdus Salam Talukder on Wednesday night accused Bangladesh Awami League of resorting to widespread terror, intimidation and violence in difference polling centres in and outside Dhaka were by-elections to vacant seats of the Jatiya Sangsad were held, reports BSS.

Addressing a hurriedly called press conference at the Dhanmondi office of BNP, the BNP Secretary General said reports pouring in from different polling centres in Bhola, Madaripur, Chittagong and Rangpur district revealed that Awami League tried to influence the polling by "muscle power."

Barrister Salam Talukder said at several centres in and outside Dhaka the polling agents of BNP were not allowed to enter the polling centres. At places the Awami League activists exploded bombs, stabbed BNP workers and ransacked election camps of BNP to scare away voters and realise their motive, he added.

State Minister for Labour and Manpower Barrister Rafiqul Islam Mia, State Minister for Civil Aviation and Tourism Abdul Mannan, State Minister for Youth and Sports Sadek Hossain Khoka, President of Dhaka City BNP Mir Shaukat Ali, MP [member of Parliament], Joint Secretary General of BNP Abdul Matin Chowdhury, MP, and BNP candidate in the Dhaka-9 constituency Barrister Jamiruddin Sircar, Whip Fazlur Rahman Pitol and Amaunllah Aman, MP, among others, were present at the press conference.

Barrister Salam Talukder regretted that violence and terror during the polling belied our hopes and expectations of free and fair by-elections that was demonstrated by all political parties in the 27 February parliamentary elections. The competing political parties in the last parliamentary elections created an unparalleled history by adhering to the code of election conduct and observing rules and regulations. But violence, terror and rigging taken recourse to in different polling centres in yesterday by-elections had dashed out high hopes, he said.

He pointed out that the BNP had formed the government by securing majority seats in the last elections. The BNP government, he said, would not face any awkward situation even if it failed to bag a single seat in yesterday's by-election to the eleven vacant seats of the Jatiya Sangsad, it was unfortunate that some unleashed terror to foil the by-elections, he added.

Barrister Salam Talukder charged Awami League activists with letting loose a reign of terror at different centres including Jigatola Primary School, Green Road Family Planning Training Institute, Mohammadpur Central College, Hazaribagh, Kishaloy School and Amtoli in Dhaka City. The polling agents of BNP were turned away from the polling centres at Jigatola, Amtoli and Mohammadpur Kishaloy School, he charged.

The BNP Secretary General said Milton, a leader of Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal, received bullet injury in his head.

Explaining the situation in Dhaka-9 constituency, he said barring a few minor incidents here and there, the overall atmosphere at Dhanmondi and Mohammadpur was peaceful till 12 noon. But tension built up when Awami League Chief entered the Green Road Family Planning Centre with about 300 people. At that time bombs were exploded and there was chase and counter chase, the Awami League activists ransacked BNP camps, he said alleging that the Awami League Chief ordered the police and the presiding officer of that polling centre to demolish BNP camps.

He also charged the Awami League activists with attacking the house of four BNP workers. Even an attempt was made to heckle Mir Shaukat Ali MP, Chief Co-ordinator of the Election, when he went to visit several polling centres, he said.

Barrister Talukder said all activists indulged in damaging cars, looting shops and attacking BNP workers. The orgy of terror and violence was still continuing at different places at Kalabagan, Kathalbaghan and Dhanmondi, he said.

He further said Sheikh Hasina stayed for about two hours at Green Road polling centre and many cast their votes at her behest. When a reporter wanted to know whether false votes were cast at the directive of Sheikh Hasina at that polling centre, Barrister Talukder said "apparently it was so."

Barrister Salam Talukder dismissed Awami League chief's charge of resorting to terror tactics by BNP workers as false and unfounded. On the contrary, the Awami League activists indulged in acts of terror, intimidation and violence, he added.

He said BNP polling agents were not allowed to enter 12 polling centres in five unions of Madaripur Sadar Upazila. A written complaint was lodged with the Returning Officer of Madaripur in this connection, he added.

At Chittagong, he said, BNP polling agents were denied entry into three polling centres. The Awami League activists exploded bombs there.

In Bhola, one BNP worker was stabbed on Tuesday night, he said.

Barrister Talukder told newsmen that he went to Shibchar on 6 September to address a referendum and

by-election meeting. But the Awami League activists damaged the dais of the meeting and injured four BNP workers, one of them seriously. The Awami League brought out a procession armed with lethal weapons the following day, he said.

In response to a question, he said we have lodged complaints with the concerned authorities including police administration about these acts of violence at different places.

Awami League Central Executive Committee Meets

92AS0083A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 19 Sep 91 pp 1, 10

[Text] Bangladesh Awami League has congratulated the people for casting 'Yes' votes in the referendum held on 15 September paving the way for establishing a parliamentary system of Government in the country.

Adopting resolutions at the two-day central executive committee meeting of the party held on Monday and Tuesday, presided over by party chief Sheikh Hasina, the Bangladesh Awami League observed that the solution to the problems facing the country lies in the uninterrupted democratic system. Any obstruction to the normal course of democracy by the whims of any individual would foil the objectives of democracy and invite autocracy in the country. The meeting observed that any measure contrary to the hopes and aspiration of the people would lead to autocracy and warned the Government to refrain from any steps opposed to the people's wishes.

The meeting of the Bangladesh Awami League also expressed serious concern over the deteriorating law and order situation in the country. It alleged that the people of the country were feeling insecure following the silence of the administration, naked interference of the ruling party and flexing of muscle by the criminals under the protection of the Government. It said that, killing, hijacking, robbery and rape by the miscreants in broad daylight had become the order of the day. The unabated crimes across the country had proved that there was no administration in the country. Bank dacoity, robbery in buses, trucks and launches proved the absence of effective administrative system in the country.

The meeting of the Central Executive Committee of the Bangladesh Awami League noted with concern that the incident in which the Awami League Chief and Leader of the Opposition in the Parliament Sheikh Hasina was shot at in a polling booth at Green Road on 11 September. Strongly condemning the incident, the meeting of the Bangladesh Awami League regretted that no step was taken from the Government so far to apprehend the miscreants responsible for the attack on the Awami League chief. It observed that the Government had encouraged the killers and the hoodlums by releasing the

alleged attackers Wahed. The meeting strongly condemned the Government for giving protection to the killers and miscreants.

The Awami League meeting also expressed its grave concern over the increased violence on the campuses. It said, the academic career of the thousands of students had become uncertain following the closure of three universities of the country. The meeting demanded immediate reopening of all the closed educational institutions of the country.

The meeting of the Bangladesh Awami League also condemned the arrest of Awami League, Jubo League and Chhatra League workers in false cases. It demanded withdrawal of false cases against the Awami League workers throughout the country. It noted with concern that many Awami League workers were being harassed by the ruling party musclemen and urged the administration to take steps in stopping this kind of incidences.

Bangladesh Awami League also expressed its serious concern over damages caused by the floods in vast areas of the country. It criticised the government in facing the flood problems and alleviating the sufferings of the people. The meeting demanded immediate supply of relief materials including cash, medicines, house building materials and seeds and pure water.

The Bangladesh Awami League strongly condemned the ruling party for resorting to ballot dacoity rigging and using the administration in the bye-elections. The Bangladesh Nationalist Party, it observed, had violated the neutrality in the elections.

The meeting observed with indignation that the ruling party occupied the election booths, stamped the ballots and stuffed the ballot boxes with the help of the administration in the bye-elections.

Sounding a note of warning, the Bangladesh Awami League said if the government did not refrain from neo-autocratic character, it would launch a massive movement across the country which the government would not be able to withstand.

The meeting of the Bangladesh Awami League also expressed concern over the price hike of the essentials. The introduction of Value Added Tax was a lack of farsightedness of the government it remarked. The meeting demanded withdrawal of VAT [value-added tax] on the essential items.

The Bangladesh Awami League demanded fixation of jute price at Taka 500 per maund and opening of jute purchasing centres by the government.

The meeting expressed its serious indignation over the decision of the government not to telecast or broadcast any programme on the occasion of the death anniversary of Bangabandhu on 15 August. It also condemned the government for issuing instruction prohibiting the use of the word "Bangabandhu" in the government media including radio and television.

Leftist Parties React to Soviet Events

Bangladesh Communist Party

92AS0068A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 27 Aug 91 p 10

[Text] The Communist Party of Bangladesh (CPB) on Monday criticised the current anti-communist hysteria in the Soviet Union and said the party is deeply worried over the developments in the country since 19 August, reports BSS.

In a statement, party General Secretary Saifuddin Ahmed Manik, said while the unconstitutional removal of Mr. Gorbachev from power can never be accepted, the banning and sealing off of the Communist Parties in different parts of the country can also in no way be supported.

The statement said the encouragement to anti-communist activities at present, including harassment to communists, can not be supported.

Mr. Manik criticised greater powers of federal government being now exercised by Mr. Boris Yeltsin as unconstitutional and not in conformity with democratic norms.

The CPB General Secretary expressed the hope the Soviet people would determine their fate without any outside interference.

Marxist-Leninists Issue Statements

92AS0068B Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 1 Sep 91 p 3

[Text] Several Marxist Leninist parties and 110 lawyers in separate statements on Saturday expressed concern over the development in the Soviet Union and said that the collapse of socialism in the Soviet Union was the conspiracy of western capitalists.

The signatories to the statement said the present Soviet leaders had surrendered to the western imperialism. They accused Gorbachev-Yeltsin axis by burying socialism and resorting to repression on the Communist leaders representing the toiling masses of the Soviet Union.

They said that the Soviet Union was once the leader of the oppressed and working classes of the Third World countries. The recent changes in the Soviet Union had pushed the newly independent countries of the world to the paws of the imperialist forces and destroyed the power balance in the world. They urged the Soviet leaders to take a positive step to save the oppressed people of the world from the clutches of the imperialist forces.

The political parties who issued statements included Marxist-Leninist Andolon, Bangladesh Swadhinata

Party, Jatiya Sramik Andolon, Progotishil Lekhak Andolon, Bangladesh Krishak Federation and Bangladesh Chhatra Federation.

Workers Party Leader Speaks at Meeting

92AS0069A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 4 Sep 91 p 1

[Text] Mr. Rashed Khan Menon MP [member of Parliament] and General Secretary of Bangladesh Workers Party criticised the present Government for being dictated by the World Bank.

Addressing the two-day meeting of the party which began on Tuesday Mr. Menon said, the economy of the country was being virtually controlled by the IMF officials and not the elected government. He said the economic measure taken by the Government was not only harmful for the nation but also a threat to the sovereignty of the country.

The General Secretary of the Workers Party said the measures like withdrawal of subsidy on agriculture, privatisation of education and health and dismantling of BADC [Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation] at the instruction of the World Bank would deepen the crises in the society.

Presenting his report at the inaugural session of the two-day meeting of the party, Mr. Rashed Khan Menon alleged that the Government did take any positive step in establishing the economic and political rights of the toiling masses. He said the Government was bypassing all the demands on the pretext of fund shortage in the Government exchequer. He further alleged that the present Government was not moving to recover the money looted by the past regime. The past Government had either looted national wealth or smuggled out the money from the country.

He criticised the Government for its failure to improve the law and order situation. Simultaneously, the Government did not bother at all to check terrorism on the campuses, he alleged.

Communists Sponsor Rally Against Communalism

92AS0070A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 27 Aug 91 p 10

[Text] Democratic and progressive political forces of the country were Monday urged by participants in a discussion on democracy and communalism to unite themselves on a renewed movement to effectively combat communalism in the society, reports BSS.

Organised by the Bangladesher Communist Party (CPB), they feared that unless the spirit of secularism was restored the expectation of the people for a democratic society would remain a far cry.

Presided over by CPB General Secretary Saifuddin Ahmed Manik, the discussion was participated, among

others, by former Chief Justice Kamaluddin Hussain, eminent educationist Prof. Kabir Chowdhury, United Communist League [UCL] leader Tipu Biswas, NAP [National Awami Party] leader Maulana Ahmedur Rahman Azmi, Awami League leader Prof. Abu Syed and CPB leader Mujahidul Islam Selim.

Describing communalism as one of the greatest dangers in way to establishing democratic society, Justice Kamaluddin Hussain said the constitution of a country cannot be fully democratic if it contained communal bias. Explaining that secularism was a part and parcel of democracy, Justice Hussain stressed the need for united efforts by the progressive democratic forces to halt the growth of communalism.

Justice Hussain felt that with the proclamation of Islam as the state religion during autocratic Ershad's regime, the religious minorities of the country had been feeling a sense of deprivation.

Prof. Kabir Chowdhury, who explained the danger of communalism, said after the fall of autocracy the country was not threatened by rising communalism and this ominous trend must be checked for strengthening the democratic process. He said the lofty national goal of democracy could not be rooted firmly unless fundamentalism was buried. In this context, he referred to the ongoing terrorism in the Chittagong University by the "fundamentalist forces" and regretted the administration's "mysterious silence" in this regard.

Saifuddin Ahmed Manik felt that the democratic forces should now unite on a single issue of combating communalism as it had already appeared to be the deterrent to democratic spirit.

The CPB leader alleged that members of minority communities were being harassed by the communal forces, who had chosen religion to confuse the common people.

Mr. Manik cautioned against the growth of fundamentalism both in India and Bangladesh and called for a concerted effort by the democratic and liberal forces in this regard.

UCL leader Tipu Biswas thanked the CPB for organising the discussion, saying that the anti-communalism drive should now be the main thrust of the democratic forces, because they were cunningly finding their ways in the society in the cover of democratic liberty. He said communalism had no place in democracy.

World Bank Report on Economy Summarized

92AS0071A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 24 Sep 91 pp 1, 8

[Text] Economic growth in Bangladesh in 1991 is expected to be lower than that of the previous year 6.2 percent. The economic growth during the current year is likely to be between 3-3.5 percent. This was predicted in the recently released World Bank Annual Report 1991 which was released in Dhaka on Saturday.

The World Bank report favoured improvement in the external competitiveness of the economy and making the environment more conducive to private sector participation. Some of the major tasks confronting the Government include the implementation of prioritised public investment programme focussing on key areas like social sectors and infrastructure. The report, however, had words of appreciation for increase in foreign exchange reserves, which, however, has been attributed to sluggish growth.

Despite an upturn in the economy of Bangladesh, short term macroeconomic indicators deteriorated in late 1989. Expansionary domestic policy led to a surge in imports, and foreign exchange reserves fell sharply to about U.S. dollar 450 million which is equivalent to 1.4 months of imports in March, 1990. In response to the situation, the Government initiated a short-term programme to stabilize the balance of payment and the budget. These efforts which included a flexible exchange-rate policy, were successful in restoring financial stability and improving competitiveness the report pointed out.

Shortly after initiating its reform programme, however, the Government was faced with high imported oil prices and the need to repatriate workers from Iraq and Kuwait in the wake of Gulf crisis. The terms of increasing domestic petroleum prices and taking measures to restrain current expenditures. It managed the difficult tasks of resettling displaced workers. More recently the balance of payments position has improved as a result of a contraction in imports.

Narrating the devastating cyclone which left about 125,000 people killed, and millions of others homeless, agricultural production and storage facilities in the area struck by the cyclone were devastated the report said. Vital public infrastructure was crippled, hampering immediate relief efforts as well as economic recovery. The damage to infrastructure and production will have a negative effect on the country's macroeconomic situation. The storm had a serious impact on the Chittagong Export Processing Zone and on export products awaiting shipment in port, shrimp farms and fish nurseries, both export industries, were also severely hurt. the report recalled.

Meanwhile the total IDA [International Development Association] disbursements, to Bangladesh including programme credits, amounted to U.S. 328 million in fiscal year 1991 while the net disbursement for projects in Asia amounted to U.S. dollar 3.16 billion which is 50 percent of the Bank's overall net disbursement of U.S. dollar 6.36 billion. The IDA lending to Bangladesh in 1991 amounted to U.S. dollar 410 million for seven operation. It has been stated in the report that the leading of the Bank in Asia totalled, U.S. dollar 7.5 billion, which was 17 percent higher than the last year.

The economic condition of countries including Bangladesh, Laos Myanmar, Nepal, Philippines, and Sri Lanka and Viet Nam has been described as facing

"uncertain or clouded prospects." These countries share to some degree, development constraints such as rapid population growth, environmental degradation, widespread poverty and deeply rooted macroeconomic problems that were accentuated by the gulf conflict. In order to address these problems what has been described slower growth countries need to employ "exceptional skill" in managing economic policy and infrastructure investments, the report states. The report urges "resolute redirection of public expenditure" toward programme such as family planning, rural social services and environment-friendly resource management.

Reportage on Dhaka University Reopening

Opening Described

92AS0084A Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 18 Sep 91 pp 1, 10

[Text] The Dhaka University [DU] reopened on Tuesday after 48-day unscheduled closure. The presence of students on the first day of reopening was satisfactory.

With the reopening of the university the campus were a lively and festive look. Many students were seen greeting each other with joy.

But the students attendance in the residential halls was very poor as most of the students did not return to their respective dormitories from mufassil areas.

Different student organisations held rallies and brought out processions demanding a campus free of arms and violence and observing the Education Day at state level.

Jatiyatabadi Chhatra Dal (JCD) at a rally urged the Government to arrest the suspected killers of Dr. Milon immediately.

Organised in front of DUCSU building, the rally was addressed by Habibunnabi Sohel and Ali Akkas Nadim.

They said it would resist any attempt to foil campus peace. The JCD leaders alleged that a section of student group were hatching conspiracy to spoil campus peace.

They called upon the general students to build resistance against the trouble mongers and armed outsiders.

Bangladesh Chhatra League [BCL] (A-A) held a rally at Curzon Hall cafeteria demanding implementation of 10-point demand of student community.

BCL President Shah Alam and General Secretary Asim Kumar Ukil spoke at the rally.

The BCL leaders expressed their concern over the frequent movement of some expelled students and alleged that these expelled students were trying to foil the academic peace on the campus.

They said a student group was hatching conspiracy to foil the campus harmony. Any attempt to foil academic peace would not be tolerated, they added.

The BCL leaders urged the Government for observing the Education Day at state level.

Bangladesh Chhatra Union (BCU) held a rally at the foot of Aparajeo Bangla. It was addressed by Nasir-Ud-Duza and Ruhin Hossain Prince.

The BCU leaders expressed regret for not organising any programme in observance of Education Day at state level. They demanded the implementation of 10-point demand of the students.

Meanwhile, Chhatra League (N-S), Shwadhin Chhatra Parisad, Jatiya Chhatra Dal and Chhatra Federation also held rallies and brought out processions on DU campus in observance of Education Day.

Samajitantrik Chhatra Front (SCF) held a rally on DU campus and submitted a memorandum to the Ministry of Education demanding observance of Education Day at the national level and implementation the various demands of students.

Belal Chowdhury and Razequzzaman Ratan spoke at the rally.

They urged the students to raise their voice against campus violence and implementation of their demands.

Zia Speech

92AS0084B Dhaka THE BANGLADESH OBSERVER
in English 18 Sep 91 pp 1, 10

[Text] Prime Minister Begum Khaleda Zia Tuesday called upon the students to rise above all petty differences and play a pioneering role to check terrorism and ensure a congenial academic atmosphere for the greater interest of the students, says BSS.

Recalling the glorious role of students in the movement against autocracy, Begum Zia urged the students to forge a movement against terrorism and violence with the same spirit with which they had ousted the autocratic regime.

The Prime Minister was speaking at a meeting with the members of Dhaka University [DU] Shikkha Paribesh Parishad at her secretariat office.

Begum Zia also called upon all the student organisations not to give shelter to the terrorists.

The Prime Minister said the present democratic government is determined to solve all problems including the session jam in the educational arena. In the current budget the highest allocation has been given for the education sector with a plan to improve the present condition of the sector, she said.

The Prime Minister said her government would take up new projects to create employment facilities for the students. She said the present government was eager to solve all problems of the students and teachers.

Begum Zia said that she knew that along with the people the students of the country had high hopes and expectation from her democratically elected government. She said with a note of confidence that her government would live up to their expectations with the cooperation of all including the students.

The Prime Minister said the autocratic regime left behind terrorism in the education institutions as one of its ills. The terrorism must have to be checked to enjoy the fruits of democracy established after long struggle against autocracy, she added.

Underlining the role of teachers in checking terrorism, Begum Zia called upon them to extend their all-out cooperation to all quarters for curbing violence in campuses and to ensure bright future for the students.

The Prime Minister reiterated her government's commitment to extend all possible cooperation to every quarter for curbing terrorism in campus.

Vice Chancellor of Dhaka University Prof. Moniruzzaman Mian, Prof. V.C. Wakil Ahmed, Dhaka University Teachers' Association President Anwarullah Chowdhury, Proctor M. Shahjahan Mian, DUCSU PV Amanullah Aman, DUCSU General Secretary Khairul Kabir Khokan, Bangladesh Chhatra League [BCL] (HA) President Muhammad Shah Alam, BCL General Secretary Ashim Kumar Ukil, President of Chhatra League (N-S) Najmul Huq Pradhan. Provosts of different halls of the university and leaders of other student organisations took part in the meeting.

The teachers and students, while exchanging views with the Prime Minister, said the sincerity and firmness of the present government to solve the problems of the educational arena including terrorism was also manifested in the earlier meetings of the Prime Minister with the students, teachers and political parties on several occasions.

The speakers also underscored the need for combined efforts of all quarters including the teachers, students, political parties and the university administration to solve the existing problems of the educational institutions.

IRAN

New Ambassador to Greece Appointed

92AS0060C Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL
in English 23 Sep 91 p 1

[Text] Tehran, 23 September (IRNA)—Mohammad-Qasem Moheb-Ali was named as the new ambassador of Islamic Republic of Iran to Greece, by the president Monday.

Mohebi Ali, who will replace Habibollah Biazar Shirazi, has handled several senior posts.

He was head of the fifth political department of the Foreign Ministry, director general for the Middle East and North Africa, and advisor to the deputy foreign minister for Arab-African affairs.

Members of 'Freedom Movement' Repent Past Deeds

92AS0015A Tehran ABRAR in English 19 Sep 91 p 12

[Quotation marks as published]

[Text] Tehran—Four members of the "Freedom Movement" and so-called "Society for Defense of Freedom" in an interview in Evin prison said their actions were contrary to the interests of the country, especially during the Iraqi imposed war, and repented for their past actions.

The full interview of the four, namely "Bani Asadi," "Tavasoli," "Davaran," and "Abedi," is given below:

Bani Asadi, member of the "Freedom Movement" initially said that the publications of the movement which were written in harsh tones against the Islamic Republic system had angered the nation and given the enemies an opportunity for mischief. He added: "The movement in his publications intended to interfere in the war and since these interferences were used by the enemies due to their wrong stances it would have been better if the movement had submitted its stances about the war secretly to the authorities."

He stressed that this move of the movement was undesirable and added that the movement's leaders should apologize to the nation. About the relations of the movement with other opposition members, Bani Asadi said, "Madani twice sent messages that he is ready to collaborate. In the congress of the year 1987 the letter of Heshmatollah Maqsudi was read. In this letter to the secretary-general of the Freedom Movement Maqsudi stated that there is no freedom in the Islamic Republic and expressed praise for the Freedom Movement. It is interesting that many of those who had participated in that congress didn't even know Maqsudi." He said such persons by sending messages expressed desire to cooperate with the movement.

Tavasoli, another member of the Freedom Movement first critically analyzed the principles of the Freedom Movement and its performance and said, "The first problem of the movement is the special idea that Mehdi Bazargan had about freedom. He used to say that the main problem of the country is dictatorship or despotism, and as long as freedom is not guaranteed no problem of the country will be solved."

Tavasoli said that the colonialist countries infiltrate into the Third World countries with complex methods, adding that the result of such idea of freedom is nothing but slavery. He said, "Pakistan has such freedoms, but practically that country is in the hands of the big powers."

In continuation of analysis of the activities of the Freedom Movement he referred to its moves during the Iraqi imposed war on Iran and said, "The positions and publications that the movement and the Society for Defense of Freedom published during the war led the enemies to take advantage of them. The publications of the movement, which started from 1985, were initially given to the enemies to be used as propaganda against the system. For instance the publication 'Israeli interference in the Iran-Iraq War' which was published under special and critical conditions had said that Iran receives weapons from Israel and South Africa. I believe this was treason because at that time this led to the intensification of Arab propaganda against the Islamic Republic of Iran."

Tavasoli stressed, "In these publications certain expressions were used which tortured the heart of the lovers of the late Imam Khomeini and Islamic combatants. In fact the publications during the war weakened the people's morale."

He said the letter written by 190 members of the movement to the President was among such acts of the movement. In this letter only negative aspects were mentioned and problems were magnified, while if we intended to enjoin good and forbid evil we should have mentioned all the positive and negative aspects. Instead of having a positive effect, this letter only served the propaganda of the enemies.

In continuation he referred to the trip of U.N. human rights representative Galindo Pohl to Tehran, and said, "When Galindo Pohl was at the house of Bazargan and Dr. Yazdi was also present from the Freedom Movement, I explained my illegal arrest, and this issue also became a source for propaganda, and even those who had no religious or cultural enmity with us utilized this issue."

Concerning the disqualification of Bazargan in the 1985 presidential elections and its repercussions, Tavasoli said, "This issue led the associates and friends of Bazargan to form the 'Society for Defense of Freedom.' The charter of the society stated that those who intend to become members of the society should officially recognize the revolution, the system and the constitution. But this is not what happened in practice. For instance persons like 'Shahshahani' and 'Abedi' who had travelled abroad contacted opposition forces and when faced with the protest of the movement, they said it is only a personal trip."

He continued, "The movement did not succeed in acting within the framework of its charter and principles and when the members of the movement became associated with persons who in the framework of defense of freedom believed in neither the system, nor the revolution, the constitution, cultural, native or Islamic beliefs, consequently they sacrificed their intellectual and religious beliefs to the issue of so-called freedom."

Elaborating he said. "During the fasting month of Ramadhan in a meeting tea was served and no respect was shown for fasting persons. I walked out of the meeting in protest."

Referring to the lack of a constant program in the charter of the movement for achieving organization, Tavasoli said, "Since the publications of the movement practically could not be published inside the country, they were sent abroad and were used by foreign radios, for instance the stances and views of the movement in the war, where in the midst of the war it demanded its stoppage." He said this belief went so far within the movement that the publications which were brought from outside the country, were attacked and were then eliminated or moderated with the intervention of Bazargan.

In conclusion, Tavasoli said "After the year 1988 I decided to separate myself from the members of the Society and the Movement. I brought this up in the political office, but unfortunately they bypassed this issue and after that I severed my relations. But due to the emotional connection I had, I became practically and unintentionally involved in the acts of the movement. The activities of the movement were not in the framework of its program and I have a duty to sever my relations with it and to express repentance from what has happened and ask forgiveness from God."

Davaran, member of the council of the Freedom Movement in this interview said concerning his activities, "I was a member in all three movement councils, and although my activities were in this framework, I realize that some of the activities of the Movement and the Society were against the interests of the country. Of course I did not agree with those in the Movement who did such acts, but it should be admitted that collective action will lead to collective consequences. I consider I am at fault and I beseech God to give me an opportunity to compensate for this damage."

Abedi, member of the council of the so-called Society for Defense of Freedom and National Sovereignty of Iran, said that he is ready to express his current stances towards the performance of the Society according to his understanding and interpretation so that he can live the rest of his natural life with a free conscience. He said, "In prison, where the material inclinations were cut off and I became alone with my conscience, I concluded that I should evaluate the past to compensate for any mistakes."

He added, "During these past few years I was led astray. The stances adopted by the movement led to contradictions with the Islamic Republic and the movement acquired a negative aspect among the people."

Abedi continued, "The Society started its activities in 1985. At that time when the greatest foreign pressures were applied on Iran, the Society in its publications mainly used to mention the failures and domestic economic difficulties."

He stressed that the wrong positions of the Society were reflected in its publications, were approved and glorified by the opponents of the regime outside the country to the extent that the enemies hardened their stance vis-a-vis Iran.

Abedi said, "Our stances indicated that we ourselves are among the opponents of the regime, while this itself was detrimental to the Islamic Republic."

In conclusion he said that unfortunately in the past in some private circles he had said expressions "polluted with sin," and added, "I repent and hope that I will be forgiven."

Health Minister Concerned About Population Growth

92AS0060B Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL
in English 24 Sep 91 p 2

[Text] Khorramabad (Lorestan) (IRNA)—Health Minister Dr. Reza Maleksadeh on Sunday warned of the dangers of the country's rapidly growing population.

However, Malekzadeh said the growth rate of population has dropped from 3.9 percent in 1986 to 2.85 percent according to a report released by the Civil Status Registration Organization.

"But birth control and population growth in our country have not yet reached a desired level," Malekzadeh told reporters. He called for the elimination of some social privileges that will encourage an increase in the number of births.

The health minister also referred to his ministry's readiness to employ Iranian experts living abroad who have a clear political background.

He also said some 400 people have been diagnosed as being positive carriers of the AIDS virus in Iran, and most of them were afflicted with the deadly disease through transfusion of contaminated blood derivatives.

Iran is immune, to a larger extent than other countries, from the spread of AIDS mainly due to its commitment to religious laws and ethical values, health minister said.

He, however, called for education of people to protect themselves from the killer disease, as an effective means of fighting AIDS.

Testing arriving passengers and quarantining those tested positive are among measures being studied by the health ministry to prevent the spread of AIDS, he said.

Heavy Industry Policies Beginning To Pay Dividends

92AS0060A Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL
in English 23 Sep 91 p 1

[Text] RASHT (Gilan), 22 September (IRNA)—A total of 31 newly designed engineering units were set up

during the first five months of the current Iranian calendar year (started 21 March), a seven-fold increase as compared to the corresponding period in the preceding year.

Heavy industries Minister Hadi Nejad-Husseinian told heads of industrial units in this Caspian province Sunday, that manufacture of machinery and equipment showed a marked increase over the past two years in Iran following changes in the government's economic policies.

As an example, he cited the manufacture of a loader, and said such projects will receive increased support from the government.

The minister asked industrialists to step up exports of their products to help bring in hard currencies "since petro-dollars cannot meet all the hard currency needs of the country."

He said this year \$350m in hard currency has been earmarked for the industrial sector compared to the \$290m last year.

According to Husseinian, production of automobiles, buses, minibuses and road-building machinery had a rise of 3.83 percent, 5 percent, 6.2 percent and 14.5 percent respectively this year compared to the year before.

For about five years, he said, factories worked at 30 percent capacities, and more time is needed to make up for the 70 percent deficits.

However, applications for investment have been pouring in, and the total amount over the past two years is more than rials 400b said the minister.

This equals the whole activities of the Heavy Industries Ministry from 1983 up to 1989 and shows the trust of the producers and consumers, he added.

First Phase of Khameneh Textile Mill Operational

92AS0116J Tehran KEYHAN-E HAVA'I in Persian
11 Sep 91 p 10

[Boldface words as published]

[Text] 10 Shahrivar, 1 September. Operation of the largest and most advanced textile factory in the country began in Khameneh.

Simultaneous with Government Week, the first phase of the Khameneh textile factory was set into operation in the presence of Ayatollah Malakuti, the representative of Vali-ye Faqih in Azarbaijan; the deputy minister of industries; the Friday imam; the governor; the representative of the people of Shabestar to the Majles; and a group of officials of the province.

Since starting production, eight tons of thread are produced daily.

In order to install and operate this factory, one of the most advanced in the Middle East, the estimated cost is 10 billion rials. To date 4 billion rials have been spent.

With the full operation of the Khameneh textile factory, 8.5 million meters of fabric will be produced annually. In addition to the domestic market, a portion of it will be exported.

This factory, with 7,300 general shareholders and an initial capital of 750 million rials, was built on a 60-hectare plot of land with 30,700 meters under construction, and currently employs 200 people.

With the full operation of this factory, which is supposed to be ready by 1372 [21 March 1993-20 March 1994], 750 people will be employed there. This factory was installed and put into operation with the cooperation of Iranian and German specialists.

Editorial on Need for Better Education Policy

92AS0060D Tehran KAYHAN INTERNATIONAL
in English 24 Sep 91 p 2

[Text] Nowadays there is much talk about the spiraling inflation as the Iranian public's No 1 issue. But there is one other problem that can easily top inflation, in terms of its long run impact on people's lives, and that is education.

Nothing can guarantee the survival of the Islamic Republic and provide long run service to the people here in Iran as much as a correctly founded educational system. Due to the changes that were imposed on the inherited educational system after the Revolution's victory the content of the education is still evolving and has yet to grow to attain its final form and what is expected of it.

Before a discussion of its content, education in the overpopulated Tehran is bogged down by the question of (educational) space, or lack of it. The reasons for this shortage is obvious: rapid population growth and a more rapid growth in the number of people electing to live in urban centers.

As far as the capital city, Tehran, as the biggest concentration of population in Iran is concerned, the number of schools come nowhere near accommodating the large and growing number of students. That is why those in charge of education have begun to juggle with the number of school hours adding to the shifts, several in one day.

Parents are grumbling that school time is becoming shorter and shorter and kids are not spending as much time at schools as they should be. What the educational system in this country needs is a comprehensive plan that deals with the question of space first and then with that of content.

To deal with the space shortage the government must rely on a campaign similar to what was used in relations

to the construction of mosques. Mosques throughout Iran acted, and they still do, as one of the basic pillars of the Islamic governance system, so when the government felt their number was not up to what was needed it encouraged both the private and public sectors to contribute to the removal of its shortage in any fashion they could.

As for its content, school kids, who form the adults of tomorrow, should be taught at an early age to develop respect for social values and the rules of living in an urban center. They should also learn that what is public actually belongs to them and maybe more so than what is at their homes. Teaching simple things can go a long way toward alleviating some costly social problems. Every year the government incurs dozens of millions of dollars in correcting problems caused by vandals with no or little education.

Education should also try to install in kids the foundations of a work ethic, respect and desire for quality work. School kids should learn that hard work, and not quick fixes, are the way to attaining goals.

Now, if education can insure the success and survival of the Islamic Republic then those (teachers) who administer it should be viewed with respect and provided with the basic securities and means of life. Teachers should be given the minimum stance no teacher who packs the basics and constantly worries can install in kids a feeling of security, continuity and hope in the future. [sentence as published]

One more thing. With the law allowing for the establishment of private ("non-profit") schools, the government should take care that education like a lot of other things would not become a monopoly of the rich.

SRI LANKA

'Tigers' of Tamil Eelam Show Their Hands

92P40017A Colombo THINAKARAN in Tamil
25 Sep 91 p 5

[Editorial: "Tigers Explain Their Situation"]

[Text] The LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam] sent an "open letter" to the Sinhala people from London on Monday night. It made abundantly clear exactly where the Tigers stand in the current power struggle as reflected in the effort to impeach President Ranasinghe Premadasa.

They requested their Sinhala "brothers and sisters" to "join in the struggle against a regime that in the name of

democracy has been ruthless in denying every democratic right to the peoples that it seeks to rule." They further called upon "all the progressive forces in the Tamil and Sinhala nations to join in the fight to dismantle a fascist and chauvinist regime. The Tiger thinking is clear. By a curious coincidence, the LTTE's "open letter" arrived at a time when the UNP [United National Party] dissidents, particularly, have begun to change gears and focus their campaign on the question of sharing arms with the LTTE instead of their previous concern on the desirability of a Westminster form of parliamentary democracy over the existing executive presidential system. It is not necessary to go into the arms sharing question here. The Defense Ministry has issued a statement explaining its position. The people of this country are well aware of the negotiations with the LTTE during which both Colombo and the Liberation Tigers attempted to oust the IPKF [Indian Peace Keeping Force].

That was the time when the Tamil National Army [TNA] was being created. Just as some of the Tamil groups, which are fighting the LTTE alongside the Sri Lankan security forces today, have been armed by the Sri Lankan State, it is no secret that the forces also shared arms with the LTTE then.

On hindsight this might suggest that the 14-month long negotiations with the LTTE and various other arrangements made during that period was a mistake. But it must not be forgotten that the withdrawal of the IPKF occurred during that period. While one monster—the LTTE—survived, the TNA did not.

If the LTTE had been given anti-aircraft guns at that time, as has been alleged, would the Tigers not have used them before Elephant Pass? Even at Elephant Pass, they did not seem to have any great anti-aircraft capability.

While the LTTE has shown its hand vis-a-vis the current political crisis by means of its open letter, Mr. Lalith Athulathmudali has gone on record saying that TAMIL TIMES editor P. Rajanayagam had pledged that the LTTE would support President Premadasa "to the very end," and that Tamil MPs [members of Parliament] who supported the impeachment motion would be punished. Rajanayagam has been unequivocal in his denial and called the former minister's statement a complete lie. He has said neither the TAMIL TIMES nor he belonged to the LTTE. Perhaps the former minister would offer an explanation about what Mr. Rajanayagam has said. Whether he does or not, it would be of little consequence now that the LTTE has spoken up for itself and has made it very clear they would like to see President Premadasa out of power.

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